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THE CONFORMITY OF THE 
GOODS TO THE CONTRACT IN 
INTERNATIONAL SALES+ 
Villy de Luca* 
ABSTRACT 
The present article aims to provide a general overview on 
the issue of conformity of the goods to the contract as regulated 
by Article 35 of the Convention on Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sales of Goods (“CISG”).  
The analysis will focus on Article 35 CISG and, after hav-
ing retraced the history that led to the current formulation of 
the provision, will concentrate on the implications following the 
adoption of a “unitary” notion of conformity. The evaluation 
will proceed focusing on the single express and implied con-
formity obligations covered, respectively, in the first and se-
cond paragraphs of Article 35 CISG.  
The discussion will then delve into the cases of exclusion of 
liability. After having considered the exemptions falling under 
Article 35(3) CISG, the two cases of failure to give notice pro-
vided by Article 39 CISG will be addressed.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The issue of conformity of the goods to the contract has al-
ways played a central role in both national and international 
sales transactions as it goes to the very essence of the contrac-
tual relationship. Indeed, the underlying reason pushing any 
buyer to conclude a sales contract is the will to receive a specif-
ic product in return for a given price; the contract is nothing 
more than the means of regulating all the aspects of this trans-
action. Given the importance of guaranteeing the correspond-
ence between the characteristics described in the contract and 
the final product, legal systems worldwide have always laid 
down provisions establishing when goods are deemed to be in 
conformity to the contract. Notwithstanding this widespread 
diffusion, the issue of conformity has not received a uniform 
regulation as the different national legislators have adopted 
their own approach to the concept. What followed is that when 
parties concluded an international sales transaction, the rules 
regulating the conformity of the goods to the contract neces-
sarily differed according to the chosen applicable law.  
The need to achieve uniformity in the field of conformity 
became pressing with the development of a global market econ-
omy. The process of globalization, a phenomenon which pushes 
toward the creation of a single common world market, boosted 
to a great extent international transactions and, inevitably, 
forced national regulators to re-think and re-arrange the basic 
categories underlying the contract. A globalized economy in 
which parties to the contract come from different legal back-
grounds called for a uniform and easily accessible law specifi-
cally designed to address the peculiarities of such transactions. 
Willing to provide economic operators with a law capable of 
overcoming national boundaries, described as being the “mer-
chants’ worst enemy,”1 national regulators decided to intervene 
                                                            
1 See Franco Ferrari, Specific Topics of the CISG in the Light of Judicial 
Application and Scholarly Writing, 15 J.L. & COM. 4 (1995). On this point see 
also Francesco Galgano, Il diritto uniforme e la vendita internazionale [The 
Uniform Law and the International Sales], in ATLANTE DI DIRITTO PRIVATO 
3
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by adopting the legal instrument which is best capable of pur-
suing uniformity: international conventions.  
The intention to create an internationally uniform disci-
pline designed to “transcend national borders in order to max-
imize the utilization of resources"2 pushed the International 
Institute for the Unification of Private Law (“UNIDROIT”) to 
undertake an extensive study on the field of sales law. Such ef-
forts led to the adoption in 1964 of the Uniform Law on the In-
ternational Sale of Goods (hereafter “ULIS”) and the Uniform 
Law on the Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods (hereafter “ULF”). In spite of the limited success of these 
first attempts,3 the United Nations Commission on Interna-
tional Trade Law (hereafter “UNCITRAL”) decided to continue 
on the same path and to revise the two conventions. When it 
became evident that a substantial modification was needed, 
UNCITRAL decided to incorporate the revisions in a new set of 
rules. The result was what has been defined as being the “most 
successful international document so far” in the field of sales 
law:4 the 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods (hereafter “CISG”).  
Of the many issues addressed in the CISG, the one which 
has received the greatest amount of attention by both Courts 
and Scholars is certainly article 35, regulating the conformity 
of the goods to the contract. While on the one side this exten-
sive bibliography has guaranteed a detailed analysis of all the 
terms and phrases of the provision, on the other, it has created 
some confusion on some of its most delicate aspects. The pre-
sent discussion will concentrate on analyzing the single provi-
                                                                                                                                     
COMPARATO [Atlas of Comparative Private Law] 211 (Francesco Galgano & 
Franco Ferrari eds. 1993) (affirming that “an obstacle to economic relation-
ships which constantly increases among citizens of different countries; an ob-
stacle above all for the enterprises that are involved in international com-
merce and that acquire primary resources or distribute goods in different 
countries which all have different law.”) 
2 Daniela Memmo, Il contratto di vendita internazionale nel diritto uni-
forme [The International Sale Contract in Uniform Law], 37 RIVISTA 
TRIMESTRALE DI DIRITTO E PROCEDURA CIVILE [Riv. Trim. Dir. Proc. Civ.] 181 
(1983) (It.). 
3 Only 9 countries adopted the Conventions. 
4 BRUNO ZELLER, CISG AND THE UNIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
LAW 94 (2007). 
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sions regulating the conformity of the goods to the contract 
with a twofold intent: provide a clear and practical guide 
through this mare magnum of sources and ascertain whether 
article 35 has contributed to the process of achieving uniformi-
ty in international trade.  
In the first chapter, the discussion will focus on the single 
express and implied conformity obligations covered, respective-
ly, in the first and second paragraphs of art. 35. After having 
presented a detailed scrutiny of the conformity issue as regu-
lated under the CISG, the analysis will then proceed to present 
those cases in which the seller will not be held liable even 
where it delivered non-conforming goods.  
 In a purely methodological key, it must be underlined 
that the analysis will always start from the history behind the 
provision and, where possible, will present opinions of both 
courts and scholars coming from the most diverse legal back-
grounds. Considering the international nature of the CISG, 
terms and phrases will always be attributed their own “proper” 
meaning so to avoid the tendency of interpreting foreign legal 
concepts in light of national categories.  
2. CONFORMITY OF THE GOODS TO THE CONTRACT IN LIGHT OF 
ARTICLE 35 CISG 
 The CISG is divided into four distinct parts regulating, 
respectively, the sphere of application and other general provi-
sions (Part I), the formation of the contract (Part II), the sale of 
goods (Part III) and, ultimately, the final provisions (Part. IV). 
The structure of the CISG is one of the main features, which 
distinguishes it from the preceding international conventions. 
Indeed, the former Hague conventions regulated the formation 
of the contract in the Uniform Law on the Formation of Con-
tracts for the International Sale of Goods and the substantive 
issues in the Convention relating to a Uniform Law on the In-
ternational Sale of Goods. Drafters of the CISG decided to elim-
inate this strict partition and inserted both sets of rules in the 
second and third part of the Convention.5 
The third part, which regulates the substantive issues re-
                                                            
5 See PETER SCHLECHTRIEM & PETRA BUTLER, UN LAW ON INTERNATIONAL 
SALES – THE UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 2 (2009). 
5
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lated to the sale of goods, is then again sub-divided into 5 chap-
ters and is characterized by the adoption of a “horizontal” 
structure which combines the obligations of one party with the 
remedies of the other party: the obligations of the seller (chap-
ter II) are followed by the remedies of the buyer in case of the 
seller’s breach of contract and then again the obligations of the 
buyer (chapter III) are followed by the remedies for the seller.6   
 Within the second chapter dedicated to the obligations of 
the seller, the rules regulating the conformity of the goods to 
the contract are contained in the second section entitled, “Con-
formity of the goods and third party claims.” Amongst the ten 
provisions contained in this section, the one which specifically 
sets out when goods are deemed to conform with the contract is 
article 35.7 
Art. 35 CISG is certainly one of the Convention’s most suc-
cessful provisions and, as will be demonstrated below, has been 
reproduced by legislators worldwide when reforming the rules 
regulating the issue of conformity. Before proceeding with the 
analysis of the individual paragraphs, it is, however, first and 
foremost important to briefly concentrate on the legislative his-
                                                            
6 Id. 
7 United Nations Convention on Contracts for International Sale of 
Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 97/18 art. 35 [hereinafter CISG]. Art. 
35 reads as follows:  
(1) The seller must deliver goods which are of the quantity, quality and 
description required by the contract and which are contained or pack-
aged in the manner required by the contract. 
(2) Except where the parties have agreed otherwise, the goods do not 
conform with the contract unless they: 
a. are fit for the purposes for which goods of the same description would 
ordinarily be used; 
b. are fit for any particular purpose expressly or impliedly made known 
to the seller at the time of the conclusion of the contract, except where 
the circumstances show that the buyer did not rely, or that it was un-
reasonable for him to rely, on the seller's skill and judgment; 
c. possess the qualities of goods which the seller has held out to the 
buyer as a sample or model; 
d. are contained or packaged in the manner usual for such goods or, 
where there is no such manner, in a manner adequate to preserve and 
protect the goods. 
(3) The seller is not liable under subparagraphs (a) to (d) of the preced-
ing paragraph for any lack of conformity of the goods if at the time of 
the conclusion of the contract the buyer knew or could not have been 
unaware of such lack of conformity. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss1/4
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tory of this provision as it will provide the necessary insight on 
the reasons which led to the adoption of the current structure 
and wording.  
2.1 History of the provision 
 Article 35 finds its roots8 in the Uniform Law on the In-
ternational Sale of Goods, specifically in articles 339 and 36.10 
                                                            
8 See Commentary on the Draft Convention on Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods, art. 33, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.95/7 (March 14, 1979), avail-
able at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/sales/cisg/a-conf-97-19-ocred-
e.pdf. Some commentators, when recalling the direct antecedents of Art. 35 
CISG, also mention Art. 19(1) ULIS which reads as follows: “Delivery consists 
in the handing over of goods which conform with the contract.” See e.g., C. 
MASSIMO BIANCA & MICHAEL JOACHIM BONELL, COMMENTARY ON THE 
INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: THE 1980 VIENNA SALES CONVENTION 269 (1987). 
The author of the present article does not deny that ULIS art. 19(1) imposes 
a duty to deliver conforming goods. However, art. 19(1) is the result of a dis-
tinction that has been abandoned by the drafters of the CISG. In this respect, 
it must be noted that while the ULIS considered the delivery of non-
conforming goods as a breach of the delivery obligation, the CISG distin-
guishes clearly the failure to deliver the goods from the failure to deliver con-
forming goods. As art. 19(1) considers the seller liable for not having complied 
with his delivery obligations in the case of non-conformity of the goods, and 
since such category is now encompassed within the unique notion of defective 
performance, Art. 35 CISG does not find its roots in the article. On the adop-
tion of a unique notion of non-conforming delivery, see infra Part 2.2.  
9 The Hague Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the International 
Sale of Goods, 1 July 1964, 834 U.N.T.S. 107 (1972) art. 33 [hereinafter 
ULIS]. 
Art. 33 ULIS: 
The seller shall not have fulfilled his obligation to deliver the goods 
where he has handed over: 
a. part of the goods sold or a larger or a smaller quantity of the goods 
than he contracted to sell; 
b. goods which are not those to which the contract relates or goods of a 
different kind; 
c. goods which lack the qualities of a sample or model which the seller 
has handed over or sent to the buyer, unless the seller has submitted it 
without any express or implied undertaking that the goods would con-
form therewith; 
d. goods which do not possess the qualities necessary for their ordinary 
or commercial use; 
e. goods which do not possess the qualities for some particular purpose 
expressly or impliedly contemplated by the contract; 
f. in general, goods which do not possess the qualities and characteris-
tics expressly or impliedly contemplated by the contract. 
No difference in quantity, lack of part of the goods or absence of any 
7
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The changes brought about by the drafters of the CISG have 
not been of a fundamental nature; however, a comparison of 
the two conventions11 shows that article 35 CISG has a simpler 
and more comprehensive structure.12  
 The first difference, easily perceptible even at a first 
glance, is the approach used to address the conformity issues. 
As a matter of fact, Article 33 ULIS lists six cases in which the 
seller has not fulfilled his obligations to deliver goods in con-
formity to the contract. Article 35 CISG, on the contrary, de-
fines the content of the seller’s obligation in a positive way by 
underlining the conditions that have to be respected in order 
for the goods to be deemed as conforming.13  
 Proceeding with the textual match-up of the different 
provisions, a second difference can be noted in respect to the 
rule regarding the exclusion of liability. While in the ULIS this 
aspect was regulated in article 36, and thus kept separate from 
the issues regarding non-conforming delivery, within the CISG 
this aspect was integrated in the third paragraph of Article 35 
to achieve a more comprehensive structure. On the exclusion of 
liability it is necessary to underline that the CISG not only re-
allocated, but also extended the scope of the provision.14 While 
the text of the ULIS did not provide for an exclusion of liability 
in the case of sale by sample or model, Article 35(3) recalls this 
hypothesis, thus guaranteeing a more homogeneous regulation. 
 A third textual difference is the distinction between ma-
terial and immaterial non-conforming delivery. The second 
paragraph of Article 33(2) ULIS excludes the seller’s liability 
                                                                                                                                     
quality or characteristic shall be taken into consideration where it is 
not material. 
10 Id. art. 36 states:  
The seller shall not be liable for the consequences of any lack of con-
formity of the kind referred to in sub-paragraph (d), (e), or (f) of para-
graph 1 of Article 33, if at the time of the conclusion of the contract the 
buyer knew, or could not have been unaware of, such lack of conformity. 
11 Match-up of CISG Article 35 with ULIS Art. 33 and 36, INST. OF INT’L 
COMMERCIAL LAW, http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/matchup/matchup-
u-35.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2014).  
12 PETER SCHLECHTRIEM & INGEBORG SCHWENZER, COMMENTARY ON THE 
UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 569 (Ingeborg 
Schwenzer ed., 3d ed. 2010). 
13 See BIANCA & BONELL, supra note 8, at 269. 
14 SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, supra note 12, at 569. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss1/4
4. VILLY DE LUCA.DOCXX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/29/15  5:18 PM 
2015] CONFORMITY OF GOODS TO THE CONTRACT 171 
when the difference in quantity, the lack of part of the goods or 
the absence of any quality or characteristic is not material. 
This provision refers to those circumstances in which the seller 
delivered non-conforming goods, but the difference between 
what was delivered and what should have been delivered is so 
irrelevant that it may not be considered as breaching the con-
tract.15 The rationale behind Article 33(2) ULIS was to avoid 
pointless litigation and to dissuade buyers from acting in bad 
faith.16 In spite of the noble intentions that inspired the draft-
ers of the ULIS, the Officers participating to the Conference on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods17 ultimately de-
cided to exclude this provision from the Convention.18 Even 
though some countries were still in favor of including such a 
rule in article 35 CISG,19 the majority found it unjustified.20 It 
                                                            
15 Recalling the words of Andrè Tunc, author of the official commentary 
to the ULIS text, the concept of immaterial non-conformity “is not to be con-
fused with the distinction between fundamental and non-fundamental breach 
of the contract. It contemplates a case of non-fundamental breach which is so 
slight as not to be considered as a breach and therefore not entitling the buy-
er to any remedy.” See Andrè Tunc, Commentary on the Hague Conventions of 
the 1st of July 1964 on International Sale of Goods and the Formation of the 
Contract of Sale, http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/tunc.html (last up-
dated Apr. 30, 1998). 
16 Id. 
17 To briefly clarify the road which led to the adoption of the CISG it 
must be noted that in 1966 the General Assembly of the UN constituted the 
“United Nations Commission on International Trade law” “(UNCITRAL”). In 
1968 the Commission established the “Working Group” on International Sale 
of Goods instructing it to ascertain whether the Uniform Laws could be modi-
fied so as to render them capable of wider acceptance by countries of different 
legal, social and economic systems. It was in 1977 that the working group ap-
proved the text of a draft Convention, which was then presented to the Com-
mission. The Commission reviewed the text and presented the draft Conven-
tion on Contracts for International Sale of Goods to the UN General 
Assembly. The General Assembly convened the United Nations Conference 
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods to consider the draft Conven-
tion prepared by the UNCITRAL and to embody the results of its work in an 
international convention. The United Nations Convention on Contracts for 
the International Sale of Goods (Vienna, 1980) was finally adopted on 10 
April 1980. For a detailed history on the adoption of the CISG see 
UNCITRAL, at 21, para. 40, U.N. Sales No. E.86.V.8 (1973), available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/publications/sales_publications/UNCITRAL-e.pdf. 
18 See UNCITRAL, [1973] Y.B. Vol. IV 64, para. 43, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.9/SER.A/1973, available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/ 
yearbooks/yb-1973-e/1973_e.pdf.  
19 During the 15th meeting of the First committee held on the 20th of 
March 1980, the CISG’s Working Group discussed the Australian amend-
9
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was argued that: 
First, there was the uncertainty of the test of "insignificant." De-
pending on findings of ‘insignificant’ non-conformity, the provi-
sion might deprive the buyer of his right to remedies for breach. 
Second, a breach, however insignificant, was nevertheless a 
breach for which the seller should be liable, and the buyer should 
not be denied his right to available remedies.21 
 Finally, the last relevant difference that may be noted 
when comparing the CISG with the ULIS is the addition of the 
packaging duty. Article 35(2)(d) of the CISG imposes on the 
seller an obligation to deliver goods packaged or contained in 
the “manner usual for such goods” or, in any case, in a way 
which guarantees the preservation and protection of the goods. 
While no corresponding provision can be found in the ULIS, 
this provision is not new to the common law tradition, as a sim-
ilar rule may be found in section 2 – 314 of the United States 
Uniform Commercial Code.22  
 Going beyond a mere textual comparison of the present 
                                                                                                                                     
ment (A/CONF.97/C.1/L.74) which proposed to add a new paragraph reading 
as follows: " No difference in quantity, quality, description or packaging is.to 
be taken into consideration if it is clearly insignificant". The Australian dele-
gate, Mrs. Kamarul, “explained that her proposal, which was based on art. 3, 
paragraph 2 ULIS was intended as a precaution,” and then added that even if 
“[s]ome delegations might regard it as superfluous…the matter was of con-
cern to her delegation since the Australian courts had made it clear that they 
were inclined to be strict when there was a question of conformity between 
the goods delivered and the contract.” The proposal was supported by the 
Egyptian and the Italian delegates. See 1980 Vienna Diplomatic Conference 
Summary Records of Meetings of the First Committee 15th Meeting, Institute 
of International Commercial Law, para. 89-100 (Mar. 20, 1980, 10 a.m.), 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/link36.html.  
20 The amendment was put to the vote during the 15th Meeting of the 
First Committee and was finally rejected 27 votes to 9. See United Nations 
Conference on Contracts for International Sale of Goods, Documents of the 
Conference and Summary Records of the Plenary Meetings and of the Meet-
ings of the Main Committees, 104, para. 6, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/19 (Mar. 10-
Apr. 11 1980), available at www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/sales/cisg/a-conf-97-
19-ocred-e.pdf. 
21 These were the words used by the Japanese delegate, Mr. Michida, 
when intervening during the 15th Meeting of the First Committee. See 1980 
Vienna Diplomatic Conference Summary Records of Meetings of the First 
Committee 15th Meeting, supra note 19, at para. 92. 
22 Section 2 – 314 para. 2(e) expressly recalls that “Goods to be mer-
chantable must be at least such as…(e) are adequately contained, packaged, 
and labeled as the agreement may require.” See U.C.C. § 2 –314 (1977). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss1/4
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and past conformity provisions, the main difference between 
article 35 CISG and the corresponding ULIS provisions may be 
found in the dogmatic classification of non-conformity.23 To ful-
ly comprehend the innovation brought about by the 1980 Vien-
na Convention, a clarification on the conceptual difference be-
tween failure to deliver and defective delivery is necessary.  
2.2 The unitary notion of non-conformity under the CISG 
 Chapter III, Section I of the ULIS entitled “Delivery of 
the Goods” opened with article 19 ULIS, which defines delivery 
as the handing over of the goods, which conform to the con-
tract. It follows that under the ULIS the seller’s failure to de-
liver conforming goods amounts to a breach of the delivery ob-
ligations.24 The drafters of the CISG, however, have abandoned 
this approach.  
 The 1980 Vienna Convention distinguishes clearly the is-
sue of delivery from the one of conformity.25 Under articles 31–
34 CISG, the seller has fulfilled its delivery obligations by 
handing over or placing at the buyer’s disposal “goods which 
meet the general description of the contract even though th[e] 
goods do not conform in respect of quantity and quality.”26 Only 
once the goods have been delivered, the buyer has a duty to in-
spect the goods27 and eventually notify28 the seller whenever 
                                                            
23 See SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, supra note 12, at 569.  
24 See Commentary on the Draft Convention on Contracts for the Inter-
national Sale of Goods, supra note 8, at para. 2. 
25 This distinction is emphasized by the structure adopted in the CISG. 
Part II, Section II entitled “Obligations of the seller” separates the provisions 
regarding the delivery of the goods from the ones regulating the conformity of 
the goods to the contract. While the former are contained within the first sec-
tion entitled “Delivery of goods and handing over of the documents” the latter 
may be found within section II dedicated to the Conformity of the Goods and 
third party claims.” 
26 See BIANCA & BONELL, supra note 8, at 269. 
27 CISG, supra note 7, art. 38.  Art. 38 CISG:  
The buyer must examine the goods, or cause them to be examined, 
within as short a period as is practicable in the circumstances. 
 If the contract involves carriage of the goods, examination may be de-
ferred until after the goods have arrived at their destination. 
If the goods are redirected in transit or redispatched by the buyer with-
out a reasonable opportunity for examination by him and at the time of 
the conclusion of the contract the seller knew or ought to have known of 
the possibility of such redirection or redispatch, examination may be 
11
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the product received breaches the conformity requirements set 
by Article 35 CISG. This clear distinction between failure to de-
liver goods and failure to deliver conforming goods has deep 
consequences when it comes to the remedies available to the 
buyer. Indeed, in case of lack of conformity, the buyer may re-
sort solely to those remedies provided for non-conforming de-
livery, while it will never allow the buyer to invoke the provi-
sions regarding failure to deliver the goods.29 
 This distinction may be found when dealing with avoid-
ance of the contract as provided by Article 49. Under the CISG, 
the contract may be avoided in two distinct circumstances: 
when the seller fundamentally breaches the contract by failing 
to comply with one of its contractual duties or when the seller 
fails to deliver goods within the additional time period fixed by 
the buyer.30 It follows that, while in the case of non-conforming 
delivery the buyer will have to prove the fundamental nature of 
the breach, when the goods have not been delivered the buyer 
is entitled to avoid the contract “without having to determine 
whether the total delay actually has reached 'fundamental' 
proportions.”31 The sole notice of avoidance will therefore, suf-
fice to untie the contractual relationship32 only in the case of 
                                                                                                                                     
deferred until after the goods have arrived at the new destination. 
28 Id. art. 39. Art. 39 CISG states: 
The buyer loses the right to rely on a lack of conformity of the goods if 
he does not give notice to the seller specifying the nature of the lack of 
conformity within a reasonable time after he has discovered it or ought 
to have discovered it. 
In any event, the buyer loses the right to rely on a lack of conformity of 
the goods if he does not give the seller notice thereof at the latest within a 
period of two years from the date on which the goods were actually 
handed over to the buyer, unless this time-limit is inconsistent with a 
contractual period of guarantee. 
29 SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, supra note 12, at 569; Commentary on 
the Draft Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, supra 
note 8, at para. 2. 
30 See Harry M. Flechtner, Remedies Under the New International Sales 
Convention: The Perspective from Article 2 of the U.C.C., 8 J.L. & COM. 53 
(1988). 
31 See JOSHEPH LOOKOFSKY, The 1980 United Nations Convention on Con-
tracts for the International Sale of Goods, in 29 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF LAWS, CONTRACTS 120 (J. Herbots & R. Blanpain eds. 2000).  
32 JOHN O. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALE UNDER THE 
1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 313 (3rd ed. 1999). 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss1/4
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non-delivery.33 
 The CISG has, therefore, adopted a unitary notion of de-
fective performance: any difference between what the parties 
have contracted for and what the seller has delivered falls 
within the concept of lack of conformity.34 This approach not 
only distinguishes the CISG from its predecessor, the ULIS, 
but also represents an innovation when compared to many na-
tional legal systems. Indeed, most domestic sales law contain 
subtle distinctions when it comes to non-conforming delivery.35 
                                                            
33 This interpretation is consistent with the intentions of the drafters 
made clear during the travaux préparatoires of the CISG. On this point see 
HONNOLD, supra note 32, at 314, “In UNCITRAL and at the Diplomatic Con-
ference proposals were made to extend the notice-avoidance procedure to cas-
es where the seller delivers goods that fail to conform to the contract. 
UNCITRAL rejected these proposals on the ground that the notice-avoidance 
procedure could be abused to convert a trivial breach into a ground for avoid-
ance. For instance, a buyer who wishes to escape from his contractual obliga-
tions—e.g., after a price-collapse—might notify the seller that it has a speci-
fied time to correct specified minor defects in the goods although the distance 
separating the parties makes it impractical for the seller to comply with the 
notice. This understanding of the decisions taken by UNCITRAL was con-
firmed at the Diplomatic Conference by the rejection of proposals to broaden 
the scope of notice-avoidance to include non-conformity; in addition, to avoid 
any possible misunderstanding, the Diplomatic Conference added the words 
"in case of non-delivery" at the beginning of the notice-avoidance provision in 
Article 49(1)(b).” 
34 On the unitary notion of lack of conformity Cf. Marino Bin, La non con-
formità dei beni nella convenzione di Vienna sulla vendita internazionale 
[Lack of Conformity of the Goods Under the CISG], 44 RIVISTA TRIMESTRALE DI 
DIRITTO E PROCEDURA CIVILE 755 (1990) (It.); Patricia Orejudo Prieto de los 
Mozos, Funcion y alcance de la Lex Mercatoria en la conformidad material de 
las mercanciàs [“Conformity of the Goods” as Regulated by the CISG and the 
UNIDROIT Principles], 5 ANUARIO ESPAÑOL DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 
PRIVADO para. II(1)(A) (2005) (Sp.), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/ 
cisg/biblio/orejudo.html#*; Teija Poikela, Conformity of Goods in the 1980 
United Nations Convention of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 1 
NORDIC J. COM. L. para. 4.1.1 (2003), available at 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/poikela.html. 
35 Just to cite a few of them, starting from the United States, the Uniform 
Commercial Code distinguishes between express and implied warranties. 
U.C.C. §§ 2-313, 2-314 (1977). The English sales law differentiates between 
conditions and warranties. Sale of Goods Act, 1979, c. 54, §§ 14, 15 (U.K.) In 
the French legal system there is a distinction between vice caché and vice ap-
parent. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] arts. 1641, 1642. The Italian Codice Civile consid-
ers separately the delivery of a different good (so called aliud pro alio) from 
the delivery of a defective good. Codice civile 16 marzo 1942, ns. 1490, 1497. 
Finally, under the Swiss law judges must distinguish the ordinary character-
istics of the goods (so-called Sacheigenschaft) from the special characteristics 
13
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The CISG, on the contrary, unifies hidden defects, lack of qual-
ity and delivery of different goods under the umbrella of non-
conforming delivery thus providing the same remedies regard-
less of the specific circumstance.36 It has been argued,37 that 
this approach better responds to the needs of international 
traders. Accordingly, this classification not only simplifies the 
situation by setting a clear line between proper performance of 
the contract and defective performance, but also avoids com-
plex distinctions within the category of non-conforming deliv-
ery. 
2.3 Allocating responsibility under article 35 CISG: caveat 
emptor or caveat venditor? 
The issue of non-conformity has always been common to all 
legal systems. Still, there are different ways in which it has 
been addressed. Ernst Rabel, one of the founding fathers of the 
modern international sales of goods law,38 in his Das Recht des 
Warenkaufs39 analyzed different sales law and reached the 
conclusion that there were differing views as to who must bear 
the responsibility for the defectiveness of the goods. One ap-
proach, based on the Roman law principle tale quale according 
to which the goods are “bought as seen”, considers that, since 
the buyer has selected the goods, it must bear the responsibil-
ity of the lack of conformity. This principle was commonly re-
ferred to as “caveat emptor” (i.e. “let the buyer beware”) and 
was certainly reasonable in a market economy based on the di-
rect exchange of goods between seller and buyer. Since the end 
of the 19th century, however, many sales laws40 have adopted a 
                                                                                                                                     
warranted by the seller (so called Zusicherrung). OBLIGATIONENRECHT 
[OR][Civil Code] Mar. 30, 1911, SR 220, RS 220, art. 197. Cf. Sannini Ilaria, 
L’applicazione della Convenzione di Vienna sulla vendita internazionale negli 
Stati Uniti, Op. Cit., 229 No. 698; SCHLECHTRIEM & BUTLER, supra note 5, at 
113; SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, supra note 12, at 570. 
36 See Cesare Massimo Bianca, ‘Consegna di Aliud pro alio e decadenza 
dai rimedi per omessa denunzia nella direttiva 1999/44/EC’ (2001) 1 Contrat-
to e Impresa/Europa, 16. 
37 See BIANCA & BONELL, supra note 8, at 271. 
38 For a brief biography of Professor Rabel, see Prof. Dr. Ernst Rabel – 
Curriculum Vitae, GLOBAL SALES LAW, http://www.globalsaleslaw.org/index.cf 
m?pageID=649.  
39 ERNST RABEL, DAS RECHT DES WARENKAUFS (1957). 
40 Cf. ULRICH KRÜGER, MODIFIZIERTE ERFOLGSHAFTUNG IM UN-
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss1/4
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more buyer friendly approach, providing for the seller’s liability 
in case of non-conforming goods. The diffusion of this so called 
caveat venditor principle (i.e. “let the seller beware”), is justi-
fied by the need to provide economic operators a set of rules 
which better suits the structure of international trade. Indeed, 
in an international transaction the buyer hardly will have had 
the chance to personally choose and inspect all the goods before 
the conclusion of the contract. It would therefore, be unreason-
able for the buyer to bear the risk of the defective goods given 
that they clearly fall outside its sphere of influence.  
There is no need to attentively analyze the individual par-
agraphs of art. 35 to understand that the Convention, in line 
with the most modern sales laws, is based on the assumption 
that the seller is liable in case of defective goods. Applying old 
categories to modern legal instruments, it may well be affirmed 
that the drafters of the CISG opted for the caveat venditor 
principle.41 This, however, is not an absolute truth but rather 
just a starting point. As a matter of fact, if the concrete circum-
stances modify the premises of the argument, the responsibility 
for the non-conforming goods may well shift to the buyer.  Sup-
pose, for example, that the buyer, an experienced firm in the 
trade, has sent an employee to inspect a sample of the goods 
and then has ordered goods “as per sample”. If the final goods 
perfectly conform to the sample but are not fit to be used for 
the intended purpose, the seller may not be found liable for the 
alleged defect.  In those circumstances it was the buyer who 
had a greater influence on the characteristics of the goods (per-
sonally chose the goods) compared to the seller (merely deliv-
ered the goods chosen by the buyer) and therefore it must bear 
the responsibility in case the final product does not conform to 
what was expected.  
Stating that the CISG, in toto, adopted the caveat venditor 
principle is therefore, incorrect. No one denies that article 35 
                                                                                                                                     
KAUFRECHT: DIE HAFTUNGSBEFREIUNG BEI LIEFERUNG VERTRAGSWIGRIGER 
WARE GEMAESS ART. 79 CISG, 25 (1997). 
41 See LOOKOFSKY, supra note 31, at 90 (recognizing that, “As under most 
modern domestic rule-sets, so too under the CISG: caveat emptor ('let the 
buyer beware') is no longer the supplementary rule, because today's interna-
tional buyer is entitled to expect the goods to possess certain basic qualities, 
even if the contract does not expressly so state. Indeed, it would seem that 
caveat venditor has become the supplementary CISG rule.”) 
15
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CISG is based on the assumption that the seller bears the risk 
of defective goods; this assumption, however, may be contra-
dicted if the facts of the case show that the buyer’s influence on 
the goods is greater than the seller’s one. In conclusion, it may 
be affirmed that, “Article 35 […] [is] a rule in which the princi-
ples of caveat emptor and caveat venditor meet”42 and, accord-
ing to the specific circumstances, the responsibility will be allo-
cated to the party, which is more closely linked to the disputed 
factors. 
2.4 Autonomous and uniform interpretation under article 7 
CISG: rejecting a “homeward trend” and promoting uniformity 
 Article 35 CISG provides a defined set of rules that apply 
to the issues regarding conformity of the goods to the contract. 
A uniform law, however, does not guarantee a uniform applica-
tion of the given set of rules. Indeed, before being enacted, eve-
ry law has to be interpreted and this creates a risk related to 
the manner the interpreter will approach the legal provision.43 
The problem of interpretation is inherently related to any legal 
system, but the risk of diverging conclusions increases when 
dealing with international conventions, as these are constantly 
used by legal practitioners having different legal back-
grounds.44 It follows, that in order to understand how the pro-
                                                            
42 René Franz Henschel, Conformity of Goods in International Sales Gov-
erned by CISG Article 35: Caveat Venditor, Caveat Emptor and Contract Law 
as Background Law and as a Competing Set of Rules, 1 NORDIC J. COM. L. 4 
(2004), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/henschel2.html. 
43 See R.J.C. Munday, The Uniform Interpretation of International Con-
ventions, 27 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 450, 450 (1978) (affirming that “[t]he princi-
pal objective of an international convention is to achieve uniformity of legal 
rules within the various States party to it. However, even when outward uni-
formity is achieved [...], uniform application of the agreed rules is by no 
means guaranteed, as in practice different countries almost inevitably come 
to put different interpretations upon the same enacted words.”). 
44 On this point, see Franco Ferrari, Uniform Interpretation of the 1980 
Uniform Sales Law, 24 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 183, 198 (stating, “Of course, 
interpretive problems can arise in relation to national legal systems as well, 
but such problems are much more prevalent when it comes to the determina-
tion of the precise meaning of a law which, like the 1980 Vienna Sales Con-
vention, has been drafted on an international level.”) See also Giuseppe 
Benedetti in Cesare Massimo Bianca, Convenzione di Vienna sui contratti di 
vendita internazionale di beni mobili (CEDAM, Padova, 1989 – 1992), 9, rec-
ognizing the difficulties related to the interpretation of a convention which 
"does not constitute an exhaustive source of its subject, but regulates only 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss1/4
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vision will be applied, one must have clear in mind the rules 
regulating its interpretation. In order to avoid the dangers of 
inconsistent interpretation and prevent any misunderstanding, 
it is necessary, at the outset, to briefly present the method, 
which has to be followed when analyzing the provision. 
There are two opposing views as to the way the interpreter 
must proceed when dealing with international conventions.45 
On the one hand, it is believed that they must be interpreted in 
light of the interpretative techniques of the country in which 
they will be applied.46 According to the opposing view, instead, 
the interpreter must approach the conventions autonomously47 
leaving aside any national category, which would not only en-
danger the uniform application, but also lead towards episodes 
of forum shopping.48 Aware of the risks related to the interpre-
tation, drafters of the CISG introduced a rule regulating it.  
 Article 7(1) CISG49 is an innovation for which there is no 
corresponding provision in the ULIS.50 It sets three guidelines 
for interpreting the CISG: the first one is the international 
                                                                                                                                     
certain issues of it excluding others” and which "does not want to identify it-
self with any legal system, because it wants to conjugate with all." 
45 Cf. Ferrari, supra note 44, at 198. 
46 Cf. Sergio Carbone, L’ambito di applicazione ed i criteri interpretativi 
della convenzione di Vienna, in LA VENDITA INTERNAZIONALE: LA CONVENZIONE 
DI VIENNA DELL'11 APRILE 1980: ATTI DEL CONVEGNO DI STUDI DI S. MARGHERITA 
LIGURE (26-28 SETTEMBRE 1980) 63, 84 (1981) (stating “in virtue of national 
proceedings, the conventions transform themselves into domestic law and 
therefore their interpretation and integration must take place according to 
the interpretive techniques . . . of the domestic system in which they are 
transplanted and will be applied.”) 
47 Cf. BERNARD AUDIT, LA VENTE INTERNATIONALE DE MARCHANDISES: 
CONVENTION DES NATIONS-UNIES DU 11 AVRIL 1980, at 47 (1990). 
48 See HONNOLD, supra note 32, at 142 (stating that "[t]he settlement of 
disputes would be complicated and litigants would be encouraged to engage 
in forum shopping if the courts of different countries persist in divergent in-
terpretations of the Convention.") 
49 Art. 7 CISG: 
In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to its inter-
national character and to the need to promote uniformity in its applica-
tion and the observance of good faith in international trade.  
Questions concerning matters governed by this Convention which are 
not expressly settled in it are to be settled in conformity with the gen-
eral principles on which it is based or, in the absence of such principles, 
in conformity with the law applicable by virtue of the rules of private 
international law. 
50 Cf. Ferrari, supra note 44, at 199. 
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character of the text, the second is the need to promote uni-
formity and, finally, the third is the observance of good faith in 
international trade.51 By imposing a duty to interpret the Con-
vention having regard to its “international character”, the 
drafters of the CISG opted for an autonomous interpretation. It 
follows that when approaching the legal provisions reported 
therein; the interpreter must leave behind any national pre-
conception and assign the meaning that results from the struc-
ture, the underlying principles and the drafting history of the 
CISG itself.52 Words and phrases, therefore, should not be in-
terpreted in light of domestic law even when they correspond to 
a particular concept present in a given legal system.53 
The choice to opt for an “autonomous” interpretation is 
consistent with the goal of promoting uniformity in interna-
tional trade.54 Indeed, if every party to the Convention were to 
                                                            
51 Cf. PETER HUBER & ALASTAIR MULLIS, THE CISG: A NEW TEXTBOOK FOR 
STUDENTS AND PRACTITIONERS 7 (2007). 
52 Cf. id. 
53 See Franco Ferrari, Have the Dragons of Uniform Sales Law Been 
Tamed? Ruminations on the CISG’s Autonomous Interpretation by Courts, in 
SHARING INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW ACROSS NATIONAL BOUNDARIES: 
FESTSCHRIFT FOR ALBERT H. KRITZER ON THE OCCASION OF HIS EIGHTIETH 
BIRTHDAY 140 (Camilla Andersen & Ulrich Schroeter eds. 2008) (stating that 
“one should not have recourse to any domestic concept […] to solve interpre-
tive problems arising from the CISG, as difficult as this may be. Many com-
mentators have argued that what has just been said is true even where the 
expressions employed by the CISG (but this is generally true for any uniform 
law convention) are textually the same as expressions which within a par-
ticular legal system have a specific meaning -- such as "avoidance", "reasona-
ble", "good faith", "trade usages", etc. In effect, these expressions as well have 
to be considered to be independent and different from the domestic con-
cepts.”) 
54 It is noteworthy to underline that achieving uniformity in internation-
al trade is not only the objective of the CISG, but is the far reaching goal pur-
sued by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL). This is supported by the UN’s Resolution establishing the 
UNCITRAL which expressly recognizes that “The Commission shall further 
the progressive harmonization and unification of the law of international 
trade by […] (c) Preparing or promoting the adoption of new international 
conventions, model laws and uniform laws and promoting the codification 
and wider acceptance of international trade terms, provisions, customs and 
practices, in collaboration, where appropriate, with the organizations operat-
ing in this field; (d) Promoting ways and means of ensuring a uniform inter-
pretation and application of international conventions and uniform laws in 
the field of the law of international trade”. See UN - General Assembly reso-
lution 2205 (XXI) of 17 December 1966, Establishment of the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law, available at http://www.jus.uio.no/ 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss1/4
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enforce the provisions according to a “nationalistic” interpreta-
tion, the CISG would result in nothing more than a uniform set 
of rules applied inconsistently55 and this would deprive the 
“signatories of the predictability and reliability of law which 
the CISG was meant to create”.56 
Interpreting the provisions autonomously may avoid the 
dangers of “homeward trend”,57 but does not alone suffice to 
guarantee a uniform interpretation of the CISG worldwide.58  
To achieve consistency it is necessary that all interpreters, 
regardless of their legal background, assign similar meanings 
to the same words and phrases when “autonomously” interpret-
ing the CISG. Drafters of the CISG were well aware of this and 
therefore, introduced a second guideline calls on the interpreter 
to have regard to the need to promote uniformity in its applica-
tion. One method to attain this kind of uniformity is resorting 
to the so-called “global jurisconsultorium.”59 This concept calls 
for a truly international approach in which the interpreter 
                                                                                                                                     
lm/uncitral.2205-xxi/doc.html#3 [accessed 19 September 2011]. 
55 As correctly noted by Viscount Simonds in Scruttons Ltd. v. Midland 
Silicones Ltd., [1962] A.C. 446 (H.L.) 4 (expounding that inconsistent inter-
pretation should be avoided as “it would be deplorable if the nations should, 
after protracted negotiations, reach agreement [...] and that their several 
courts should then disagree as to the meaning of what they appeared to agree 
upon.”) 
56 Marcus G. Larson, Applying Uniform Sales Law to International Soft-
ware Transactions: The Use of the CISG, its Shortcomings, and a Compara-
tive Look at How the Proposed U.C.C. Article 2B Would Remedy Them, 5 TUL. 
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 445, 459 (1997). 
57 See Harry Flechtner & Joseph Lookofsky, Nominating Manfred 
Forberich: The Worst CISG Decision in 25 Years? 9 VINDOBONA J. INT’L COM. 
L. & ARB. 199, 202 (2005) (defining the concept of “homeward trend” as the 
“tendency of those interpreting the CISG to project the domestic law in which 
the interpreter was trained (and with which he or she is likely most familiar) 
onto the international provisions of the Convention.”) 
58 In SO. M. AGRI s.a.s di Ardina Alessandro & C. v. Erzeugerorganisa-
tion Marchfeldgemüse GmbH & Co. KG, Tribunale di Padova, No.40552, 25 
Feb. 2004, available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cases/040225i3.html 
[last visited 19 September 2011] it has been clearly stated that “the mere au-
tonomous interpretation of [CISG] – [i.e. an] interpretation that does not re-
fer to the meaning attributed to specific expressions by a particular national 
regulation – is by itself inadequate to assure the uniformity to which [CISG] 
aims in order to promote the development of international trade.” 
59 See CAMILLA BAASCH ANDERSEN, FRANCESCO G. MAZZOTTA, & BRUNO 
ZELLER, A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO THE CISG 1 (2010), available at 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/andersen-mazzotta-zeller.html. 
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must rely on international scholarly materials and practice of 
other contracting States.60 Judges and arbitrators, therefore, 
should conform to the findings of foreign judicial bodies when 
they have solved similar or analogous questions.61 To aid legal 
practitioners in this hard task, since 198862 UNCITRAL has 
adopted a reporting system according to which national corre-
spondents submit to the UNCITRAL Secretariat decisions ap-
plying the different UNCITRAL instruments. With the goal of 
promoting uniform interpretation and application of the texts, 
decisions are then made available in the six UN languages in 
both hard copy and on the internet.63 This “official” initiative, 
together with the other valuable unofficial ones64, has been es-
                                                            
60 Cf. CAMILLA BAASCH ANDERSEN, UNIFORM APPLICATION OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: UNDERSTANDING UNIFORMITY, THE GLOBAL 
JURISCONSULTORIUM AND EXAMINATION AND NOTIFICATION PROVISIONS OF THE 
CISG 47 (2007); HERBERT BERNSTEIN & JOSEPH LOOKOFSKY, UNDERSTANDING 
THE CISG IN EUROPE 32 (2002). 
61 See Dietrich Maskow, The Convention on the International Sale of 
Goods from the Perspective of the Socialist Countries, in LA VENDITA 
INTERNAZIONALE: LA CONVENZIONE DI VIENNA DELL’ 11 APRILE 1980 39, 54 
(1981). On this point, see also Albert H. Kritzer, The Convention on Contracts 
for the International Sale of Goods: Scope, Interpretation and Resources, in 
CORNELL REVIEW OF THE CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL 
SALE OF GOODS 147, 155 (1995). 
62 On the adoption of this system of reporting, see Rep. of the U.N. 
Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, 21st Sess., Apr. 11-20, 1988, U.N. Doc. A/43/17 
(1988), reprinted in [1988] UNCITRAL Y.B. XIX – U.N. Sales No. E.89.V.8, 
para. 98 - 109, available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/yearbooks/yb-
1988-e/yb_1988_e.pdf (affirming “[i]nformation on the application and inter-
pretation of the international text would help to further the desired uniformi-
ty in application and would be of general informational use to judges, arbitra-
tors, lawyers and parties to business transactions.”) 
63 Abstracts of the decisions are available free of charge on the “Case Law 
on UNCITRAL Texts” (CLOUT) which “a system for collecting and dissemi-
nating information on court decisions and arbitral awards relating to Con-
ventions and Model Laws that have emanated from the work of the Commis-
sion […] The purpose of the system is to promote international awareness of 
such legal texts elaborated or adopted by the Commission, to enable judges, 
arbitrators, lawyers, parties to commercial transactions and other interested 
persons to take decisions and awards relating to those texts into account in 
dealing with matters within their responsibilities and to promote the uniform 
interpretation and application of those texts.” For more information on the 
CLOUT system see UNCITRAL, Case Law on UNCITRAL Texts (CLOUT) 
(2010, No. A/CN.9/SER.C/GUIDE/1/Rev.2), available at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V10/547/96/PDF/V1054796.pdf?OpenElement. 
64 Of the many, the main ones are certainly the “Albert H. Kritzer – 
CISG Database” created by the Pace University Institute of International 
Commercial Law, available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/ and the 
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss1/4
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sential for the process of uniform application of the CISG.65 
In the present dissertation, Article 35 CISG will be ana-
lyzed consistently with the underlying interpretation principles 
of the 1980 Vienna Convention. To this extent, terms and 
phrases will be given a proper “CISG-meaning” detached from 
any national preconception or category; moreover, case law of 
the contracting States will often be invoked to explain concepts 
or support a thesis.  
2.5 Conformity of the goods under CISG Article 35 
Article 35 is the sole provision within the CISG that regu-
lates the seller’s obligation to deliver goods in conformity to the 
contract. The provision has a threefold function: it states the 
seller’s general obligation to deliver conforming goods, sets the 
criteria by which the goods are deemed to conform to the con-
tract and, finally, provides for an exception to the seller’s liabil-
ity.66 
The conformity provision is divided in three distinct para-
graphs. Article 35(1) of the CISG deals with the “express” con-
formity obligation and imposes upon the seller the duty to de-
liver goods of the quantity, quality, and description and 
                                                                                                                                     
“UNILEX” database created by the Centre for Comparative and Foreign Law 
Studies of Rome, available at http://www.unilex.info/. 
65 Several cases show that judges are well aware and use these instru-
ments when having to deal with cases regulated by the CISG. See for exam-
ple, Al Palazzo S.r.l v. Bernardaud di Limoges S.A, Tribunale di Rimini, No. 
3095, 26 November 2002, available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cases/021 
126i3.html (stating “there are many worthwhile publications that help to re-
duce interpretative differences, namely data bases that collect and edit inter-
national case law. See, for example, http://www.unilex.info); See also, Chicago 
Prime Packers, Inc., v. Northam Food Trading Co., 408 F.3d 894 (7th Cir. 
2005), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/050523u1.html (where it 
is affirmed that the “Court relie[d] upon the detailed abstracts of those deci-
sions provided by UNILEX, an “intelligent database” of international case 
law on the CISG. All of the abstracts cited therein are available at 
unilex.info.”) 
66 Many commentators to the CISG define Art. 35 as a rule defining the 
conformity obligation. It is the author’s opinion, however, it is necessary to be 
more precise. Art. 35 differentiates between the duty to deliver conforming 
goods and the criteria, which determine a conforming delivery. On this (in-
deed subtle) distinction Compare, See BIANCA & BONELL, supra note 8, at 268, 
(affirming that “Article 35 states that the seller must deliver goods conform-
ing to the contract (conformity principle) and lays down the conformity crite-
ria.”) 
21
4. VILLY DE LUCA.DOCXX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/29/15  5:18 PM 
184 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol.  XXVII::1 
packaged in the way provided by the contract. Article 35(2) sets 
four “implied” conformity obligations, which apply only if not 
otherwise agreed. Lastly, article 35(3) regulates the conditions 
for the exclusion of the seller’s liability in the case of non-
conforming delivery.  
2.5.1  Article 35(1) CISG: the express conformity obligations 
When it comes to determining whether the seller has com-
plied with its conformity obligations, Article 35(1) places pri-
mary importance on the agreement of the parties as expressed 
in the contract. Borrowing the words used in the Secretariat 
Commentary, “[T]his provision recognizes that the overriding 
source for the standard of conformity is the contract between 
the parties.”67 Indeed, Article 35 rejects an “objective” notion of 
conformity and opts, as have other domestic legal systems,68 for 
the concept of “subjective” defect.69 Goods are deemed to be 
conforming not when they meet abstract and objective stand-
ards, but rather when they correspond to the concrete descrip-
tion contained in the contractual agreement.70 The highlight 
placed on the will of the parties is yet another example of the 
CISG’s fundamental principle according to which the primary 
source of rules governing international sales is the agreement 
                                                            
67 Secretariat Commentary on article 33 of the 1978 Draft (draft counter-
part of CISG article 35), para. 4. 
68 The reference is to the German, French and Swiss legal systems, which 
adopt a similar “subjective” approach to the conformity obligations. See also, 
P. Schlechtriem, Schuldrecht, Besonder Teil (Mohr siebeck, Tübingen, 2003), 
para. 33; Ben Abderrahmane, ‘La Conformitè des Merchandise dans la Con-
vention du 11 Avril 1980 sur le Contrats de Vente Internationale de Merchan-
dises’, DROIT ET PRATIQUE DU COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL/INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
LAW AND PRACTICE (Paris) 15 (1981) 551; H. Honsell, Schweizerisches Obliga-
tionenrecht – Besonder Teil (Stämpfli Verlag, Bern, 2006), 74. 
69 See SCHLECHTRIEM & BUTLER, supra note 5, at 11, 113(recognizing that 
“The conformity of the goods with the contract is not determined objectively 
but depends first and foremost on the “subjective” description of the goods in 
the contract.”) 
70 See R. HYLAND in SCHLECTRIEM P. (ed.), Conformity of Goods to the 
Contract Under United Nations Sales Conventions and the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, EINHEITLICHES KAUFRECHT UND NATIONALES OBLIGATIONENRECHT, 
319 (Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1987), (affirming that according to a subjective 
notion of defect “goods are defective when they do not possess the characteris-
tics the parties assumed they possessed at the moment the contract was con-
cluded.”) 
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of the parties.71 
Given the central role played by the contract, whenever the 
contractual provisions are unclear, serious doubts arise as to 
the extent of the conformity obligations. In those circumstanc-
es, in order to ascertain the characteristics the parties have 
agreed upon, the contract must be interpreted72 using the cri-
teria set by Article 8 CISG.73 To this extent, one must look at 
the intent of the party who made the statement so long as the 
other party knew or could not have been unaware of what the 
intent was or, if not applicable, in light of the understanding 
that a reasonable person would have had in the same circum-
stances.74 
The conformity obligations, however, are not limited solely 
to what the contract expressly reports; the seller must also 
comply with the implied contractual requirements.75 Implied 
requirements may arise, for example, from practices estab-
                                                            
71 See LOOKOFSKY, supra note 31, at 89; On the central nature of this 
principle see UNCITRAL, ‘UNCITRAL Digest of case law on the United Na-
tions Convention on the International Sale of Goods – Article 6, para. 2 (2004, 
No. A/CN.9/SER.C/DIGEST/CISG/6), available at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V04/547/50/PDF/V0454750.pdf?OpenElement 
[accessed 19 September 2011].  
72 Cf. HUBER and MULLIS, supra note 51, at 131. 
73 Art. 8 CISG: 
For the purposes of this Convention statements made by and other con-
duct of a party are to be interpreted according to his intent where the 
other party knew or could not have been unaware what that intent was. 
If the preceding paragraph is not applicable, statements made by and 
other conduct of a party are to be interpreted according to the under-
standing that a reasonable person of the same kind as the other party 
would have had in the same circumstances. 
In determining the intent of a party or the understanding a reasonable 
person would have had, due consideration is to be given to all relevant 
circumstances of the case including the negotiations, any practices 
which the parties have established between themselves, usages and any 
subsequent conduct of the parties. 
74 For the sake of clarity it is noteworthy to underline that even though 
the wording of Art. 8 CISG only refers to the “statements” and “conduct” of a 
party, it is commonly accepted that the rules presented therein also apply to 
the interpretation of the contract. See R. Brand, F. Ferrari & H. M. Flechtner, 
The Draft Uncitral Digest And Beyond - Cases, Analysis And Unresolved Is-
sues in the U.N. Sales Convention (Sellier European Law Publishers, 2003), 
175; P. Huber, ‘Some introductory remarks on the CISG’ (2006) 6 Interna-
tionales Handelsrecht, 235. 
75 See SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, supra note 12, at 571. 
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lished between the contracting parties or from a trade usage 
the parties were aware of and which is widely known in the 
trade industry.76 Even if the contract is silent, the seller has 
the duty to comply with these implied requirements in order to 
fulfill the conformity obligations. The importance of the implied 
conformity obligations was emphasized by a leading Austrian 
case decided in February 2003. The dispute dealt with the de-
livery of frozen fish and the Austrian Supreme Court recog-
nized that, regardless of the contractual provisions, “where […] 
international business customs with respect to certain charac-
teristics exist, these must be presented as a minimum of quali-
ty.”.77 
Implied conformity obligations, which are binding for the 
seller, should not be confused with statements made by the 
parties during preliminary negotiations.78 Under Article 35(1), 
conformity obligations arise solely from what is (either express-
ly or impliedly) provided within the contract. What is left out-
side of the contract has not been agreed between the parties 
and, therefore, may not be considered as a source of legal obli-
gations; however, not directly binding, negotiations are funda-
mental when it comes to the interpretation of the contractual 
provisions. Indeed, in recalling the circumstances, which have 
to be kept in mind when determining both the intent of the 
parties or the understanding of a reasonable person, Article 
8(3) expressly refers to the negotiations. It follows that state-
ments and conduct during the pre-contractual phase will not 
per se create legal obligations but will aid the interpreter to 
better understand the extent of the latter. 
When addressing the seller’s obligations under Article 
                                                            
76 Both circumstances are provided by the Convention itself under Art. 9 
which clearly affirms that : 
The parties are bound by any usage to which they have agreed and by 
any practices, which they have established between themselves. 
The parties are considered, unless otherwise agreed, to have impliedly 
made applicable to their contract or its formation a usage of which the 
parties knew or ought to have known and which in international trade 
is widely known to, and regularly observed by, parties to contracts of 
the type involved in the particular trade concerned. 
77 Oberster Gerichtshof, No. 2 Ob 48/02a, Austria, 27 February 2003, 
available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/030227a3.html [accessed 19 
September 2011]. 
78 See HYLAND, supra note 70, at 308. 
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35(1), it must be recalled that liability arises if there is a fail-
ure to provide goods in respect of the following four criteria: 
quantity, quality, description and packaging.  
2.5.1.1  Contractual quantity 
The delivery of an amount of goods, which differs from the 
contractually agreed quantity constitutes a breach of the con-
formity obligations. The general rule imposes upon the seller a 
duty to deliver the exact quantity of goods stipulated in the 
contract;79 any discrepancy, regardless of the significance, al-
lows the buyer to invoke the remedies provided for non-
conforming delivery.80 Regardless of the general rule, the con-
tract may well provide for the seller to deliver goods falling 
“around” a given quantity. As the standard for conforming de-
livery is set by the contract, the seller may not be found liable if 
the amount of goods falls within the tolerated range.81 
When dealing with contractual quantity, Article 35(1) 
CISG does not distinguish between the delivery of more or less 
than the agreed amount of goods. Both circumstances consti-
tute a violation of the conformity obligations.82 What differs, 
                                                            
79 On the practical application of this principle, see, Oberlandesgericht 
Düsseldorf, No. 17 U 82/92, Germany, 8 January 1993, available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/930108g1.html [accessed 19 September 
2011] where the seller was found in principle liable under Art. 35(1) as it 
failed to deliver the exact amount of cucumbers. In the specific circumstance, 
however, the buyer lost the right to rely on such non-conformity as it failed to 
give a timely notice under Art. 39 CISG. 
80 See HUBER and MULLIS, supra note 51, at 131, fn. 469, drawing the fol-
lowing parallel “In English law, the courts have refused to allow buyers to 
take advantage of a merely “de minimis” variation […]. Whether the position 
would be the same under the Convention is open to doubt.” It, however, then 
adds “Unless there is a contractual term, previous course of dealing or trade 
usage allowing variation, it is suggested that any variation including those 
which are merely de minimis” amount to a breach of contract. 
81 See SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, supra note 12, at 569. 
82 For the sake of completeness it must be recalled that in a case regard-
ing the supply of electronic components, the Appellate Court of Paris (see  
Fauba France FDIS GC Electronique v. Fujitsu Microelectronik GmbH, Cour 
d’appel de Paris, No. 92-000 863, France, 22 April 1992, available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/920422f1.html [accessed 19 September 
2011]) found that the buyer was bound to retain the excessive goods as it 
should have immediately returned them to the seller rather than notifying 
the discrepancy. Notwithstanding the fact that the decision was confirmed by 
the French Supreme Court (see Cour de Cassation, No. 92-16.993, France, 4 
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however, are the remedies reserved to the buyer. If the seller 
has delivered less than what has been agreed83 the situation is 
regulated by Article 51 CISG.84 Under this provision, the buyer 
may, alternatively, fix an additional time period for delivery of 
the missing part,85 accept the non-conforming delivery con-
tracting a price reduction,86 declare the contract partially 
avoided with respect to the missing parts87 or, avoid the entire 
contract if the partial non-delivery constitutes a fundamental 
breach of the whole contract. In any case, the seller is entitled 
to damages arising from the partial delivery.88 
The delivery of an excessive quantity of goods, instead, 
falls under the scope of article 52,89 which provides that the 
                                                                                                                                     
January 1995, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/950104f1.html 
[accessed 19 September 2011]), this opinion is to be considered incorrect. For 
a more detailed criticism of the decision see Poikela, supra note 34, at para. 
5.1.1. 
83 It goes without saying that this circumstance solely applies to separa-
ble goods. When the contract provides for the delivery of a single good deliver-
ing “less” than the agreed quantity would entail a non-delivery situation. 
84 Art. 51 CISG: 
If the seller delivers only a part of the goods or if only a part of the 
goods delivered is in conformity with the contract, articles 46 to 50 ap-
ply in respect of the part which is missing or which does not conform. 
The buyer may declare the contract avoided in its entirety only if the 
failure to make delivery completely or in conformity with the contract 
amounts to a fundamental breach of the contract. 
85 Cf. M. Will in BIANCA and BONELL, supra note 8, at 378. 
86 Cf. HONNOLD, supra note 32, at 344. 
87 See Secretariat Commentary on article 47 of the 1978 Draft (draft 
counterpart of CISG article 51), para. 2, available at 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/secomm/secomm-51.html [accessed 19 
September 2011]. “This rule was necessary because in some legal systems a 
party cannot avoid only a part of the contract […] However, under article 
47(1) [draft counterpart of CISG article 51(1)] it is clear that under this Con-
vention the buyer is able to avoid a part of the contract if the criteria for 
avoidance are met as to that part.” 
88 See UNCITRAL, ‘UNCITRAL Digest of case law on the United Nations 
Convention on the International Sale of Goods – Article 51’ (2004, No. 
A/CN.9/SER.C/DIGEST/51), para. 5, available at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V04/553/20/PDF/V0455320.pdf?OpenElement 
[accessed 19 September 2011] stating that the buyer may in any case request 
damages as “this remedy remains unimpaired and can be exercised in addi-
tion to or instead of the remedies referred to in article 51 (1). Even if the buy-
er has lost its right to declare a part of the contract avoided because of lapse 
of time, it may still claim damages.” 
89 Art. 52 CISG: 
If the seller delivers the goods before the date fixed, the buyer may take 
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seller is entitled either to accept (all or part of) the excess goods 
or, on the contrary, refuse the excess quantity. Moreover, even 
though not expressly regulated within the provision, it is ac-
cepted that the whole contract may be avoided if the buyer is 
not able to reject the “extra” goods and the excessive delivery 
fundamentally breaches the sales contract.90 If, for some rea-
son, the buyer has to take the excess quantity of the goods, it 
may claim for any damages thereby suffered.91 
2.5.1.2  Contractual quality 
The second condition set by article 35(1) CISG upon the 
seller, is to deliver goods of the quality provided in the contract. 
The Convention does not set a threshold as to the allowed di-
vergence from the agreed standard; any variation, therefore, is 
to be considered a lack of conformity regardless of the conse-
quences on the usability or value of the goods.92  
The circumstances falling under the scope of this provision 
are the most diverse given the broad significance attributed to 
the word “quality”. Indeed, it is commonly accepted that the 
term must be interpreted widely93 so as to comprise not only 
the lack of physical conditions, but also “all factual and legal 
circumstances concerning the relationship of the goods to their 
                                                                                                                                     
delivery or refuse to take delivery. 
(2) If the seller delivers a quantity of goods greater than that provided 
for in the contract, the buyer may take delivery or refuse to take deliv-
ery of the excess quantity. If the buyer takes delivery of all or part of 
the excess quantity, he must pay for it at the contract rate. 
90 See United Nations Conference on Contracts for International Sale of 
Goods – Official Records (1980), Op. cit., 44, para. 9, reporting that “If it is 
not feasible for the buyer to reject only the excess amount, as where the seller 
tenders a single bill of lading covering the total shipment in exchange for 
payment for the entire shipment, the buyer may avoid the contract if the de-
livery of such an excess quantity constitutes a fundamental breach.” 
91 See UNCITRAL, ‘UNCITRAL Digest of case law on the United Nations 
Convention on the International Sale of Goods – Article 52’ (2004, No. 
A/CN.9/SER.C/DIGEST/CISG/52), para. 5, available at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V04/553/26/PDF/V0455326.pdf?OpenElement 
[accessed 19 September 2011]. 
92 See K. Maley, The Limits to the Conformity of Goods in the United Na-
tions Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 12 INT’L 
TRADE & BUS. L. REV. 104 (2009). 
93 See HUBER and MULLIS, supra note 51, at 132. 
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surroundings”.94 The most common situation is that the seller 
must deliver goods possessing the agreed physical characteris-
tics. One example is a French decision regarding the delivery of 
wine. The Cour de Cassation recognized that by delivering 
chaptalized95 wine that had then turned into vinegar, the sell-
er, “had not honored its contractual obligation to supply a wine 
conforming to the contract and of fair merchantable quality.”96 
Another simple yet illustrative case regards the delivery of 
steel bars. As the parties had agreed for a specific weight allow-
ing a +/- 5% variation, the delivery of bars falling outside this 
range was considered a breach of the contractual obligations in 
respect to quality.97  
Physical conditions are not the sole characteristics to be 
assessed. As already noted, due regard is to be given to all oth-
er factual and legal circumstances established between the par-
ties. Given the paramount role played by party autonomy, 
there are no limits to these situations as the parties are free to 
agree upon any non-physical characteristic.98  
Indeed, the contract may well provide for goods to origi-
nate from a specific location,99 to be produced respecting cer-
                                                            
94 SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, supra note 12, at 573. 
95 Chaptalization is the process of adding sugar to unfermented grape 
must in order to increase the alcohol content after fermentation. 
96 See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters], No. 
173 P/B 93-16.542, France, Jan. 23, 1996, available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/960123f1.html. 
97 See Madden v. Thyssen (Syria v. Ger.), No. 6653, Mar. 26, 1993 [ICC 
Int’l Ct. Arb.), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/936653i1.html. 
98 Kristian Maley, The Limits to the Conformity of Goods in the United 
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG), 
12 INT’L TRADE & BUS. L. REV. 82, 103 (2009) (citing RENÉ FRANZ HENSCHEL, 
THE CONFORMITY OF GOODS IN INTERNATIONAL SALES (2005), 162. Recalling the 
words of Prof. Henschel, “The starting point is that there are no limits to the 
contractual requirements which the parties may agree with respect to the 
goods, for example, that the goods may not be made by child workers, that 
the goods should be produced in an environmentally-friendly way ... that the 
goods should satisfy the special safety and environmental requirements of 
the buyer's country, etc. Only the imaginations of the parties and mandatory 
public law rules can set limits to what can be validly agreed.”) 
99 See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Apr. 3, 1996, 
No. VIII ZR 51/95, (Ger.), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cases/ 
960403g1.html. (Where the parties had agreed that the cobalt sulfate had to 
be of British origin and that the plaintiff should supply certificates of origin 
and of quality.). 
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tain ethical principles100 or to respect certain manufacturing 
standards in the production process. Were the seller to violate 
these provisions, the goods would be non-conforming.  
 Article 35(1) does not distinguish between the delivery of 
better or worse quality than the one agreed. Indeed, both cir-
cumstances constitute a breach of contract, which, if correctly 
notified ex article 39, allows the buyer to invoke the remedies, 
provided in articles 46 – 52. Contrary to the situation of defec-
tive quantity, there is no specific limitation to the remedies 
available to the buyer when goods are of non-conforming quali-
ty. 
2.5.1.3  Contractual description 
 The third situation addressed in article 35(1) CISG re-
gards the delivery of goods that do not correspond to the con-
tractual description. As is true of defective quality, this re-
quirement covers a wide range of events given that the concept 
of description has been broadly defined as, “the usual way 
through which the parties determine the content of their obli-
gation”.101  
When drafting the agreement, there are no limits to the 
way goods may be described. Indeed, parties may decide to re-
fer to the goods through express contractual provisions or, on 
the contrary, impliedly by referring to an external document 
that illustrates the goods and their qualities.102 Moreover, par-
ties have the possibility to determine the extent of the obliga-
tion as the contract may provide for the sale of either generic or 
specific goods. In the first event, the seller would be bound to 
deliver goods comprised within the described category. Where 
                                                            
100 See P. Schlechtriem, Non-Material Damages - Recovery under the 
CISG? 19 PACE INT’L L. REV. 89, 100 (2007), available at 
http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1061&context=pil
r (stating, “A prospective buyer […]can and should try to stipulate that cer-
tain standards of production have to be observed. Such standards then be-
come requirements of quality, i.e. conformity, under Article 35 (1) of the 
CISG. Goods produced in violation of these standards are non-conforming. 
The purchaser of rugs, for example, can demand to stipulate that the weavers 
should not be younger than sixteen and should work no more than forty-eight 
hours a week”.) 
101 See BIANCA & BONELL, supra note 8, at 273.  
102 An example often recalled is the reference to an advertisement or a 
brochure describing the goods. 
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the parties have instead contracted for a specific good, the con-
formity obligation is fulfilled only with the delivery of “the” 
good that has been agreed upon. 
When dealing with the extent of the contractual descrip-
tion, an issue that has been debated amongst scholars is 
whether the delivery of an aliud (i.e. goods of a different kind) 
is to be considered as falling under the scope of this provi-
sion.103 On the one side, it is argued that handing over goods 
that are totally different from what has been agreed should not 
be regarded as delivery of non-conforming goods but rather as 
failure to deliver.104 Supporters of this position recall the words 
of the Secretariat Commentary according to which “if the con-
tract calls for the delivery of corn, the seller has not delivered if 
he provides potatoes”.105 On the other side, the distinction be-
tween defective delivery and failure to deliver goods is firmly 
rejected.  
In light of this opposing view, the delivery of an aliud is to 
be regarded as a non-conforming delivery ex art. 35(1).106 
                                                            
103 Cf. HUBER and MULLIS, supra note 51, at 133.  
104 See BIANCA & BONELL, supra note 8, at 273. (Stating that there is a 
“necessity to draw a line between the delivery of the goods bargained for and 
the delivery of what is absolutely extraneous to the seller's obligation. Nei-
ther the text of the rule nor international trade […] support the extreme 
opinion which assumes that the seller has delivered the goods even when he 
has handed over goods which, according to common sense, are totally differ-
ent from the goods expected by the buyer”.). 
105 See Secretariat Commentary on article 29 of the 1978 Draft (draft 
counterpart of CISG article 31), para. 3, available at 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/secomm/secomm-31.html.  
106 See P. SCHLECHTRIEM, The Seller's Obligations Under the United Na-
tions Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods in 
INTERNATIONAL SALES: THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR 
THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS, 6-1, 6-12 (N. M. Galston & H. Smit eds.  
Matthew Bender, New York, 1984) (affirming that, “There is delivery even 
when goods entirely different from the ones ordered have been handed over 
[…] The view of the UNCITRAL Secretariat's Commentary that where some-
thing entirely different has been delivered there is not delivery within the 
meaning of Article 30 and following seems to me to be mistaken and even 
dangerous. The danger lies in the risk of transferring to the Convention a 
most unfortunate controversy from German legal science and practice, name-
ly, the question whether 'merely defective' goods (a "peius") have been deliv-
ered, or whether there is no delivery at all because an "aliud" has been hand-
ed over […] This situation should be avoided by assuming delivery whenever 
the goods handed over to the buyer or carrier have been selected for the pur-
pose of performing the sales contract in question.") 
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Notwithstanding the valuable arguments proposed by sup-
porters of both positions, the second opinion is preferable for 
two main reasons. Primarily, the choice to reject any distinc-
tion between delivery of non-conforming goods and failure to 
deliver is certainly more in line with the underlying principles 
of article 35. As discussed above,107 drafters of the CISG decid-
ed to opt for a unitary notion of non-conformity, which compris-
es under the same heading delivery of non-conforming goods 
and delivery of an aliud. Recalling the words of Prof. Audit:  
In the Vienna Convention, 'delivery' has been used for what it 
means in English: the handing over of the goods. ... Delivery is 
accomplished by the physical acts that the seller must perform in 
order to discharge his obligation, such as handing over the goods 
together with the necessary documents to a carrier. ... Conformi-
ty is regulated by a separate set of provisions.108 
 Secondly, the wording of article 35 calls for an inclusion 
of the delivery of an aliud. Indeed, if the delivery of goods of a 
different kind were not to be delivery of non-conforming goods, 
then a breach of article 35 would occur only when the seller 
handed over goods that correspond to the general contractual 
description but are missing some agreed qualities. That would 
render the concept of “description” a mere repetition of the 
“quality” notion, thus redundant and futile.  
In conclusion, both the drafting history and the wording of 
the CISG call for an extensive interpretation of the term “de-
scription” as to comprehend also the case of delivery of totally 
different goods.  
2.5.1.4  Packaging  
The issue of packaging is central in international trade as 
it affects directly the quality, usability and resaleability of the 
contracted products. Given the importance of a correct packag-
ing, article 35 CISG addresses this issue both in the express 
                                                            
107 See above at 0, “2.2 The unitary notion of non-conformity under the 
CISG.” 
108 B. Audit, The Vienna Sales Convention and the Lex Mercatoria, in 
LEX MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION: A DISCUSSION OF THE NEW LAW MERCHANT, 
173, 180 (T. E. Carbonneau ed., Transnational Juris Publications, Dobbs Fer-
ry, N.Y., 1990). 
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and implied conformity provisions.109 The consequence of this 
“double approach” is that, regardless of the specific situation, 
the seller must always comply with a specific set of rules when 
packing the goods. Indeed, either these rules are provided, ex 
article 35(1) CISG, directly in the contract or they derive from 
the general practices adopted in the market as provided by ar-
ticle 35(2)(d). Leaving aside, for the moment, the implied con-
formity obligation, under article 35(1), the seller is bound to de-
liver goods that are contained or packaged in the manner 
required by the contract. In light of this provision, therefore, 
the seller’s liability is strictly related to what the parties have 
agreed upon. It follows that to comply with the conformity obli-
gations it is not sufficient that the packaging occurs, “in a 
manner adequate to preserve and protect the goods”; it must be 
done in compliance with the contractual terms.110  
An illustrative case, which addressed the issue of defective 
packaging is the Polypropylene case decided under the CIETAC 
rules.111 The buyer ordered polypropylene specifying the follow-
ing: Packaging: 25 kilograms each bag, packed with one-layer 
brown paper lined with PE film; the packing shall be strong 
enough to be suitable for sea, land, and inland waterway 
transportation; and each 15 tons of the goods shall be loaded in 
a 1×20 foot container. When the buyer received the goods, how-
ever, it realized that the goods had been packed in a three layer 
brown paper and consequently filed a claim against the seller. 
When assessing the merits of this case, the arbitral tribunal 
found the seller in breach of contract for having packed the 
goods in a way, “which was not in conformity with the Con-
tract”. As the defective packaging had damaged the goods, the 
seller was liable for the losses suffered by the buyer. 
                                                            
109 Cf. A. Vincze, Conformity of the Goods under the UN Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG): Overview of CIETAC's 
Practice, in SHARING INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW ACROSS NATIONAL 
BOUNDARIES: FESTSCHRIFT FOR ALBERT H. KRITZER ON THE OCCASION OF HIS 
EIGHTIETH BIRTHDAY, 552, 577. (C. B. Andersen & U. G. Schroeter eds., Wildy, 
Simmonds & Hill Publishing, 2008).  
110 Cf. HUBER and MULLIS, supra note 51, at 134.  
111 See China International Economic & Trade Arbitration Commission 
(CIETAC), No. CISG/1997/23, China, July 23, 1997, available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/970723c1.html. 
32http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss1/4
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2.5.2   Art. 35(2) CISG: the implied conformity obligations 
When drafting an international sales contract it is rare, if 
not impossible, for the parties to spell out all the features that 
the contracted goods must possess.  
Indeed, much is taken for granted. Suppose, for example, 
that a buyer orders 10 kilos of apples to be delivered at his 
warehouse by a given date. Rarely will the contract will specify 
that the apples need not to be rotten or that they have to be fit 
for human consumption or, still, that they have to be packed as 
to guarantee their integrity. Now the question is: if goods de-
livered do not comply with such conditions, will the seller be 
found liable for having failed to comply with its conformity ob-
ligations? In light of article 35(2) CISG, the answer to this 
question is yes.  
Well aware that the contract rarely provides for a detailed 
description of all the characteristics of the goods, drafters of the 
CISG introduced a number of objective criteria that regulate 
what has not been, expressly or impliedly, agreed in the con-
tract.112 These provisions have to be considered as, “what rea-
sonable parties would have agreed upon had they put their 
mind to it.”113 
When dealing with the conformity obligations set by article 
35(2) CISG, it is first and foremost important to underline that 
they have a limited scope. As the wording of the CISG makes 
clear, these provisions operate as supplementary rules that ap-
ply insofar as the parties have not agreed otherwise.114 It fol-
lows, that the implied conformity obligations are default rules 
that fill in possible gaps left open by incomplete contractual de-
                                                            
112 Cf. SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, supra note 12, at 575. 
113 SCHLECHTRIEM & BUTLER, supra note 5, at 115.  
114 UNCITRAL, ‘2012 UNCITRAL Digest of case law on the United Na-
tions Convention on the International Sale of Goods – Article 35’, para. 1, 
available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/digest-2012-35.html (affirm-
ing that “Article 35(2) states standards relating to the goods’ quality, function 
and packaging […].” In other words, these standards are implied terms that 
bind the seller even without affirmative agreement thereto. If the parties do 
not wish these standards to apply to their contract, they can (in the words of 
article 35) “agree [...] otherwise.” Unless the parties exercise their autono-
mous power to contract out the standards of article 35 (2), they are bound by 
them.”).  
33
4. VILLY DE LUCA.DOCXX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/29/15  5:18 PM 
196 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol.  XXVII::1 
terminations.115 
By recognizing the predominance of the parties’ agree-
ment, the Convention not only restates the central role played 
by party autonomy in international trade, but also avoids pos-
sible conflicts between express and implied conformity obliga-
tions. 116  While in theory what the parties have expressly 
agreed and what the Convention provides can conflict, in prac-
tice, the conflict may never occur as the latter will apply only in 
those limited circumstances in which the parties’ agreement 
does not provide otherwise.117 
Similarly to the rules adopted in other jurisdictions,118 Ar-
ticle 35(2) prescribes four objective criteria that have to be con-
sulted when determining the conformity of the goods to the 
contract: fitness for the ordinary purpose (35(2)(a)), fitness for 
a particular purpose (35(2)(b)), conformity to a model or sample 
(35(2)(c)) and, finally, adequate packaging (35(2)(d)).  
2.5.2.1  Article 35(2)(a) CISG: fitness for the ordinary purpose 
The first subsection of paragraph 2 embodies the obvious, 
yet fundamental rule according to which goods delivered must 
be fit to be used for their ordinary purpose. The reason why 
                                                            
115 See T. Neumann, Features of Article 35 in the Vienna Convention; 
Equivalence, Burden of Proof and Awareness, 11 VINDOBONA J. OF INT’L 
COMM. L. & ARB. 81, 82 (2007), available at 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/neumann.html#v (The provisions of 
Art. 35 section 2 have been defined as “gap-filling device[s].”) 
116 See H. M. Flechtner, Conformity of Goods, Third Party Claims, and 
Buyer’s Notice of Breach under the United Nations Sales Convention 
("CISG"), with Comments on the "Mussels Case," the "Stolen Automobile 
Case," and the "Ugandan Used Shoes Case, UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH 
SCHOOL OF LAW WORKING PAPER SERIES, Working Paper No. 64, 1, 5 (2007), 
available at http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1065& 
context=pittlwps (affirming that “Article 35(2) fine-tunes the rule of party au-
tonomy in Article 35(1) by identifying obligations concerning the quality and 
packaging of the goods that the parties are presumed to have intended unless 
they affirmatively agree otherwise.”) 
117 See HUBER and MULLIS, supra note 51, at 134.  
118 For example: the German BGB (section 434) provides for the goods to 
be fit for the ordinary and particular purpose; the English Sale of goods act 
(1979) binds the seller to deliver goods fit for the particular or ordinary pur-
poses (section 14) or in conformity with the sample eventually provided (sec-
tion 15); the United States Uniform Commercial Code (section provides the 
seller to warrant the merchantability of the goods (section 2 – 314) and, even-
tually, their fitness for a particular purpose (2 – 315). 
34http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss1/4
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such a provision is needed is that while goods are always 
bought for a use, this use is not always specified within the 
contract. This is particularly true when dealing with routine 
transactions as the parties would find it futile to specify what 
“goes without saying”:119 it is clear that food must be edible, 
cars must be drivable, clothes must be wearable and so on. To 
avoid overly specific contracts and reduce the risk that sellers 
will take advantage of the contractual “silence” to deliver infe-
rior quality goods, the drafters of the CISG introduced a de-
fault rule reflecting what the parties would have agreed if only 
they had negotiated on the term.120 It follows that even in the 
absence of a specification on the use, the seller must guarantee 
that the goods will, at the minimum, be fit for their ordinary 
uses.121  
Given its supplementary nature, however, article 35(2)(a) 
CISG is legally binding only if certain conditions are respected. 
The first condition is the absence of a conflicting contractual 
term.122 The second condition is the absence of a particular 
purpose ex article 35(2)(b). If a specific purpose for which the 
goods were to be used was made known to the seller, it takes 
priority over the ordinary purposes.123  
Given the broad range of situations this provision had to 
regulate, the CISG does not set any specific condition or tech-
nical standard under which goods are deemed to be conform-
ing.124 It follows that an evaluation under this provision can be 
                                                            
119 See J. O. Honnold, Uniform Law for International Sale under the 1980 
United Nations Convention, 3, 255 (1999), available at 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/honnold.html. 
120 Cf. C. P. Gillette & F. Ferrari, Warranties and "Lemons" under CISG 
Article 35(2)(a), Internationales Handesrecht 1/2010, 2, (2010), available at 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/gillette-ferrari.html.  
121 Cf. Poikela, supra note 34, at para. 5.2.1.  
122 See LOOKOFSKY, supra note 31, at 91. (An example, presented by Prof. 
Lookofsky, of a contractual provision which would exclude Art. 35(2)(a) would 
be the following: “the seller 'undertakes no obligations whatsoever in respect 
of the goods fitness for ordinary and/or particular purposes'.) 
123 Cf. HUBER and MULLIS, supra note 51, at 135, recognizing that “Art. 
35(2) lit. (b) should take priority over lit. (a) in the sense that if any specific 
purpose was made known to the seller under lit. (b), goods that do not meet 
this standard will not be in conformity of the contract even if they are fit for 
the ordinary purposes.” 
124 Cf. HONNOLD, supra note 32, at 255. 
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made only through a case-by-case approach125 that compares 
the purposes for which the good can be used with the purposes 
for which goods of the same description would ordinarily be 
used. Aware of the fact that often there is more than one ordi-
nary use, article 35(2)(a) recalls not the one but the many pur-
poses for which the goods may be employed. The employment of 
the plural has a two-fold function: on the one side it avoids liti-
gation related to the determination of the ordinary purpose 
and, on the other side, it guarantees that even in the absence of 
a specific contractual determination, the goods delivered will be 
fit for all the ordinary uses. Fitness to only some of the ordi-
nary purposes will amount to a breach of contract.126  
Due to its broad language, there has been, and there still 
is, much debate amongst courts and scholars on the extent of 
this provision. The two main interpretative issues related to 
article 35(2)(a) CISG regard the meaning of ordinary purpose 
and the standards, which have to be applied when measuring 
it.  
2.5.2.1.1  Complying with the ordinary purpose: average 
quality, reasonable quality or merchantable quality? 
 Whether a product is deemed to be conforming under ar-
ticle 35(2)(a) CISG depends on what is considered as being the 
“ordinary” purpose of that category of products. It follows, that 
in order to avoid the negative consequences related to a non-
conforming delivery, the seller must understand what is nor-
mally expected from the contracted goods. Given that the Con-
vention does not provide any guidance on how to ascertain the 
ordinary purposes, courts and scholars have attempted to set 
some criteria, which may aid the seller in this complex task. 
As a starting point, it is assumed that the fitness of the 
goods for their ordinary purposes, “must be decided by refer-
                                                            
125 See Maley, supra note 92, at 112. (Calling for a case-by-case ap-
proach.) 
126 To avoid responsibility, by triggering the exception set out in art. 
35(3) CISG, the seller should inform the buyer of the non-conformity before 
the conclusion of the contract. On this point SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, 
supra note 12, at 575 (suggesting that “if the goods are not fit for all, but 
merely some, of the purposes for which goods of that type are ordinarily used, 
the seller must inform the buyer of the fact.”) 
36http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss1/4
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ence to the objective view of a person in the trade sector con-
cerned”.127 This criteria, however, is not per se sufficient. Not 
only because there is a high degree of uncertainty related to 
the determination of an “objective view”, but also because there 
is no indication as to how the standard will be fixed by those 
who operate in the trade sector. 
Many commentators have taken the analysis one step fur-
ther, and have attempted to define what is intended by fitness 
for the ordinary purposes. While it is agreed that the standard 
set by art 35(2)(a) does not impose upon the seller a duty to de-
liver perfect or flawless goods, unless perfection is necessary to 
fulfill the ordinary purposes,128 there has been much disagree-
ment on what the standard positively requires.129 A detailed 
analysis of the different interpretations of art. 35(2)(a) CISG 
was carried out by the Netherland Arbitration Institute in the 
Condensate crude oil mix case.130 
The facts of the case were the following.131 A group of 
Dutch companies, sellers in the dispute, had entered into sev-
eral contracts for the supply of a condensate crude oil mix re-
ferred to as “Rijn Blend” with an English firm, buyer in this 
circumstance. After the first deliveries, the buyer informed the 
sellers that it would not accept the next products, because, due 
to high levels of mercury, further processing or sales were im-
possible. The buyer’s refusal to take the goods, forced the 
sellers to enter into a substitute sale at a lower price. One of 
the issues raised in the ensuing arbitration was that the Rijn 
Blend, even with increased levels of mercury, “was in accord-
                                                            
127 SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, supra note 12, at 576; Cf. Secretariat 
Commentary, supra note 67, at para. 5.  
128 See Brand, Ferrari & Flechtner, supra note 74, at 630. (For a concrete 
decision supporting this statement); see also Handelsgericht Kantons Zürich, 
No. HG 960527/O, Switzerland, Sept. 21, 1998, available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/980921s1.html. (Recognizing that one mis-
placed line of text, which did not impede the legibility of the text, did not ren-
der an art exhibition catalogue non-conforming.) 
129 See Adam M. Giuliano, Non-conformity in the Sale of Goods between 
the United States and China: The New Chinese Contract Law, the Uniform 
Commercial Code, and the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale 
of Goods, 18 FLA. J. INT’L L. 331, 352 (2006). 
130 See Condensate Crude Oil Mix Case (Neth. v. U.K.), Case No. 2319 
(Neth. Arb. Inst. 2002), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/021015n 
1.html. 
131 See id. 
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ance with the contracts since no specific quality requirements 
had been agreed upon”.132 By refusing to take delivery, the 
buyer therefore, breached the contract. The buyer, on the con-
trary, affirmed that, in light of the non-conformity, it was enti-
tled to refuse delivery and to suspend its obligations. 
When addressing the merits of the case, the court found 
that the dispute had to be solved in light of article 35(2)(a) 
CISG. It then analyzed the three approaches to this provision: 
“merchantable” quality, “average” quality and “reasonable” 
quality.  
According to the first view, the seller must deliver goods of 
“merchantable” quality. In light of this standard, goods are 
deemed to be conforming if there is a substitute market for the 
goods.133 This concept roots back to the English common law 
and was amply debated during the travaux preparatoires when 
drafters of the CISG discussed how article 35 should be inter-
preted. On the one side, common law countries argued in favor 
of the adoption of the “merchantability” standard. On the other 
side, Civil law countries argued in favor of “average” quality.134 
To clarify which standard should apply, during the 14th meet-
ing of the First Committee, the Canadian delegation proposed 
an amendment to article 35 in light of which, to comply with 
the ordinary purposes, the goods would have to be, “of fair av-
erage quality within the description.”135 The endorsement of 
this civil law approach was justified in light of the uncertain-
ties that the concept of merchantable quality had created in the 
common law jurisdictions.136 However, after consulting with 
                                                            
132 Id. 
133 See id. 
134 See Gillette, supra note 120, at 7. 
135 1980 Vienna Diplomatic Conference, Vienna, Austria, Apr. 7, 1980, 
Report of the First Committee, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/C.1/L.115, at para. 3. 
(For the whole text of the Canadian amendment (A/C0NF.97/C.1/L.115) to 
art. 35), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/1stcommittee/summar 
ies35.html. 
136 1980 Vienna Diplomatic Conference, Vienna, Austria, Mar. 19, 1980, 
Report of the First Committee, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/C.1/L.115, at para. 30, 
available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/firstcommittee/Meeting14. 
html (reporting that the Canadian delegate, Mr. Shore, explained that the 
amendment would “spell out more fully the meaning of the concept of general 
fitness as used in paragraph [(2)(a)] of the article. The comparable concept of 
"merchantability" in common law jurisdictions had attracted an enormous 
amount of litigation and in the absence of clearer guidance, similar difficul-
38http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss1/4
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several other common law delegates, the proposal was with-
drawn.137 Even though the drafters of the CISG did not express 
themselves in favor of any specific standard, supporters of the 
“merchantability” consider the decision to withdraw the pro-
posal as impliedly favoring this approach. However, as of to-
day, there is no known case law under the CISG recognizing 
the merchantable quality as sufficient.138 
The view that the goods must be of “average” quality is 
strongly endorsed by several leading commentators139 on the 
basis that many domestic legal systems had opted for a similar 
rule.140 The “average” quality standard has been expressly 
acknowledged in at least one case. An Italian seller of shoes 
filed a claim against a German buyer after the latter had re-
fused to pay the whole purchase price claiming the non-
conformity of the shoes. When addressing the issue of conform-
ity, the District Court of Berlin recognized that “to fulfill the 
requirement of [article 35 CISG] the goods must be fit for the 
purposes for which goods of the same description would ordi-
narily be used or for any particular purpose made known to the 
seller. The goods must be of average quality, and it does not 
suffice that they can only just be traded”.141 Notwithstanding 
this (limited) acknowledgment, the average quality standard is 
                                                                                                                                     
ties might be encountered with the provisions of  article [35 (2)] (a) if left un-
changed.”) 
137 See id at para. 45. 
138 See Condensate Crude Oil Mix Case supra note 130 at para. 68. 
139 See Cesare Massimo Bianca, art. 35, in Commentary on the Interna-
tional Sales Law: The 1980 Vienna Sales Convention Giuffré, Milan 268, 273 
(C.M. Bianca & M.J. Bonell ed., 1987), available at 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/bianca-bb35.html. (Affirming that 
“The goods can be more or less fit for their purposes, but the seller must on 
the whole deliver goods of average fitness”); see also Rolf Herber and Beate 
Czerwenka, Internationales kaufrecht, Kommentar zu dem Ubereinkommen 
der Vereinten Nationem vom 11, April 1980 Uber Vertage Uber den Interna-
tionalen Warenkauf, (C. H. Beck, München, 1991), Art. 35, para. 4.  
140 U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(b) (2002) (For example, expressly provides for goods 
to be “of fair average quality within the description.”); see also § 243(1) BGB 
(Similar provisions may also be found in the German legal system); see also 
Obligationenrecht art. 71(2) (The Swiss legal system); see also art. 1246 Code 
Civil (The French legal system). 
141 Landgericht Berlin [LG] [regional court] Sept. 15, 1994, 52 S 247/94 
(Ger.), English abstract available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/940915g 
1.html.  
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to be rejected.142 Not only because, as shown above, the pro-
posal to introduce such a rule in the Convention was with-
drawn,143 but also because interpreting the Convention in light 
of what domestic legal systems provide goes against the inter-
national character of the convention.144 
The third view considers article 35(2)(a) as calling for the 
delivery of “reasonable” quality goods. Whether the goods were 
of reasonable quality has to be determined on a case-by-case 
basis since it calls for the, “quality a reasonable person in the 
position of the buyer would be entitled to expect”.145 The quali-
tative standard, therefore, cannot be fixed a priori in abstract 
but has to be determined in the specific circumstances. Similar-
ly to the “average” quality, this approach has been upheld also 
in case law. The Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, in Beijing 
Light Automobile Co. v. Connell, acknowledged that, “the prin-
ciple of the buyer's reasonable expectancy with respect to the 
general and particular purpose of the goods […] can hardly be 
regarded as controversial. […] Without explicit contractual 
provisions dealing with these natural expectations of the buyer, 
it is difficult to see how this provision […] can be effectively set 
aside”.146  
Moreover, the Netherland Arbitration Institute opted for 
the notion of “reasonable” quality considering it the most con-
sistent with the legislative history and interpretative method-
ology of the CISG. The tribunal started the reasoning by recog-
nizing that, in accordance with the guidelines set by the CISG, 
article 35(2)(a) had to be interpreted in light of its international 
                                                            
142 See HUBER and MULLIS, supra note 51, at 135. 
143 See id. above the history of the Canadian amendment calling for an 
introduction of the average quality rule. 
144 See Condensate Crude Oil Mix Case supra note 130 at para. 70. (The 
Arbitral tribunal in the Condensate crude oil mix case recognized that “some 
French authors have specifically stated that the average quality rule of the 
French Civil Code is not applicable to CISG cases”.). For opinions rejecting 
the application of the domestic views to the CISG see AUDIT, supra note 47, at 
96; V. Heuzé, La vente internationale de marchandises (Paris, GLN Joly, 
1992), 219. 
145 See HUBER and MULLIS, supra note 51, at 135. On this point see also 
Maley, supra note 92, at 112.  
146 Beijing Light Automobile Co., Ltd v. Connell Limited Partnership, 
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, 5 June 1998, available at: 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/980605s5.html> [accessed 19 September 
2011]. 
40http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss1/4
4. VILLY DE LUCA.DOCXX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/29/15  5:18 PM 
2015] CONFORMITY OF GOODS TO THE CONTRACT 203 
character and aware of the need to foster uniformity in its ap-
plication. It followed that both the “merchantable” and the “av-
erage” quality standards were to be rejected as being domestic 
notions of quality.147 Applying these standards when interpret-
ing the Convention would mean resorting to a “homeward 
trend” analysis, thus violating the interpretive methodology set 
by article 7.148 The tribunal therefore affirmed that “reasona-
ble” quality was the preferable standard. Given that there was 
no consensus as to which standard should apply, the drafters of 
the CISG had decided to opt for an “open texture” provision. In 
the absence of a precise indication as to how the provision 
should be interpreted, the tribunal considered that, in accord-
ance with article 7(2), the matter should be solved resorting to 
the general principles upon which the CISG is based. Being 
that reasonableness is one of the general principles, it was con-
cluded that the “reasonable” quality was the concept that best 
suited the intentions of the drafters and interpretation stand-
ards set by the Convention. The conclusions reached in the 
Condensate crude oil mix case are certainly not flawless,149 but 
offer interesting insights on the meaning of article 35(2)(a).  
What clearly emerges from the analysis of this case is that 
the consensus on how the provision should be interpreted is 
still far from being achieved. This, however, is the consequence 
of a provision that is, “necessarily and inherently ambigu-
ous”150 as it had been designed to apply to the countless cir-
cumstances in which the parties have failed to set a minimum 
qualitative threshold. Given the broad range of situations fall-
                                                            
147 See L. DiMatteo et al., The Interpretive Turn in International Sales: 
An Analysis of Fifteen Years of CISG Jurisprudence, 24 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 
399 (2004). 
148 Contra Gillette, supra note 120, at 9, criticizing this conclusion affirm-
ing the following: “The Tribunal […] rejected "average quality" as being so 
linked with "national notions regarding quality of goods" that it could not be 
used to interpret Article 35(2)(a), since the CISG implicitly rejected the use of 
domestic concepts to create international sales law. But this argument is […] 
flawed. It is true that domestic law should not be used to interpret the CISG 
where the sole reason for adopting an interpretation is that it is consistent 
with domestic law. But if a particular interpretation, such as average quality, 
has independent merit, the fact that it is also consistent with domestic law 
should not disqualify it from being used to construe a provision of the CISG.” 
149 For a detailed criticism of the decision see Gillette, supra note 120, at 
8 ff. 
150 See Gillette, supra note 120, at 3. 
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ing under its scope, it would be impossible to set precise condi-
tions on when goods are deemed to be conforming to the ordi-
nary purposes. Notwithstanding its vagueness, the “reasona-
ble” quality standard is the one that best adapts to the features 
of article 35(2)(a). Not only because it guarantees the highest 
degree of flexibility but also because it accommodates the ap-
plication of the other standards where “reasonable”. Nothing 
precludes that in the specific circumstance the seller must de-
liver goods of “merchantable” or “average” quality, if that is the 
standard a reasonable person in the position of the buyer would 
be entitled to expect. 
2.5.2.1.2  Complying with the ordinary purpose: seller’s or 
buyer’s national standards? 
 The difficulty of applying article 35(2)(a), also lies in the 
differences amongst what is considered as being the “ordinary” 
purpose of the goods: what may be considered sufficient in one 
country may not be enough in another one. It follows, therefore, 
that the choice of the applicable national standard is an issue 
that deeply influences the judgment on the conformity of the 
goods to the contract. What needs to be determined is whether 
the goods must comply with the public law standards of the 
seller’s state or with those of the buyer’s state.151 
On the one side, it has been argued that the ordinary use 
will be defined by the standards of the country or region in 
which the buyer intends to use the goods.152 As the seller will 
not always be aware of this information, supporters of this 
opinion have recognized that it would be “advisable” for the 
buyer to inform the seller where the goods will be employed.153 
The underlying idea of this view is that, once the seller is 
aware of the destination of the goods, it must, unless otherwise 
agreed, comply with the standards existing in that country. 
The Appellate Court of Grenoble upheld this opinion in Caito 
                                                            
151 See Henschel, supra note 42, at para. 4.1(a), affirming that “The start-
ing point for assessing the ordinary use of the goods is the objective norm in 
the relevant commercial sector”. On this point see also P. Schlechtriem, In-
ternationales UN-Kaufrecht (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 1996), p. 80 ff. 
152 See SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 106, at 6 ff. 
153 See SCHLECHTRIEM & BUTLER, supra note 5, at 119. 
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Roger v. Société française de factoring.154 In that case the seller 
was found liable under article 35(2)(a) as the parmesan cheese 
failed to comply with the French marketing regulations. The 
court justified the decision in affirming that, “the [seller] knew 
that the parmesan sachets ordered by the [buyer] would be 
marketed in France […] this knowledge imposed the duty on 
him, according to the provision of Article 8(1) of the Vienna 
Convention, to interpret the order as pertaining to goods, 
which have to comply with the marketing regulations of the 
French market”.155 This view, however, has been widely criti-
cized. Accepting it would mean not only placing upon the seller 
a burden, which if placed upon the buyer, would be much light-
er,156 but also forcing the seller to modify its production pro-
cess. In the modern economy goods are often produced in series 
well before there has been a contact between the buyer and the 
seller. It would clearly be impossible for the seller to produce 
goods respecting different national regulations, which perhaps, 
were not even identifiable at the time of production. It follows, 
that the indication of the country in which the goods will be 
used, without further specification, does not per se bind the 
seller to deliver goods complying with that specific national 
standard.157  
The alternative position is that the regulations that have 
to be consulted when evaluating the conformity of the goods to 
the contract are those in force in the seller’s state. This ap-
proach is based on the idea that it would be unrealistic to ex-
pect the seller to be aware of the particular requirements of all 
the different states in which the goods will be used. Of the two 
views, this is certainly the one, which has received the greatest 
support.158 The same German Supreme Court, in one of the 
                                                            
154 See Caito Roger v. Société française de factoring, Cour d'Appel de 
Grenoble, Chambre Commerciale, No. 93/4126, France, 13 September 1995, 
available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/950913f1.html 
[accessed 19 September 2011]. 
155 Id. at para. 2. 
156 See Henschel, supra note 42, at para. 4.1(a), recognizing that “This 
can also be justified on economic grounds, since the buyer can obtain the rel-
evant information more effectively and cheaply than the seller can.” 
157 See BIANCA & BONELL, supra note 8, at 275. 
158 See F. ENDERLEIN & D. MASKOW, International Sales Law - United Na-
tions Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (Oceana 
Publications, New York, 1992), 144; B. PILTZ, Internationales Kaufrecht: Das 
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leading cases on the matter, expressly acknowledged the pre-
dominance of this standard. In that circumstance, a Swiss sell-
er had entered into a contract for the delivery of mussels with a 
German buyer. The buyer, however, claimed a breach of article 
35(2)(a) as the mussels contained a level of cadmium which, 
while acceptable in Switzerland, violated the German food reg-
ulations and thus could not have been resold in the market. 
When analyzing the merits of the case the Bundesgerichtshof 
found that, 
a foreign seller can simply not be required to know the not easily 
determinable public law provisions and/or administrative prac-
tices of the country to which he exports, and […] the purchaser, 
therefore, cannot rationally rely upon such knowledge of the sell-
er, but rather, the buyer can be expected to have such expert 
knowledge of the conditions in his own country or in the place of 
destination, as determined by him, and, therefore, he can be ex-
pected to inform the seller accordingly.159 
Recognizing the predominance of the seller’s national regu-
lations, however, does not preclude in absolute terms the appli-
cation of other standards. Indeed, in the absence of a precise 
indication contained within the Convention, the choice of the 
applicable standard must be made on a case-by-case basis tak-
ing into consideration the specific circumstances. In the Frozen 
pork liver case,160 for example, the Austrian supreme court 
listed the situations in which the seller would be bound to re-
spect the rules existing in the buyer’s state: when the same 
standards apply in the seller’s state, when the buyer drew the 
seller’s attention to the standards in the buyer’s state or, final-
ly, when the seller knew or could not have been unaware of 
them. If any one of the three is respected, the goods will have to 
conform to the regulations in force in the seller’s country.  
 
                                                                                                                                     
UN-Kaufrecht in praxisorientierter Darstellung (Verlag C.H. Beck, Munich, 
1993), 4. 
159 Bundesgerichtshof, No. VIII ZR 159/94, Germany, 8 March 1995, 
available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/950308g3.html 
[accessed 19 September 2011]. 
160 See Oberster Gerichtshof, No. 7 Ob 302/05w, Austria, 25 January 
2006, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/060125a3.html#* [ac-
cessed 19 September 2011]. 
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2.5.2.1.3  Functions and effects of article 35(2)(a) on 
international trade 
In line with the caveat venditor principle that underlines 
the conformity obligations,161 article 35(2)(a) places the risk of 
defective delivery upon the seller. Even though the CISG does 
not use this wording, under this provision the seller substan-
tially warrants a certain qualitative standard.162 It has been 
argued that, “the primary explanation for [this] implied war-
ranty is related to the question of asymmetric information”.163 
This concept refers to the situation in which one party to the 
transaction possesses relevant information unknown to the 
other party. When it comes to international trade, it is realistic 
to assume that, unless the specific circumstances show the con-
trary, sellers will have more information than buyers about the 
quality of the contractually agreed goods.164 Given this situa-
tion, if the buyers are unable to detect ex ante the qualitative 
level of a particular good, there is a concrete risk that the sell-
er, abusing his superior position, will charge a price that does 
not reflect the actual quality of the good. In the long run, buy-
ers would lose confidence in the market and would be inclined 
to treat all such goods as being of low quality.165 Aware of this 
risk, the CISG obliges the seller to deliver goods that comply 
with a minimum qualitative standard. This default warranty 
has a twofold function. First of all, it reduces the risk of fraudu-
lent actions: the seller will have no interest in substituting 
high quality goods with low quality ones as under Article. 
35(2)(a) it would have to make up for (and eventually reim-
burse the damages deriving from) any lack of quality affecting 
the ordinary usability of the goods. Secondly, this provision 
partially reduces the informational gap between the seller and 
the buyer. Indeed, even though the seller knowledge remains 
superior, the buyer can rely on the fact that the goods will cer-
                                                            
161 See supra Part 0 (for an analysis of the caveat venditor principle). 
162 Cf. DiMatteo, supra note 147, at 390 (referring to art. 35(2)(a) as a 
warranty). 
163 Gillette, supra note 120, at 4. 
164 Cf. Henschel, supra note 42, at para. 2. 
165 See G. A. Akerlof, The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and 
the Market Mechanism, 84 Quarterly Journal of Economics, 488 (1970), for a 
more in depth analysis of the problems and consequences related to asym-
metric information.  
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tainly possess those characteristics that make it suitable for 
the ordinary purposes.  
An example may better illustrate this point.166 Assume, for 
example, that a given good has only one purpose: either it is fit 
to be used for this purpose, and therefore has a value of 10, or 
it is not fit for this purpose, and therefore, has a value of 0. 
Suppose, moreover, that the cost of production varies according 
to the quality of the good: high quality goods, which are fit to be 
used, cost 7, while low quality goods that are not fit to be used, 
cost 3. Suppose, in addition, that there are only 2 kinds of sup-
pliers in the market: suppliers of high quality goods and sup-
pliers of low quality goods. Assume, finally, that there is no 
possibility to distinguish the two ex ante and, therefore, there is 
an equal chance of receiving either one of the goods. The 
asymmetry in the information possessed by the parties, would 
tempt suppliers of low quality goods to sell their products at 
the price of high quality ones. Leaving aside any moral issue, 
whether this temptation actually leads to fraudulent behavior 
depends upon the existence of a warranty on the usability of 
the goods.  
Lacking any warranty on the usability of the product, the 
suppliers of low quality goods will be tempted to sell their 
products at the price of high quality ones. Aware that there is a 
50% chance of receiving a defective good, buyers will be willing 
to pay a price that reflects the expected value of the goods. In 
this circumstance, the expected value would be the following:167 
2) 
𝐸 𝑥=  10 0.5+ 0(0.5) 
𝐸 𝑥=   5 
With a market price of five, suppliers of high quality goods 
would be facing losses, as the production costs would be greater 
than the revenues. It follows, that either these producers man-
age to distinguish themselves from low quality producers war-
ranting directly the products, or the losses will eventually force 
them out of the market. In this second event, the market will 
                                                            
166 See Gillette, supra note 120, at 4 for an example. 
167 Where Ex stands for the expected value of a random good, x!repre-
sents the price of high quality goods, 𝑝!represents the probability that the 
good received is of high quality, 𝑥!stands for the price of the low quality good 
and finally 𝑝! is the probability the the good received is a low quality good. 
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eventually fail once buyers realize that no more high quality 
goods are traded in the market.168 
 The situation changes drastically if the seller is bound by 
Article 35(2)(a) CISG to provide goods that are fit for the ordi-
nary purpose. Producers of low quality goods may still fraudu-
lently try to sell their goods as high quality ones, but the initial 
profit will fade in the long run. Once the buyer realizes that the 
goods are not fit for their ordinary purposes, it may avoid the 
contract claiming restitution of the purchase price and, eventu-
ally, damages. Aware of the risks related to deceptive conduct, 
the sellers will be more inclined to disclose truthful information 
to the buyers thus minimizing asymmetry in the market. 
In conclusion it may be affirmed that an implied conformi-
ty obligation as the one provided by Article 35(2)(a), has more 
than one beneficial effect on the market. Indeed, this approach 
not only fosters international trade by spreading trust amongst 
economic operators but also pushes the sellers towards efficien-
cy and innovation. As to the first point, if a minimum standard 
is guaranteed, the buyers will be more inclined to engage in a 
transaction given that they trust the quality of the goods. As 
for the second point, the seller who wishes to increase its profit 
must necessarily invest in efficiency and innovation. If goods 
must comply with a minimum standard, the seller wishing to 
increase its profits will be forced to reduce the production costs 
rather than the quality; this can be achieved either rendering 
the current production process more efficient or by discovering 
a new and cheaper method to produce the same goods. 
2.5.2.2  Article 35(2)(b): fitness for the particular purpose 
In any transaction, goods are bought to be used for a spe-
cific purpose. When this purpose corresponds to the ordinary 
employment of the goods, there is no need for the buyer to spec-
ify as Article 35(2)(a) will safeguard its right to receive goods fit 
for such ordinary use. The situation changes when the buyer 
intends to employ the goods for a special or particular purpose. 
                                                            
168 Mathematically, once no more high quality goods are produced, the 
expected price falls to zero.  
Ex  =    10 0+ 0( 1)=   0 
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Suppose, for example,169 that the buyer orders a set of drills in-
tended to drill a plate of carbon steel. If the seller were to de-
liver ordinary drills, these would break when drilling the re-
sistant carbon steel. Thus, the buyer would be unable to use 
them for the intended purpose. Aware of such risks, the CISG 
provides for a default rule intended to protect the buyer: Article 
35(2)(b) CISG places upon the seller an obligation to deliver 
goods fit for the particular purpose expressly or impliedly 
communicated at the time the contract was concluded.  
Similarly to article 35(2)(a) CISG, the function of this im-
plied conformity obligation is to set a minimum qualitative 
standard. Indeed, once the particular purpose has been com-
municated, the seller is bound to deliver goods possessing those 
qualities that make them fit for the specific use. The main dif-
ference between the two provisions lies in the relevant yard-
stick consulted to establish the conformity of the goods to the 
contract. While in paragraph (2)(a) the goods need to comply 
with an objective standard, meaning the qualitative level a 
reasonable person in the position of the buyer would be entitled 
to expect, in paragraph (2)(b) the conformity of the goods is to 
be considered solely in light of the buyer’s intentions. It follows 
that to determine the conformity of the goods to the contract 
one must proceed with a case-by-case analysis comparing the 
use that can be made of the goods with the particular use the 
buyer intended to make of the goods. This implied conformity 
obligation, which protects the concrete intentions of the buyer, 
is a specification of the general warranty contained in art. 
35(2)(a) CISG.170 
In line with the principle of party autonomy, the relation-
ship between the ordinary and particular purposes is based on 
the predominance of Article 35(2)(b). It follows that, regardless 
of their ordinary purposes, when goods are bought for a specific 
purpose, the seller must deliver a product suitable to be em-
ployed for that purpose. This, however, does not necessarily 
imply that the goods will not be fit for their ordinary uses. In 
many cases, in fact, the implied conformity obligations set by 
                                                            
169 See HONNOLD, supra note 32, at 257. 
170 See HUBER and MULLIS, supra note 51, at 138 (affirming that “Art. 
35(2) lit. (b) CISG provides the buyer with an additional protection over and 
above that provided by lit. (a).”) 
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paragraphs (a) and (b) overlap. If that is the case, conformity 
will still be measured in relation to the particular purpose but 
the same result could be reached by referring to the standard 
set by Article 35(2)(a) CISG.171 The situation changes when the 
there is no correspondence between ordinary and particular 
purposes. That may occur either when the two deal with au-
tonomous and independent situations or when the particular 
purpose renders the goods not fit for the ordinary uses. In the 
first case, Article 35(2)(b) covers a series of situations, which in 
the absence of contractual specification, would not be protected 
under Article 35(2)(a). An example that may be recalled is that 
of the drills mentioned above. Drills to be used on carbon plates 
need to be more resistant than normal ones, yet this extra re-
sistance is not usually contemplated as drilling carbon plates is 
not an ordinary purpose of the good. Article 35(2)(b), therefore, 
covers a situation which, unless specifically agreed, would be 
excluded from Article 35(2)(a).  
The second case, instead, deals with those circumstances 
in which the particular and ordinary purposes conflict with one 
another. Complying with the former necessarily entails a viola-
tion of the latter. In light of the prevailing role played by the 
will of the parties, the seller will be bound to deliver goods 
complying with Article 35(2)(b) CISG even at the expense of the 
ordinary usability.172 A concrete example of this situation 
would be the purchase of a car to be used in the F1 driving 
championship. To be fit for such use these cars need to possess 
certain characteristics that render them not drivable on regu-
lar roads.  
2.5.2.2.1  Communicating the particular purpose 
 The obligation to deliver goods fit for a particular pur-
pose is not triggered automatically; it arises only if the seller 
has been informed of the specific use the buyer intends to make 
of the goods.173 Notwithstanding this broad wording, article 
35(2)(b) CISG has a very narrow scope of application that 
                                                            
171 See Lookofsky, supra note 31.  
172 Cf. J. O. HONNOLD & H. M. FLECHTNER, UNIFORM LAW FOR 
INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION at art. 
35, para. 231 (4th ed., The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2009).  
173 See Flechtner, supra note 116, at 5. 
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needs to be clearly defined. What must be underlined, at the 
outset, is that this provision does not deal with those cases in 
which the buyer and the seller have contractually agreed upon 
the fitness for a particular purpose. A breach of a contractual 
term entails a violation of the express conformity obligations, 
thus calling for the application of Article 35(1) CISG. This pro-
vision, instead, is designed to apply in those circumstances in 
which the buyer merely displays the intention to use the goods 
for a particular purpose.174 This interpretation not only best 
suits the structure of the implied conformity obligations, but is 
also consistent with the conclusions reached during the 1980 
Diplomatic Conference which led to the adoption of the Con-
vention. The Official Records report that during the 15th meet-
ing, the delegate from the Federal Republic of Germany sub-
mitted an amendment175 aimed at eliminating the ambiguities 
related to Article 35(2)(b). It was stated that the particular 
purpose should be recognized if only it had been made, either 
expressly or impliedly, part of the contract.176 The amendment, 
however, was rejected on the grounds that, “limiting the provi-
sion to particular purposes which were made part of the con-
tract was an unjustified narrowing of the seller's obligations 
and that accordingly it was not desirable”.177 Article 35(2)(b) 
was applied in this sense in the Coin Change machine case.178 
                                                            
174 See BIANCA & BONELL, supra note 8, at 275. 
175 See Amendment A/CONF.97/C.1/L.73 in United Nations Conference 
on Contracts for International Sale of Goods – Official Records (1980), at 104, 
para. 1 (proposing to “Re-word paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) as follows: 
"(b) are fit for any particular purpose expressly or impliedly made part of the 
contract.") 
176 On this point see United Nations Conference on Contracts for Interna-
tional Sale of Goods – Official Records, supra note 90, at 306, para. 57, clearly 
reporting the following “Mr. KLINGSPORN (Federal Republic of Germany) 
explained that his delegation had submitted amendment A/CONF.97IC.l/L.73 
because it thought that the present text of [draft] article 33, paragraph 1(b), 
was too complicated and liable to give rise to litigation. In order to remove all 
ambiguity, it should be expressly stated that the delivery of goods which were 
not fit for the purpose to which the buyer intended to put them was not a 
breach of contract unless the parties had expressly or impliedly made that 
purpose part of the contract.” 
177 See United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, ‘Year-
book – Volume VIII (1977)’, 316, para. 172, available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/yearbooks/yb-1977-e/yb_1977_e.pdf (last 
visited Sept. 19 2011). 
178 See Société P[...] Service et Société L[...] de transport en commun v. 
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A French buyer had purchased from a German seller banknote-
to-coin changing machines possessing specific characteristics. 
Once the machines turned out not to work as anticipated, the 
buyer brought an action against the seller claiming termina-
tion of the contract and restitution of the purchase price. When 
addressing the merits of the case, the Appellate Court of Lyon 
declared the seller liable under Article 35(2)(b) CISG as it 
failed to deliver goods fit to be used for the particular purpose. 
The court found that even though the particular purpose had 
not been expressly contracted for, the seller’s knowledge of the 
intended use sufficed to establish its liability.179 
The wording of the provision indicates that the particular 
purpose can be made known either expressly or impliedly. 
While the concept of “express” communication is so straight-
forward that it does not need to be explained, what is intended 
for “implied” communication is less obvious. The purpose is to 
be considered “impliedly” communicated when, in light of the 
concrete circumstances, the seller should have understood the 
use the buyer intended to make of the goods. The problems 
arise when the seller should have recognized the particular 
purpose, but failed to do so.180 The seller is, nevertheless, con-
sidered to be aware of the particular purpose if a reasonable 
person in the same position would have recognized the use the 
buyer intended to make of the goods.181 This same conclusion 
was reached in the Channel Steel case182 where the parties had 
entered into a contract for the sale of channel steels. Even 
though nothing was said with regard to the intended use of the 
goods, the contract strictly specified the width and height of the 
goods. As these did not conform to the contract, the buyer 
                                                                                                                                     
Société F[...] automatique et Société G[...] et Société N[...],Cour d’Appel de 
Lyon, France, Dec. 18 2003, available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cases/ 
031218f1.html (last visited Sept. 19,2011). 
179 See id. at para. 3(B) (In this specific circumstance the Court found 
that the seller “had knowledge of the set of requirements specifying the de-
mands of [the buyer] when they concluded and agreed to the transaction, as 
indicated in the minutes of the meeting on 22 June 1995 that took place be-
tween” the parties.) 
180 See HYLAND, supra note 70, at 321. 
181 Cf. HUBER and MULLIS, supra note 51, at 139. 
182 See China International Economic & Trade Arbitration Commission 
(CIETAC), No. CISG/1996/48, China, (Oct. 23 1996), available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/961023c1.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2011). 
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commenced arbitration proceedings. When addressing the mer-
its of the case the Arbitral Tribunal considered that the specifi-
cations on width and height were an implied indication that 
the goods were intended for a particular use. The seller, there-
fore, was found liable under art. 35(2)(b) for having delivered 
goods that were not fit for the particular purpose impliedly 
communicated.  
As for the time when the particular purpose must be com-
municated, Article 35(2)(b) specifies that this needs to be done, 
“at the time of the conclusion of the contract”.183 Subsequent 
notifications, therefore, would not suffice to trigger the applica-
tion of Article 35(2)(b).184 The reason behind this timing is that 
it allows the seller to evaluate its capability to comply with the 
particular purpose and eventually refuse the transaction if it is 
unable to provide adequate goods or to ask for a higher price.185 
2.5.2.2.2  Reliance on the seller’s skills and judgment 
The violation of art. 35(2)(b) CISG may be invoked only 
when there has been a reasonable reliance on the seller’s skill 
and judgment. This second condition is an expression of the 
principle of fairness upon which the implied conformity provi-
sion is based.186 Parties who enter a contract may have differ-
ent levels of knowledge about the goods. Suppose, for example, 
that the buyer is an experienced firm in the trade while the 
seller is an intermediary not aware of the characteristics the 
goods must possess to comply with the highly technical particu-
lar purpose.187 Obliging the seller to warrant that the goods 
were fit for the particular purpose would “unfairly” place upon 
the less knowledgeable seller an obligation that the expert 
buyer could handle more easily. The situation is less clear 
                                                            
183 Art. 35(2)(b). 
184 Cf. U. Magnus in J. von Staudingers, Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen 
Gesetzbuch mit Einführungsgesetz und Nebengesetzen. Wiener UN-Kaufrecht 
(CISG), (Sellier-de Gruyter, Berlin, 1999) Art. 35, para.  30. 
185 See Secretariat Commentary, supra note 67, at para. 8. 
186 See Neumann, supra note 115, at 9.  
187 See F. ENDERLEIN, IN P. SARCEVIC & P. VOLKEN (eds.) International 
Sale of Goods: Dubrovnik Lectures, at 157 (Oceana Publications 1986) (recog-
nizing that the seller may not rely on the seller’s skills and judgment “If the 
buyer uses the goods himself in his factory, he may well be better informed 
than a seller who is a trader and not a producer.”) 
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when the seller and the buyer have the same level of expertise 
with regard to the contracted goods. A closer examination of 
the facts must be undertaken to determine whether the buyer 
has actually relied on the seller’s expertise.  
The circumstances in which the buyer deserves protection 
as it relied on the seller’s skills and judgment cannot be identi-
fied in advance, but must be determined on a case-by-case ba-
sis.188 Nonetheless, as a general consideration, the cases cov-
ered by Article 35(2)(b) are those in which the buyer is 
purchasing the goods for a particular purpose but does not 
know the characteristics the goods must possess in order to ful-
fill that purpose.189 It follows that the buyer has no obligation 
to inform the seller of any difficulty related to the selection of 
the appropriate goods. The mere communication of the intend-
ed use suffices to trigger the application of this implied con-
formity obligation.190  
In general, there has been no reliance if the buyer selected 
or inspected the goods before the purchase.191 Where the buyer 
did so, it directly influenced the manufacture or specification of 
the goods192 thus bypassing the seller’s evaluation on the fit-
ness for the specific purposes. Doubts on the reliance arise 
when the buyer did not directly select a good but rather insist-
ed on a particular brand. Some authors believe that there can 
be no reliance once the buyer has indicated a specific brand.193 
This approach, however, has been contested on the basis that 
“a mere purchase under a trade name does not prove that the 
purchaser is not relying at all on the skill and judgment of the 
                                                            
188 See BIANCA & BONELL, supra note 8, at 275. 
189 Poikela, supra note 34, at para. 5.3.1. 
190 See R. H. FOLSOM, M. W. GORDON & J. A. SPANOGLE, INTERNATIONAL 
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS IN A NUT SHELL, 88 (West Publishing Co. 3d ed. 
1988), (affirming that “There is no express requirement that buyer inform 
seller of buyer's reliance, but only of the particular purpose. More important-
ly, there is no requirement that buyer inform seller of any of the difficulties 
which buyer may know are involved in designating or designing goods to ac-
complish this particular use.”) 
191 See Henschel. supra note 42, at 236. 
192 See Neumann, supra note 115, at para. 9.  
193 See ENDERLEIN & MASKOW, supra note 158, at [insert page number]; 
Cf. Peter Huber & Ingeborg Schwenzer, Obligations of the Seller, in 
COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 
(CISG) (Peter Schlechtriem ed., 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, 1998). Art. 
35, para. 23. 
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seller.”194 It has been argued that the choice of the brand does 
not per se exclude the reliance on the seller’s skills and judg-
ment, as this is only one of the many factors to consider when 
evaluating the specific circumstances.195 
However, even though the buyer relied on the seller’s ex-
pertise, the reliance would be unreasonable if the seller did not 
possess the skills needed to deliver goods fit for the particular 
purpose.196 As a general rule, this exception applies when the 
seller does not have any special knowledge of the contracted 
goods.197 It would be “unfair” to consider him liable if the goods 
were not fit for the particular purpose for which they were pur-
chased. To ascertain whether it was reasonable for the buyer to 
rely on the counterpart, what has to be considered is the aver-
age knowledge in the seller’s trade branch. If the knowledge 
necessary to deliver goods fit for the particular purpose is not 
common in the seller’s trade, there can be no reliance on the 
seller’s skills and judgment.  
A last issue strictly related to the reliance on the seller’s 
expertise is the conflict between the express contractual terms 
and the fitness for the particular purpose. If the seller has in-
formed the buyer that the goods are not fit for the particular 
purpose,198 but the buyer proceeds to purchase the goods any-
ways, it is clear that art. 35(2)(b) CISG would not apply as  
there has been no reliance on the seller’s skills and judg-
                                                            
194 See Pabellon v. Grace Line. Inc, 191 F.2d 169, 172 (2d.Cir. 1951) (even 
though this case was decided under the United States Uniform Commercial 
Code, this principle may well apply also to Article 35(2)(b) CISG considering 
the similarities between this article and section 2 – 315 UCC.)  
195 See Maley, supra note 92, at 120 (recognizing that, “[a]s the seller 
knows the characteristics of the goods better than the buyer, it is probable 
that there is reliance. It would be an absurd outcome if the seller escaped lia-
bility merely because the buyer had requested a particular brand…Hence, 
although a choice of brand or trademark may indicate that the seller has re-
lied on its own skill and judgment [sic], this is merely one factor to consider.”) 
196 Cf. Excerpt from “The Application and Interpretation of the CISG in 
Finnish Case Law 1997-2005”, CISG DATABASE, Apr. 2009, available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/980630f5.html. 
197 See BIANCA & BONELL, supra note 8, at 275. 
198 See Secretariat Commentary on Article 33 of the 1978 Draft [draft 
counterpart of CISG article  35] [conformity of the goods], CISG DATABASE, 
Aug. 29, 2006 at para. 9, available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/ 
secomm/secomm-35.html. 
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ment.199 
2.5.2.3  Art. 35(2)(c) CISG: conformity to a sample or model 
The third implied conformity obligation imposes upon the 
seller a duty to deliver goods in conformity with the sample or 
model provided. This provision is designed to address those cir-
cumstances in which the buyer, rather than describing the 
physical features of the goods analyzes a representative sample 
or model of the product and places the order according to it. 
Similarly to Article 35(2)(b) CISG, this obligation does not arise 
automatically with the conclusion of the contract, but rather 
comes into play only if the seller has held out a sample or mod-
el of the contracted goods.200  
The first question is whether the mere holding out suffices 
under Article 35(2)(c) CISG or an agreement between the par-
ties is also necessary. It is clear that no such doubts arise if the 
seller supplied a model or sample and the contract directly pro-
vides for the goods to conform to the latter (i.e. the contractual 
term provides for goods to be “as per sample” or “as per mod-
el”). The seller would have a twofold obligation towards the 
buyer: the sample not only creates a legal obligation, for  exam-
ple Article 35(2)(c) of the CISG, but also serves the function of a 
contractual description, thus binding the seller under Article 
35(1) CISG.201 The problems arise when the buyer has received 
a sample or model but has ordered the goods without any refer-
ence to them. On one side, it has been affirmed that goods do 
not need to conform to a given sample or model if parties have 
not so agreed .202 This position has been clearly acknowledged 
by the District Court of Berlin in the Shoes case203 (already 
                                                            
199 See SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, supra note 12, at 582. 
200 See Flechtner, supra note 116, at 5. 
201 See Poikela, supra note 34, at para. 5.4.1. 
202 See G.A., UNCITRAL Digest of case law on the United Nations Con-
vention on the International Sale of Goods, Art. 35, para. 11, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.9/SER.C/DIGEST/CISG/35 (2004) (recognizing that “the goods must 
conform to a model only if there is an express agreement in the contract that 
the goods will do so”); see also HERBER & CZERWENKA, supra note 139, at Art. 
35, para. 6. 
203 Landgericht Berlin [LG] [District Court] Sept. 15, 1994, 52 S 247/94 
(Ger.), English abstract available at, http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cases/ 
940915g1.html. 
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mentioned above)204 where the court stated that a “sample only 
has binding effects where the parties actually agreed so.”205  
Supporters of the opposing view believe, instead, that 
there is no need for an implied agreement as the mere holding 
out of the model or sample suffices to create a binding legal re-
lationship.206 It has been argued that by submitting a sample 
or model the seller specifies his offer by showing those qualities 
that will be possessed by the final product.207 An illustrative 
case which applied this second view was Delchi Carrier v. Ro-
torex208 decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit . Rotorex Corporation and Delchi Carrier SpA 
entered into a contract in which Rotorex agreed to supply 
10,800 compressors, which Delchi intended to use as part of the 
portable air conditioners it produced. Prior to the execution of 
the contract, the seller supplied the buyer with a sample com-
pressor. When two of the three expected shipments were deliv-
ered, the buyer realized that the goods failed to conform to the 
sample as they had lower cooling capacity and consumed more 
power than the sample. After several unsuccessful attempts to 
cure the defect, the buyer decided to avoid the sales contract 
and filed a claim for restitution of the purchase price and dam-
ages. The Second Circuit Court affirmed the decision of the tri-
al court finding the seller was liable as it had delivered goods 
that failed to conform to the sample provided. The Court held 
that the “agreement between [the parties] was based upon a 
sample compressor supplied by Rotorex” even though there was 
no reference of the sample in the contract.209 The court consid-
                                                            
204 See id. at para. 0. (2.5.2.1.1  Complying with the ordinary purpose: 
average quality, reasonable quality or merchantable quality?) 
205 Landgericht Berlin [LG] [regional court] Sept. 15, 1994, 52 S 247/94 
(Ger.), English abstract available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/940915g 
1.html. 
206 See SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, supra note 12, at 582. 
207 On this point see BIANCA & BONELL, supra note 8, at 276 (affirming 
that “the submission of a sample or a model involves by itself the seller's 
promise to provide goods possessing the same qualities as those shown to the 
buyer. Holding out a sample or a model is a concrete way for the seller to 
specify his offer. Without questioning the distinction between sale by sample 
or model and sale by description, it may be said that the submission of a 
sample or a model is a factual description and, therefore, a contractual way to 
determine the kind and quality of the goods the buyer is entitled to.”) 
208 Delchi Carrier, S.p.A. v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d 1024 (2d Cir. 1995). 
209 Id. at 1028. 
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ered the mere holding out of the sample sufficient to trigger Ar-
ticle 35(2)(c) even in the absence of an express or implied con-
tractual agreement between the parties.210  
Of the two positions, the latter has received wider support, 
not only because it is more in line with the legislative history, 
but also because it is more consistent with the nature of the 
provision. Article 35(2)(c) CISG finds its antecedent in Article 
33(c) of the ULIS. Matching up the two provisions what can be 
immediately noted is the different approach used by the draft-
ers of the two conventions. Under the ULIS, the obligation to 
deliver goods in conformity with the model or sample followed 
the seller’s express or implied undertaking.211 The legal obliga-
tion, therefore, could not arise if the seller merely handed over 
a sample or model without creating an understanding that the-
se would be representative of the final product. Drafters of the 
CISG, however, abandoned this approach and decided to elimi-
nate any reference to the concept of express or implied under-
taking.  
This conclusion is certainly more consistent with the na-
ture of the provision. Contrary to modern trend in comparative 
law,212 the CISG considers the obligation to deliver goods in 
conformity with the sample or model as an implied rather than 
an express conformity provision. Even though the choice may 
be criticized,213 it still is the undisputable structure of the 1980 
                                                            
210 Id. 
211 Precisely, Article 33(c) considered that the seller had not complied 
with its delivery obligation if it had delivered “goods which lack the qualities 
of a sample or model which the seller has handed over or sent to the buyer, 
unless the seller has submitted it without any express or implied undertak-
ing that the goods would conform therewith.” 
212 Indeed, in the United States legal system, the sample or model is con-
sidered an express contractual obligation similarly to an affirmation or de-
scription of the goods and is, in fact, placed under section 2 – 313 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code entitled “Express Warranties by Affirmation, 
Promise, Description, Sample”. Moreover, section 494 of the German BGB, 
considers the sale by sample or model as an express guarantee. An interme-
diate approach may be found in the 1979 English Sales of Law Act, which in 
section 15 provides that “[a] contract of sale is a contract for sale by sample 
where there is an express or implied term to that effect in the contract.” 
213 Professor Hyland correctly noted that: “As a practical matter, even the 
Convention's requirement that the goods conform to the sample or model will 
more closely resemble an express than an implied conformity requirement, 
for it is directly based on the seller's representations. It arises only when 
goods are ‘held out...as a sample or model,’ that is, in situations in which the 
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Vienna Convention and Article 35(2)(c) has to be considered ac-
cordingly. If the parties had to contractually agree on the con-
formity of the goods to the model or sample, Article 35(2)(c) 
would function as a default rule of an implied conformity obli-
gation that operates only when the parties have not otherwise 
agreed would be negated.214  
Moving on to the second condition, Article 35(2)(c) CISG 
clearly states that the model or sample must be held out by the 
seller. It follows that if the model or sample has been provided 
by the buyer (so-called ‘order sample’), the seller will have no 
obligation under Article 35(2c) to deliver goods of that kind or 
possessing those specific qualities.215 In order to hold the seller 
responsible two solutions have been suggested. On the one side, 
it has been proposed to apply this provision by analogy also to 
the cases in which the buyer supplies the sample.216 This solu-
tion, however, disregards the wording of the provision. The se-
cond, more preferable, solution regards these cases as falling 
under Article 35(1); what must be ascertained is whether the 
qualities of the ‘order sample’ have been implicitly agreed be-
tween the parties.217 In the Marble Slabs case,218 the Appellate 
Court of Graz adopted this second solution. An Austrian buyer 
entered into a contract with an Italian seller for the purchase 
of granite slabs. The order had been made referring to a sample 
marble block that had been supplied to the seller. When the 
slabs were delivered, however, the buyer claimed a breach of 
contract as the color of the goods allegedly differed from the 
color of the sample provided. The Court of First Instance219 
                                                                                                                                     
required conformity between the goods and the sample or model might as 
easily be considered ‘required by the contract’. The legislative history pro-
vides no hint of the reason for the characterization of the sample or model re-
quirement as implied. In fact, it is doubtful that the drafters focused on the 
potential consequences”. See HYLAND, supra note 70, at 305, 323. 
214 See Neumann, supra note 115, at 82. 
215 See SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, supra note 12, at 584. 
216 Cf. HUBER and MULLIS, supra note 51, at 140. 
217 See SCHLECHTRIEM & BUTLER, supra note 5, at 120, affirming that “If 
the buyer uses an order sample it has to be ascertained whether the charac-
teristics of that sample have been agreed upon impliedly and if requirements 
of Article 35(1) CISG have been met.” 
218 Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional Court for Appeals from a 
Landesgericht], Nov. 9, 1995, docket No. 6 R 194/95, available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/951109a3.html (Austria). 
219 Landesgericht für Zivilrechtssachen [LGZ], June 28, 1995, docket No. 
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ruled in favor of the buyer and recognized its right to reduce 
the final price by 20%. On appeal the Oberlandesgericht direct-
ly addressed the issue of the ‘order sample’ and recognized the 
following: 
It is insignificant that Art. 35(2) CISG presupposes that the sell-
er has held out the sample or model to the buyer, whereas in the 
present case the [buyer] has presented the color sample taken 
from a brochure […] Even if one assumed that Art. 35(2)(c) CISG 
was not applicable to such a case, an agreement of the parties 
that the stone was to correspond to the color sample would con-
stitute an agreement on a specific quality under Art. 35(1) 
CISG.220 
Having analyzed the conditions that trigger the application 
of this implied conformity obligation, it is now possible to sub-
stantiate what is meant by conformity to the given model or 
sample. 
2.5.2.3.1  Determining the conformity to a model or sample 
The seller provides the buyer a sample or model of the good 
with the intent of identifying and describing the subject matter 
of the contract. The main difficulty, however, concerns the fact 
that goods possess an infinite number of characteristics, and, 
unless the parties expressly specify, it is often difficult to de-
termine which are illustrated by the sample or model.221 As a 
preliminary issue, it must be noted that the situation differs 
according to whether the seller has provided a sample or a 
model. Indeed, while the former is taken from the goods that 
the seller intends to deliver, the latter is a representation of 
the goods that will be supplied although they are still not 
available.222 Given the differences between samples and mod-
                                                                                                                                     
Cg 321/93a-55, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/950628a3.html 
(Austria). 
220 Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional Court for Appeals from a 
Landesgericht], Nov. 9, 1995, docket No. 6 R 194/95, available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/951109a3.html (Austria). 
221 See HYLAND, supra note 70, at 305, 324. 
222 The definition of the two words reflect this distinction. According to 
the Oxford English Dictionary, the term sample is defined as “a small part or 
quantity intended to show what the whole is like” and the term model is de-
fined as a “representation of a person or thing or of a proposed structure, typ-
ically on a smaller scale than the original.” OXFORD’S ENGLISH DICTIONARY 
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els, the two may represent, to a different extent, the qualities 
the final product must possess. Unless the parties have other-
wise agreed, when a sample is provided from the bulk of goods 
that is the subject matter of the contract, there should be a per-
fect identity between the sample and the final product. Indeed, 
where a seller has provided a sample, it has created an under-
standing that the final goods will possess all the features of 
that sample.223  
However, “models may range from crude approximations to 
detailed replicas [and therefore] may be meant to portray one, 
several, many, or all of the characteristics of the goods”.224 It is 
impossible to determine ex ante the level of correspondence in-
tended. It follows that when a model is supplied, one must in-
terpret the specific situation so to establish which of the many 
features of the goods are illustrated by the model.225 This is 
fundamental as the seller will have complied with its conformi-
ty obligations only if the final goods possess those qualities that 
were portrayed by the model.226 The level of correspondence, 
therefore, varies according to the number of features that the 
model represented.  
Notwithstanding the differences in degree of correspond-
ence, in both of the above situations the buyer ultimately has a 
precise understanding of the features the final good must pos-
sess to comply with the conformity requirements. This asser-
tion, however, does not apply in those cases in which the seller 
provides a model or a sample only to give an approximate de-
scription of the goods offered to the buyer. In those circum-
stances, the final goods must possess the qualities illustrated 
                                                                                                                                     
page # (ed., year)----NEEDS CITATION 
223 On this point see HONNOLD, supra note 32, at 258, affirming that 
“[w]here the seller has held out goods to the buyer as a sample or model he 
has created an understanding that the goods would conform to the sample.” 
224 See HYLAND, supra note 70, at 305, [32? insert page number] (Peter 
Schlechtriem ed., 1987). 
225 Cf. AUDIT, supra note 47, at 98. 
226 As clearly reported in the Secretariat Commentary on Article  35 “if 
the seller indicates that the sample or model is different from the goods to be 
delivered in certain respects, he will not be held to those qualities of the sam-
ple or model but will be held only to those qualities which he has indicated 
are possessed by the goods to be delivered”. See Secretariat Commentary on 
article 33 of the 1978 Draft [draft counterpart of CISG article 35] [conformity 
of the goods], CISG DATABASE, Aug. 29, 2006 at. para. 11, available at 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/secomm/secomm-35.html. 
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either by the sample or by the model but slight deviations are 
to be tolerated.227 In the absence of a precise indication on 
what is to be considered as an acceptable deviation from the 
agreed standard, due reference has to be given to the circum-
stances of the specific case, including the negotiations.  
A last scenario, which completely differs from those de-
scribed above, is one in which the seller provides a model or 
sample “without any obligation”. In those rather limited cir-
cumstances, the seller has no legal obligation to deliver goods 
in conformity with the model or sample as they do not become 
the agreed qualitative standard of the contract. 
Although there are no doubts that the seller must deliver 
goods possessing those qualities that are easily noticeable upon 
a proper inspection of the sample, it is not clear whether the fi-
nal product must also comply with those “hidden” features that 
could have been identified only with a thorough and detailed 
examination. It must be underlined that this issue applies sole-
ly to those circumstances in which the level of correspondence 
requested is at its maximum, meaning that goods presented as 
sample or model and goods delivered must be identical. In par-
ticular, when the seller warrants some specific features they 
must necessarily be present regardless of whether they are ap-
parent at first glance or only after a detailed examination.  
In the absence of a precise indication within the CISG, 
there are serious doubts as to whether the conformity obliga-
tions cover both apparent and “hidden” features of the sample. 
Starting from the commonly accepted assumption according to 
which when a sample is provided the final goods must possess 
all of its qualities, it has been argued that the seller must de-
liver goods possessing also those features that are identifiable 
only through a detailed inspection regardless of the buyer’s 
knowledge on the existence of the latter.228 Supporters of this 
                                                            
227 See BIANCA & BONELL, supra note 8, at 276. 
228 As correctly noted by Professors Huber and Mullis “That the qualities 
not present in goods delivered were hidden or not apparent from the sample 
might be a relevant factor to take into account in deciding whether the 
breach was a fundamental one.” See HUBER and MULLIS, supra note 51, at 
140. Indeed, when considering whether a breach is of fundamental nature or 
not, art. 25 CISG imposes to verify if the buyer has been deprived of what it 
was entitled to expect under the contract. It is clear that if the buyer was not 
even aware of the existence of a feature, it can hardly allege that it expected 
the final product to possess it. In support of this position see Franco Ferrari, 
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position argue that there is nothing in the CISG that suggests 
a limitation of the protection solely to the easily identifiable 
physical characteristics. Notwithstanding the uncertainties re-
lated to the issue, this conclusion seems the most reasonable as 
even if they were not readily identifiable during the initial in-
spection, the seller must still deliver a product possessing all 
the qualities of the sample, whether apparent or hidden.229 
2.5.2.3.2  Solving conflicts between Article 35(2)(c) and the 
other conformity obligations 
It is not always possible for the seller to supply goods that 
comply with all the conformity obligations. Suppose, for exam-
ple, that the buyer, an experienced firm in the fishing industry, 
is interested in purchasing hooks to catch fish weighing be-
tween 150 and 190 kg. Before the conclusion of the contract, 
the seller provides the buyer with different hook samples stat-
ing that they were representative of the product being offered. 
Of the many hooks provided, the buyer selects one which, how-
ever, is fit to catch fish weighing no more than 150 kg. When 
ordering the product, the buyer first identifies the hook stating 
that this had to be “as per sample #XXXXX” but then describes 
the goods by specifying that they had to be fit for catching fish 
weighing between 150 and 190 kg. Given the discrepancy be-
tween the sample and the contractual description of the goods, 
the seller must choose whether the expressed or the implied 
conformity obligations must take priority. Although the word-
ing of the CISG might suggest that when the parties have “oth-
erwise agreed”230 the implied conformity obligation should not 
apply,231 in case of contrast between the contractual terms and 
                                                                                                                                     
Fundamental Breach of Contract Under the UN Sales Law – 25 Years of Arti-
cle 25 CISG, (2006) 25 J. L. & COM. 489, 497 (2006) affirming that “[f]rom the 
language of Article 25, it can be derived that the extent of the detrimental 
consequences of a breach of contract must be assessed by reference to what 
the damaged party could have expected under the contract." 
229 See HUBER and MULLIS, supra note 51, at 140.  
230 CISG, supra note 7, at art. 35(2).  
231 See ENDERLEIN & MASKOW, supra note 158, at 144. (Affirming that “In 
the case of a sample or model, a problem might arise if the contract described 
the quality of the goods in a different manner than is shown by the sample or 
model. Only if there is not a different description in the contract will the 
sample or model prevail. Otherwise, I do not think that the sample should 
prevail in any case if the description in the contract was clear and unambigu-
62http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss1/4
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the sample it has been argued that “the conflict must be inter-
preted on the facts of the individual case in order to establish 
which qualities the parties intended to take priority”.232 This 
contra legem approach is justified in light of the fact that the 
sample is a “factual” description of the final goods that eventu-
ally become part of the contractual agreement.  
The need to consider the facts of the specific case has been 
recognized by the Austrian Supreme Court in the Frames for 
Mountain Bikes case.233 A German buyer and an Austrian sell-
er entered into a contract for the sale of mountain bikes. The 
contractual relationship was premised on the seller’s presenta-
tion of a special model built with a milled frame that rendered 
the bicycle particularly light. However, the buyer had not 
placed an order on the occasion of the initial presentation but 
several months later. When placing the order, the buyer re-
quested specific models of mountain bikes that had the normal 
frame. Once the bikes were delivered, the buyer realized that 
they did not possess the special milled frames and in turn re-
fused to pay the outstanding price and asserted a claim for res-
titution for the amount paid, which the seller refused. In the 
ensuing litigation the Court of First Instance234 dismissed the 
claim on the grounds that the buyer had misunderstood the 
presentation of the bicycles as the seller neither explicitly nor 
tacitly promised to deliver specially milled frames bicycles. On 
appeal the Court of Appeals235 reversed the decision. It held 
that the fact that the buyer had ordered a specific model of 
normally framed bicycles was not relevant as the sample sup-
plied by the seller had created an understanding that all the 
bicycles would have possessed such special frame. The seller, in 
turn appealed to the Austrian Supreme Court. The Oberster 
Gerichtshof reversed the Appellate Court's decision and re-
manded the case to the Court of First Instance. In doing so, the 
                                                                                                                                     
ous.”) 
232 SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, supra note 12, at 583. 
233 Oberster Gerichtshof, [OGH] [Supreme Court], Mar. 11, 1999, docket 
No. 2 Ob 163/97b, (Austria), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/990 
311a3.html [accessed 19 September 2011]. 
234 Landesgericht Innsbruck, [LGZ] Wien, Jul. 12, 1996, docket No. GZ 11 
Cg 1/95k-62 (Austria).  
235 Oberlandesgericht Innsbruck, Nov. 15, 1996, docket No. GZ 4 R 
244/96f-68 (Austria). 
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Supreme Court recognized the discrepancies in the contract 
and suggested that the solution on which qualities should take 
priority had to be found by interpreting the circumstances of 
the specific case.  
A conflict between Art. 35(2)(c) and the expressed terms of 
the contract are not the only scenarios that may give rise to 
conflicts amongst conformity provisions. Indeed, complying 
with the sample may well lead to the delivery of goods that are 
not fit to be employed for their ordinary or particular purposes. 
Starting with the conflict between letters (a) and (c) of Art. 
35(2), what can be affirmed, at the outset, is that there is no 
straightforward solution to this conflict. The leading opinion 
considers that in case of sale by sample or model the qualities 
of the latter should be complied with even if this means deliver-
ing a good which is not fit for its ordinary purpose. This view is 
based on the assumption that Art. 35(2)(c), to a certain extent, 
can be regarded as some sort of parties’ agreement that should 
therefore take priority over the purely objective standards con-
tained in Art. 35(2)(a).236 This position, however, has not found 
unanimous support. Sponsors of the opposing view suggest that 
in case of contrast between the two implied conformity obliga-
tions, Art. 35(2)(c) CISG should prevail “only if it is clear that 
the parties understood that compliance with the model or sam-
ple inevitably meant that goods would not be fit for their usual 
purpose”.237 In the absence of a precise indication contained 
within the Convention, this last solution appears as being more 
reasonable also considering that the CISG does not set a pre-
cise hierarchy between the different implied conformity obliga-
tions.  
A different solution is instead suggested when the contrast 
is between letters (c) and (b) of Art. 35(2) CISG. These are the 
cases in which, if the goods were to correspond with the sample 
or model, they would not be fit for the particular purpose in-
tended by the buyer. An example of this situation would be the 
one illustrated above regarding fishing hooks. In that case, 
while the buyer wanted a special hook capable of catching fish 
weighing up to 190 kg, it ordered a product referring to a sam-
ple hook that was not fit to catch fish weighing more than 150 
                                                            
236 Magnus, supra note 184, at para. 37. 
237 See HUBER and MULLIS, supra note 51, at 140.  
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kg. It is clear that if the seller complies with the model or sam-
ple, the final product will not be fit for the particular purpose. 
In case such a conflict was to arise, the seller must deliver 
goods in conformity with the sample or model as  Art. 35(2)(c) 
CISG will take priority. The reason behind this conclusion has 
been summarized by Professor  Schlechtriem: “Since the spirit 
and purpose of a sale by sample or model is to give the buyer 
the possibility of examining the goods or using them in a trial 
run, it should, as a rule, be assumed that qualities provided for 
under Art. 35(2)(c) CISG take priority, because, in that respect, 
the buyer places no reliance on the seller’s skills and judg-
ment”.238 
2.5.2.4  Art. 35(2)(d): usual or adequate packaging 
The last implied conformity obligation deals with the way 
goods should be packaged in case parties have not expressly 
agreed on this point. Art. 35(2)(d) provides for two alternative 
ways in which goods must be packed: either in a manner which 
is usual for such goods or, if there is no such manner, in a way 
that guarantees an adequate protection. The 1978 Draft Con-
vention only provided for goods to be “contained or packaged in 
the manner usual for such goods”.239 The addition of the second 
part of the provision was suggested by the Australian delega-
tion at the Diplomatic Conference. According to the proposal, 
Art. 35(2)(d) had to be amended so as to also provide for goods 
to be “packed in a manner which, in the circumstances, would 
generally afford greater protection than the manner usual for 
such goods, or where there is no manner usual for such goods, 
in a manner adequate to preserve and protect the goods”.240 
The reasoning behind the addition was that the initial text of 
Art. 35(2)(d) did not cover all those situations in which there 
was no established “usual” way to contain or pack the goods.241 
                                                            
238 See SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, supra note 12, at 583. 
239 CISG, supra note 7, at 103.  
240 CISG, supra note 7, at 104. 
241 CISG, supra note 5, at 316, para. 72. Indeed, the Australian delegate, 
Mrs. Kamarul, pointed out that “Her delegation considered that paragraph 
1(d), which indicated the way in which the goods should be contained or 
packaged, did not cover all possible situations. What would happen if the 
goods were of a new type and there was no usual container or packaging for 
them? The provision proposed by her delegation provided that in cases where 
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During the discussion that led to the adoption of the current 
wording, the Australian delegation, however, decided to with-
draw the first part of the amendment. It had been heavily criti-
cized not only in light of the fact that its application might 
have led to increase the price of the transaction,242 but also be-
cause such a rule would place upon the seller an excessively 
heavy burden.243 Once the proposed addition was restricted, 
the First Committee adopted the amendment.244  
 Similarly to Art. 35(2)(a), the function of this implied 
conformity obligation is to set a minimum standard the seller 
must respect when packing the goods.245 It is clear that the 
standard set by Art. 35(2)(d) suffers a high degree of uncertain-
ty as it will vary according to the circumstances of the specific 
case. Other than the type of goods involved in the transaction, 
the manner of packaging will change, amongst others, accord-
ing to the quantity, the method of transportation, the type and 
duration of the carriage and the climate in the country of des-
tination.246 Aware of the infinite variables, which can influence 
this situation, the same drafters of the CISG have decided to 
adopt an open formula, which avoids any concrete indication as 
to how the packaging must occur.  
Art. 35(2)(d) applies irrespective of whether the goods must 
be delivered at the buyer’s place of business or merely have to 
be placed at his disposal for collection. This can be implied from 
                                                                                                                                     
new standards had not been established, the manner in which the goods 
would be contained or packaged should be adequate to preserve and protect 
them.”  
242 CISG, supra note 5, at 316, para. 74. (Reporting the Swedish dele-
gate’s opinion which noted that “The buyer would obviously not complain if 
the goods he received were packaged in a better manner than was usual or 
than had been specified in the contract, but that would not be true if the 
packaging involved the buyer in extra expense.”) 
243 CISG, supra note 5, at 317, para. 76. Mr. Szàsz, from Hungary, point-
ed out this issue affirming that the first part of the Australian amendment 
“might improve the minimum rules laid down in the present text of article 33, 
but in view of the doubts as to its implications, it would be better to leave it 
to the parties who wished to go further than the minimum rules to settle the 
matter in the contract between them.”  
244 CISG, supra note 5, at 104, para. 6. Notwithstanding the second part 
of the amendment had been orally withdrawn, the Australian proposal was 
adopted by a margin of only 3 votes with 22 in favor and 19 against.  
245 Secretariat Commentary, supra note 8, at para.12.  
246 See ENDERLEIN & MASKOW, supra note 158, at 159.  
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the CISG itself, as the wording of the provision does not distin-
guish contracts of sale involving carriage of goods from other 
type of contracts. It follows that even if the goods need not to be 
delivered, they must be contained or packaged so to allow the 
buyer to load and carry them away.247 The burden of packing 
the goods will shift from the seller to the buyer only if the con-
tract expressly provides for such different allocation of du-
ties.248  
Whether the goods are delivered to the buyer or left at his 
disposition, the seller is to be considered liable for any damage 
caused by the inadequate packaging, regardless when it occurs. 
It follows that, contrary to the general rule;249 the seller will 
also bear the costs of damages arising after the passing of the 
risk.250 According to the first paragraph of such provision, the 
seller is to be considered liable for any lack of conformity 
“which exists at the time when the risk passes to the buyer, 
even though [this] becomes apparent only after that time”.251 
An example came before the Appellate Court of Koblenz in the 
Bottles case.252 This dispute involved an Italian seller and a 
German buyer who had concluded a contract for the sale of a 
certain number of bottles. The product had to be delivered “ex-
factory”253 and then taken over by a carrier employed by the 
buyer. Once the bottles had been delivered, the buyer refused 
to pay the purchase price alleging that due to the inadequate 
packaging the bottles had been either broken or had lost their 
sterility and thus were not useable. The seller, therefore, filed a 
claim against the buyer requesting payment of the full pur-
                                                            
247 Poikela, supra note 34, at para. 5.5.1. 
248 See BIANCA & BONELL, supra note 8, at 277. 
249 See Sylvain Bollée,  ‘The Theory of Risks in the 1980 Vienna Sale of 
Goods Convention’ in PACE REVIEW OF THE CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR 
THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (Kluwer Law International, 1999-2000) at 
271, available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/bollee.html. Rec-
ognizing that “The buyer must bear loss of or damage to the goods from the 
moment at which risk passes to him.” 
250 See HUBER and MULLIS, supra note 51, at 141.  
251 CISG, supra note 7, at art. 36(1). 
252 Oberlandesgericht Koblenz, [OLG] [Higher Regional Court] Dec. 16, 
2006, No. 2 U 923/06, (Ger.), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/061 
214g1.html [accessed 19 September 2011]. 
253 This is a commonly used International Commercial Term (so called 
Incoterms), which indicates those cases in which goods have to be collected at 
the seller’s premises. 
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chase price. The Court of First Instance rejected the claim and 
ruled in favor of the buyer, recognizing that the bottles had 
been improperly packaged. The seller challenged this finding 
alleging that the damage to the bottles occurred after the goods 
had been handed over to the carrier. The Oberlandesgericht of 
Koblenz, however, rejected the appeal on the basis that the 
damage was not due to their miscarriage, but rather to their 
improper packaging. It follows that, although the risk might 
have been shifted to the buyer, the seller is to be considered li-
able for those defects, which are due to his own non-compliance 
with the contract.  
2.5.2.4.1  Usual packaging 
According to the first part of Art. 35(2)(d), the seller must 
deliver goods that are “contained or packaged in the manner 
usual for such goods”. When determining what constitutes the 
“usual” packaging, regard should be primarily had to any usage 
that applies in the particular trade branch.254 It follows that in 
order to understand the extent of the seller’s obligation, one 
must identify if a specific trade usage exists. In the absence of 
a precise conventional definition of the concept,255 a usage is 
deemed existing if the two conditions set by Art. 9(2) are re-
spected.256 According to the first “subjective” criterion, the par-
ties are bound by those usages which they knew or ought to 
have known. The second condition is rather more objective and 
                                                            
254 See SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, supra note 12, at 584. 
255 See Chan Leng Sun, ‘Interpreting an International Sale Contract’ in 
Celebrating Success: 25 Years United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods (Coalition of Papers at UNCITRAL - SIAC Con-
ference 22-23 Sept 2005, Singapore) at 84, available at 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/sun1.html.  
256 Leonardo Graffi, Remarks on Trade Usages and Business Practices in 
International Sales Law 3 BELGRADE LAW REVIEW 105 (2011), available at 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/graffi1.html#ii [accessed 19 Septem-
ber 2011]. The author recognizes two conditions under art. 9(2): CISG “in-
cludes two prongs: (a) a subjective one and (b) an objective one. The subjec-
tive prong essentially states that, unless otherwise agreed, the parties are 
deemed to have impliedly made applicable to their contract or its formation a 
usage of which the parties knew or ought to have known. This means that if 
the subjective test is met, both parties will be bound by the usage. The objec-
tive test requires that the usage be "widely known" in international trade, 
and be regularly observed by parties to contracts of the type involved in the 
particular trade concerned.” 
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demands for the usage to be widely known and regularly ob-
served by those who deal in the particular trade sector.  
The situation becomes more complex if goods are different-
ly contained or packaged from place to place. While some au-
thors tend to believe that the local standards in the place of 
business of one or the other party need not be considered when 
assessing the “usualness” of the packaging,257 others, instead, 
recognize that “a usage that is of local origin […] may be appli-
cable if it is 'widely known to and regularly observed by' parties 
to international transactions involving these situations”.258 
This second opinion was also upheld by the Appellate Court of 
Saarbrücken in the Marble Panel case.259 To ensure a correct 
delivery of natural stone marble panels, the buyer had conclud-
ed a contract with a transport company. When the panels ar-
rived in a damaged condition, the buyer commenced legal pro-
ceedings against the transport company. The transport 
company, in turn, filed a claim against the seller alleging that 
goods had been improperly packaged. In addressing this second 
claim, the Court of Appeals first recognized that, in the absence 
of a contractual determination as to the packaging, it must sat-
isfy the criteria set by Art. 35(2)(d). The Court then proceeded 
to analyze the implied conformity obligation and stated that: 
“In order to determine whether or not the obligation to deliver 
has been breached, it must be examined whether the goods are 
contained or packaged in the manner usual and adequate for 
such goods. In general, the standards in the seller's country de-
termine the adequacy for usual purposes.”260 
This view is to be preferred because it is more consistent 
with the wording used by the CISG. Indeed, Article 35(2)(d) 
does not require for an internationally accepted standard and, 
therefore, nothing prevents a widely known and generally ac-
cepted packaging standard of local origin from being binding 
for the seller. 
                                                            
257 See SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, supra note 12, at 584. Affirming 
that “attempts to regard the standards in the State of the place of business of 
one of the parties, e.g. of the seller, [...] do not seem appropriate.” 
258 HONNOLD, supra note 32, at 178.  
259 See Oberlandesgericht Saarbrücken, [OLG] Jan. 17, 2007 No. 5 U 
426/96-54 (Ger.), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/070117g1.html 
[accessed 19 September 2011]. 
260 Id. at para. 2. 
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2.5.2.4.2  Adequate Packaging 
The second part of Article 35(2)(d) CISG is intended to deal 
with those cases in which the contract does not determine the 
manner goods should be packaged and there is no widely 
known and regularly observed way in which it should be done.  
According to the provision, the seller is bound to deliver 
goods contained or packaged in a manner adequate to preserve 
and protect them. What follows is that the “adequateness” of 
the packaging cannot be ascertained ex ante. The sole criterion 
is the ability of the packaging to preserve and protect the 
goods. The peculiarity of this obligation is that the CISG does 
not call for the application of an objective standard, but rather 
adopts a functional approach that judges the conformity ac-
cording to the results achieved. The seller has absolute freedom 
to pack or contain the goods as it deems appropriate, provided 
that this guarantees an adequate protection and preservation 
of the goods. However, the seller is not liable for any damage 
merely affecting the packaging. As has been pointed out “if the 
packaging is damaged during transport of the goods, without 
the goods themselves being damaged, the seller incurs in no li-
ability if the sole purpose of the packaging was to ensure the 
protection of the goods during transport”.261  
Although the “adequateness” of the packaging will be eval-
uated after the goods have been delivered in light of its capaci-
ty to protect and preserve, the packaging to be used must be 
determined prior to the shipment. Therefore, the seller, must 
predict what would guarantee the desired result. As a general 
rule, the manner is to be considered adequate when it seems 
appropriate in light of the circumstances of the specific case,262 
thus the seller will consider the nature of the goods, the dura-
tion, the type of transport, and the climatic conditions..263 
There is no way of verifying the correctness of the seller’s deci-
sion until the goods have been handed over to the first carrier 
or to the buyer.  
                                                            
261 See SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, supra note 12, at 569, which also 
correctly adds “The position is different if the packaging forms part of the 
contract; for example, the original packaging of branded goods or permanent 
packaging intended for subsequent resale, such as bottles or bags.” 
262 See BIANCA & BONELL, supra note 8, at 269. 
263 Id. at 269. Cf. HUBER and MULLIS, supra note 51, at 141. 
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When selecting the appropriate method, the buyer must 
consider that the packaging not only has to endure the car-
riage, but has to last until the goods have been delivered at the 
seller’s place of destination. If the seller knew or should have 
known of a possible redirection or re-dispatch, the selected 
packaging must be fit to endure and last until the new destina-
tion.264 
3. EXCLUSION OF LIABILITY IN CASE OF NON-CONFORMING 
DELIVERY 
Article 35 paragraph (1) and (2) set those criteria which 
have to be used when evaluating the conformity of the goods to 
the contract. As a general rule, violating any of these provi-
sions constitutes a breach of contract entitling the buyer to 
those remedies envisaged by the CISG. The same Convention, 
however, provides for cases in which the seller’s liability is ex-
cluded even when a breach of the express or implied conformity 
obligation occurs. There are two main circumstances in which 
the buyer loses the right to rely on lack of conformity: 1) when 
it knew or could not have been unaware of the defectiveness of 
the goods, and 2) when it failed to give notice of the non-
conforming delivery. 
3.1 Article 35(3): Awareness of the Buyer 
Delivering goods that fail to comply with the conformity 
requirements provided by the Convention does not always al-
low the buyer to invoke the remedies provided for the breach of 
contract. Article 35(3) excludes the seller’s liability for any lack 
of conformity if at the time of the conclusion of the contract, the 
buyer knew or could not have been unaware of the non-
conformity. The underlying principle behind this provision is 
that the buyer who agreed to purchase goods notwithstanding 
their notable or apparent defectiveness cannot expect to receive 
a product of better quality and condition.265 However, it is im-
                                                            
264 See Poikela, supra note 34, at para. 5.5.1. 
265 Cf. SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 106, at 6, recognizing “that the pre-
sumption of corresponding promises in article 35(2)(a-d) cannot hold where 
the parties knew the condition of the goods and the buyer thus could not ex-
pect the seller to impliedly warrant the ordinary or particular qualities requi-
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portant to note that not all knowledge of the non-conformity is 
capable of triggering the exception provided by Article35(3). In-
formation gained after the contract has been concluded will not 
affect the seller’s obligation to deliver conforming goods.266 
Notwithstanding its clear wording, there is still much de-
bate on the extent of Article 35(3) CISG. Although the provi-
sion expressly excludes the seller’s liability “under [Article. 
35(2)] sub-paragraphs (a) to (d),” some authors267 believe it 
should apply by analogy to the lack of conformity covered by 
paragraph (1). The main argument in support of this view is, in 
both common and civil law jurisdictions, express conformity re-
quirements are sometimes excluded when the buyer either was 
aware of the defect or was offered the opportunity to examine 
the goods (and therefore could have become aware of the de-
fect).268 This position, however, should be rejected. Not only be-
cause according to the “autonomous” interpretation of the 
CISG, the solutions adopted by national regulators are not rel-
                                                                                                                                     
site for the contractual purpose.” See also D. Ramos Muñoz, The Rules on 
Communication of Defects in the CISG: Static Rules and Dynamic Environ-
ments. Different Scenarios for a Single Player, Dec. 2005, at para. VII (2)(B), 
available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/munoz.html#2. 
266 See FOLSOM ET AL., supra note 190, at 88. 
267 See ENDERLEIN & MASKOW, supra note 158, at 147, expressly affirming 
that “We could imagine that paragraph 3 be applied analogously to the re-
quirements under the contract pursuant to paragraph 1.” On this point, see 
also DAS UNCITRAL-KAUFRECHT IM VERGLEICH ZUM ÖSTERREICHEN RECHT, 
109 (Peter Doralt eds., Manz, Vienna, 1985); see also LOOKOFSKY, supra note 
31, at 95 fn. 4. 
268 See HYLAND, supra note 70, at 327, recalling the following three ex-
amples “Under French law, the buyer who is aware of a defect may not recov-
er for it. It would seem therefore that the buyer's knowledge, at the time the 
contract is concluded, of the absence of an agreed-upon characteristic of the 
goods would preclude the seller's liability. The buyer's duty to inspect under 
French law probably applies equally to qualities expressly required by the 
contract. Similarly, under German law, the buyer who knows of the absence 
of a guaranteed characteristic may not hold the seller for nonconformity. 
However, in the case either of a guaranteed characteristic or of a defect which 
the seller guaranteed would not be present, the buyer who does not actually 
know of the problem may recover, even if the buyer was grossly negligent for 
failing to inspect. Within the framework of the UCC, it is unclear what con-
sequences should be ascribed to the buyer's knowledge that the goods do not 
conform to the seller's express representations. In some situations, the buy-
er's knowledge may prevent the representations from becoming part of the 
basis of the bargain. In others, the seller's representations may cause the 
buyer to believe that the goods will be brought into conformity with the con-
tract before they are tendered.” 
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evant when interpreting the provisions, but also because both 
the legislative history and the underlying principle of Article. 
35(3) of the CISG are inconsistent with this solution. Starting 
from the legislative history, it is clear from the Official Records 
that the drafters of the CISG expressly decided not to extend 
this exception to the express conformity obligations. In the 
course of the 37th meeting of the First Committee, the Norwe-
gian delegate proposed to modify Article 35(3) CISG so as to in-
clude in the exception the cases provided by Article 35(1) 
CISG.269 The proposal was rejected because it would modify the 
substance of the provision.270  
When it comes to analyzing the underlying principles of 
Article 35, it is even clearer that the exception provided by Ar-
ticle 35(3) should solely cover the implied conformity obliga-
tions. The provisions contained in Article 35(2) sub-paragraphs 
(a) to (d) operate as default rules that apply insofar as the par-
ties have not otherwise agreed. If the buyer had positive 
knowledge of the non-conformity in respect of one of the quali-
ties at the time of contracting, it could not later expect the 
goods to conform in that respect.271 The situation is clearly dif-
ferent when the parties contractually agreed on a specific qual-
ity. Even if the buyer knew or should have known that the 
goods were defective at the time of the conclusion of the con-
tract, it can still contract for full performance assuming that 
                                                            
269 The Norwegian Amendment (A/CONF.97/C. 1/L.102) proposed to “re-
place the words subparagraphs (a) to (d) of paragraph [draft] (1) of this arti-
cle’ by the words ‘the preceding paragraph." This rewording was so justified 
“According to that phrase there was an exception to the subsequent sub-
paragraphs when otherwise agreed, but any further liability agreed to would 
fall outside the scope of paragraph 2 and would fall under paragraph 1, to 
which paragraph 3 did not refer. Paragraph 3 as drafted thus appeared […] 
to be too restrictive and confusing, and [it was] proposed that it be reworded 
to refer not merely to subparagraphs (a) to (d) of paragraph 2, but to [art. 35] 
in its entirety.” See United Nations Conference on Contracts for International 
Sale of Goods – Official Records supra note 90, at 426 para. 5. 
270 Id. at 427, para. 5, reporting that “Mr. HJERNER (Sweden) said he 
opposed the Norwegian amendment which, he thought, involved a change of 
substance. Paragraph 3 of article [35] provided for an exception to subpara-
graphs (a) to (d) of paragraph 2 by exonerating the seller from liability if, at 
the time of the conclusion of the contract, the buyer new or could not have 
been unaware of the lack of conformity. The introductory phrase of paragraph 
2, which provided for express agreement between the parties, should not be 
linked to paragraph 3, which referred to a simple state of affairs.” 
271 See Poikela, supra note 34, at para. 5.6. 
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the seller will remedy the non-conformity prior to the deliv-
ery.272 Indeed, when there is a specific contractual provision, 
the buyer’s actual or supposed knowledge of the condition of 
the good is irrelevant as it does not modify the content of what 
the seller has promised to the buyer.273 As pointed out by the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, the 
theory behind the inapplicability of paragraph (3) to the ex-
press conformity obligations is based on the fact that "[t]he 
buyer's knowledge of defects in the goods may modify the im-
plied obligations based on normal expectations, but not the 
promises or undertaking that relate to this specific transac-
tion."274 Any other solution would not only violate the principle 
of  which the primary source of rules governing international 
sales is the agreement of the parties, but would also lead to the 
unrealistic consequence that the seller would never be bound 
by contractual provisions for better quality goods. 
Another reason that justifies the inapplicability of Article 
35(3) CISG to the express conformity obligations is the impos-
sibility for this exception to operate with part of Article 35(1) 
CISG. Prior knowledge is inconceivable where the non-
conformity implies differences in quantity or delivery of a 
product of a different type from that contracted.275 Where the 
contract provides for a given quantity of a specific good, the 
buyer will realize the lack of conformity in respect of quantity 
or type of the goods only when they have been delivered.  
The buyer’s positive knowledge of the non-conformity, 
however, plays a role, though limited, in the interpretation of 
the contract. Even though it will not exempt the seller from the 
express conformity obligations under Article 35(1), the buyer’s 
awareness of the non-conformity will eventually be considered 
when understanding whether the relevant features have actu-
ally been agreed upon.276 The seller might well argue that, de-
spite the wording of the provision, the parties have otherwise 
agreed277 or, according to Article (8) CISG, any reasonable per-
                                                            
272 See supra note 8, para. 14. 
273 See BIANCA & BONELL, supra note 8, at 279.  
274 See UNCITRAL, supra note 18, at 46, para. 74. 
275 See ENDERLEIN, supra note 187, at 160. 
276 Cf. HUBER and MULLIS, supra note 51, at 142. 
277 See Henschel, supra note 42, at para. 4.2. 
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son in the same position of the buyer would have understood 
that in these specific circumstances the final goods would not 
possess those specific characteristics.278 Moreover, in the ex-
treme situation where the buyer knows from the beginning 
that the lack of conformity cannot be rectified, the seller will 
not be bound to comply with the contract. Any insistence on 
compliance of the goods with that specific characteristic would 
not only constitute venire contra factum proprium279 but would 
also violate the principle of good faith in international trade.280  
As already pointed out when tracing the legislative history 
of this provision,281 one crucial difference between Article 35(3) 
CISG and its predecessor is the inclusion of sale by sample or 
model. According to the current formulation, even when goods 
are sold on the basis of a sample or model, the buyer may not 
rely on apparent qualities he knows in reality are not present 
in the contracted goods.282 As has been noted, Article 35(3) 
CISG, however, is of little practical importance when it comes 
to sale by sample or model.283  Since the seller is obliged to de-
liver goods possessing all the qualities of the sample or model, 
the buyer cannot expect to receive goods of better quality, and 
the seller cannot deliver goods of lesser quality. Provided that 
the final product corresponds to the sample or model, there is 
no need to investigate whether the buyer had actual or implied 
knowledge of the defects in the goods.  
Although the wording of Article 35(3) of the CISG does not 
expressly mention any exception, there are two cases in which 
the seller is liable even if the buyer knew or could not have 
known of the lack of conformity. The first situation regards 
those cases in which the buyer insisted on perfect goods. Even 
if the buyer was aware of the lack of conformity upon conclu-
sion of the contract, the seller will be expected to remove the 
                                                            
278 Prof. Schlechtriem calls for a “corrective interpretation” of the  
contract according to Article 8(3) CISG “by which the contractual  
description loses its character as an obligation.” See SCHLECHTRIEM, supra  
note 106, at 6. 
279 See SCHLECHTRIEM & BUTLER supra note 5, at 121. 
280 Cf. W. A. ACHILLES, KOMMENTAR ZUM UN-
KAUFRECHTSÜBEREINKOMMEN (CISG) 99 (Luchterhand, Neuwied, 2000). 
281 Id. at  para. 0 – 2.1 History of the provision. 
282 See BIANCA & BONELL, supra note 8, at 279. 
283 See SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, supra note 12, at 588. 
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defects if the buyer expressly requested faultless quality.284  
The second situation regards those cases in which the sell-
er fraudulently misinterpreted the qualities of the goods to be 
better than what they actually were or deliberately concealed a 
defect.285 The seller will have to bear the responsibility for the 
lack of conformity as a “buyer who is unaware of a defect mere-
ly on account of his gross negligence seems to be more worthy 
of protection than a seller who deliberately sets out to deceive 
the buyer.”286 This exception to Article 35(3) was first present-
ed by the Appellate Court of Koln in the Used Car case.287 An 
Italian seller and a German buyer, both car dealers, entered in-
to a contract for the sale of a used car. The documents indicat-
ed that the contracted car was licensed in 1992 and the odome-
ter288 displayed a low mileage. Once the car had been resold, 
the final customer started an action against the German car 
dealer when it discovered that the car had actually been li-
censed in 1990, and the mileage was higher than what was 
displayed in the odometer. After having paid the damages to its 
customers, the buyer brought an action against the Italian sell-
er claiming reimbursement of the damages paid due to the car’s 
lack of conformity. The Oberlandesgericht of Koln stated that:  
“It has to be inferred from the basic idea of Article (40) CISG, 
whereby a seller is not entitled to rely on the conduct of the buyer 
if the seller is to blame more, in connection with Article 7(1) 
CISG, that in case of a fraudulent conduct of the [seller], the 
[seller] has to accept responsibility even if the [buyer] could not 
be unaware of the non-conformity. […] Even a grossly negligent 
unknowing buyer appears to be more protection-worthy than a 
seller acting fraudulently. Consequently, when there is fraudu-
lent conduct of the seller, the inapplicability of Art. 35(3) CISG 
follows from Art. 40 in connection with Art. 7(1) CISG.”289 
                                                            
284 Cf. B. PILTZ, INTERNATIONALES KAUFRECHT: DAS UN-KAUFRECHT IN  
PRAXISORIENTIERTER DARSTELLUNG para. 5-53 (Verlag C.H. Bec, Munich, 
1993). See also ENDERLEIN & MASKOW, supra note 158, at 149. 
285 See HUBER & MULLIS, supra note 51, at 143. 
286 Poikela, supra note 34, at para. 5.6. 
287 See Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Provincial Court of Appeal]  May 21, 
1996, No. 22 U 4/96 [insert beginning page], 1996 (Ger.), available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/960521g1.html. 
288 The odometer is the instrument which indicates the distance traveled 
by a vehicle. 
289 See Oberlandesgericht Koln[OLG] [Provincial Court of Appeal]  May 
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Similarly to the mechanism adopted in art. 40 CISG,290 the 
Appellate Court of Koln decided to deprive the seller in bad 
faith of a defense to which he would otherwise be entitled.291 
The underlying principle of this decision is that the seller 
should not be able to benefit from his fraudulent conduct.292  
3.1.1  Actual or presumed knowledge of the non-conformity 
The seller wishing to avoid liability on the grounds that 
the buyer either knew or could not have been unaware of the 
lack of conformity at the time of the conclusion of the contract, 
bears the heavy burden of proving the buyer’s actual or pre-
sumed knowledge.293 Demonstrating that the buyer was actu-
ally aware of the lack of conformity will never be an easy task. 
Other than the unlikely circumstance that the buyer directly 
admits they knew of the non-conformity, the seller will be able 
to prove the awareness only if the circumstances of the specific 
case contain an unequivocal indication in this respect.294 Given 
the difficulties related to demonstrating the buyer’s actual 
state of mind, the Convention allows the seller to invoke the 
exception provided by art. 35(3) also when the buyer “could not 
have been unaware” of the lack of conformity. This expression, 
also used in other provisions within the Convention,295 is in-
tended to lighten the seller’s burden of proof as it “is more diffi-
cult to demonstrate what a party knew than to establish what 
a party should have been aware of”.296 Indeed, although the 
                                                                                                                                     
21, 1996, No. 22 U 4/96 [insert beginning page], 1996 (Ger.) at para. 2. 
290 Art. 40 CISG; The seller is not entitled to rely on the provisions of arti-
cles 38 and 39 if the lack of conformity relates to facts of which he knew or 
could not have been unaware and which he did not disclose to the buyer. 
291 See S. Kuoppala, Examination of the Goods Under the CISG and the 
Finnish Sale of Goods Act, (Sept. 19, 2011) para. 4.8, available at 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/kuoppala.html#v. 
292 Cf. NEUMANN, supra note 115, at para. 9. 
293 AUDIT, supra note 47, at 101. 
294 HONNOLD, supra note 32, at 339. (Suggesting that the seller will have 
the hard task of proving “that facts that were before the eyes reached the 
mind.) 
295 See CISG arts. 8(1), 40, 42(1) and 42(2)(a). 
296 These were the words used by the Norwegian delegate, at the Vienna 
Diplomatic Conference to explain the difference between the two concepts. 
Mr. Rognlien also added that “ ‘could not have been unaware’ […] meant that 
a judge could not believe or accept, having regard for the circumstances 
which were in practice […], that a party had not been aware of the other par-
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apparent similarity between the facts a party “knows” and the 
facts a party “could not have been unaware” of, there is a slight 
difference between the two concepts.297 The conceptual distinc-
tion was debated at the Vienna Diplomatic Conference after 
the United Kingdom’s delegation proposed to eliminate from 
Art. 7 the phrase “could not have been unaware” alleging that 
it could not be distinguished from the notion of actual 
knowledge.298 After ample discussion, the Committee ultimate-
ly rejected the United Kingdom’s proposal by a large majori-
ty.299  
Even though the phrase “could not have been unaware” is 
often used within the Convention, it has never been precisely 
defined. What follows is that one must necessarily rely on 
scholarly writings to fully understand when the buyer could 
not have been unaware of a specific fact. Notwithstanding the 
differing approaches, all authors agree that the concept is re-
lated to negligence.300 The differences, however, arise when 
having to qualify the degree of negligence. While some believe 
that the buyer could not have been unaware of those facts 
which only a grossly negligent buyer would have missed,301 
others believe that more than gross negligence is required.302 
                                                                                                                                     
ty's intent. It contained a stricter criterion than "ought to have known" but 
one that was hardly less objective”. See United Nations Conference on Con-
tracts for International Sale of Goods, supra note 20, at 260 para. 6. 
297 In support of a distinction between the two concepts see C. Rauda and 
G. Etier, Warranty for Intellectual Property Rights in the International Sale of 
Goods, 4 VINDOBONA J. OF INT’L COMM. L. & ARB. 45 (2000). However, contra 
A. M. Shinn, Liabilities under Art. 42 of the U.N. Convention on the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods, 2 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 124 (1993). (Considering these 
two terms as “tautological.”) 
298 See United Nations Conference on Contracts for International Sale of 
Goods, supra note 20, at 259, para. 4 (reporting how the United Kingdom’s 
delegate, Miss O’Flynn argued that “it seemed to her that to say that a party 
"could not have been unaware" […] was to say that the party must have 
known.”) 
299 The proposal rejected by a vote of 7 in favor and 26 against. See Unit-
ed Nations Conference on Contracts for International Sale of Goods, supra 
note 20, at 88 para. 3(iii). 
300 Cf. V. Grosswald Curran, Cross References and Editorial Analysis – 
Article 40, available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/cross/cross-
40.html#$15.  
301 Cf. Magnus, supra note 184, at  para. 47. 
302 See HUBER and MULLIS, supra note 51, at 142 (recognizing that “Could 
not have been unaware” denotes more than mere negligence or even ‘gross’ 
negligence and requires something much closer to ‘blind eye’ recklessness.”) 
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Of the different solutions proposed, the one which seems to best 
fit this situation has been proposed by Professor John Honnold. 
According to his position, “an obligation based on facts of which 
one ‘could not have been unaware’ does not impose a duty to 
investigate — these are the facts that are before the eyes of one 
who can see”.303 What follows is that the seller willing to rely 
on art. 35(3), will simply have to demonstrate that the lack of 
conformity was “before the eye” the buyer. In evaluating 
whether the buyer was in the position to “see” the non-
conformity, the seller will not solely rely on purely objective 
standards but may also consider the circumstances of the spe-
cific case.304 
3.1.2  Becoming aware of the lack of conformity 
Although there are no limits to the ways the buyer can ac-
quire the knowledge of the non-conformity, there are three sit-
uations which are considered the most likely to occur. In the 
first case, the buyer might discover the lack of conformity by 
carrying out an examination before the contract has been con-
cluded. In the second case, the buyer will realize that the goods 
are defective as a result of something the seller told him. In the 
last case, the non-conformity can be implied by analyzing the 
circumstances of the specific case.   
Starting from the first of the three possible scenarios, it 
must be underlined that the Convention does not impose upon 
the buyer a duty to examine the goods before entering into the 
contract.305 As the choice on whether or not to carry out an in-
spection is left to the sole will of the buyer, the seller will not 
escape liability for lack of conformity merely by offering an op-
portunity to examine the goods: for art. 35(3) to apply, the buy-
er has to carry out an inspection.306 Once the buyer decides to 
                                                            
303 See HONNOLD, supra note 32, at §229(a). 
304 Cf. J. Ghestin, ‘Les obligations du vendeur’ in LA CONVENTION DE 
VIENNE SUR LA VENTE INTERNATIONALE ET LES INCOTERMS, 100 (Y. Derains and 
J. Ghestin eds. 1990). 
305 See R. F. Henschel, Creation of Rules in National and International 
Business Law: A Non-National, Analytical-Synthetic Comparative Method in 
SHARING INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW ACROSS NATIONAL BOUNDARIES: 
FESTSCHRIFT FOR ALBERT H. KRITZER ON THE OCCASION OF HIS EIGHTIETH 
BIRTHDAY 187 (C.B. Anderson and U.G. Schroeter ed., 2008). 
306 Cf. SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, supra note 12, at 587 (which, how-
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perform an examination, it will lose the right to claim the non-
conformity of the goods in respect of those defects which were 
either discovered or could not have been ignored when inspect-
ing the goods.307  For example, In the Second hand bulldozer 
case, an Italian seller and a Swiss buyer entered into a contract 
for the sale of a Caterpillar bulldozer.308 Prior to the conclusion 
of the contract, the buyer tested the bulldozer and requested 
the seller to substitute three defective parts. Once the product 
was delivered, however, the buyer filed a claim against the 
seller alleging the non-conformity of the goods. According to the 
Swiss Court of Appeal of Valais, the seller was not to be found 
liable for the non-conforming delivery. By inspecting the goods, 
the buyer became aware or, at least, could not have been una-
ware, of the bulldozer’s defectives.  
The second way in which the buyer is likely to acquire 
knowledge of the non-conformity is through a declaration of the 
seller. The seller will have to prove not only that the lack of 
conformity was communicated to the buyer, but also that, fol-
lowing this communication, any reasonable person in the same 
position as the buyer could not have been unaware of the lack 
of conformity. Moreover, where it is alleged that the buyer be-
came aware of the defects as a result of something brought to 
his attention by the seller, a general indication that the goods 
have defects, without a specification on the nature of the latter, 
is considered as insufficient.309 Indeed, if the seller wishes to 
rely on the exception provided by art. 35(3) CISG, it must prove 
                                                                                                                                     
ever, recognizes that notwithstanding this general rule, there is at least one 
case in which the seller’s offer to inspect the goods suffices to exempt him 
from the conformity obligations: “If the seller combines the request to exam-
ine the goods with a reference to possible defects in the goods, then, in any 
event, the buyer loses his right under art. 35(3) in respect of defects which 
would have been obvious upon such an examination, even if he does not per-
form it.”)  
307 See LOOKOFSKY, supra note 31, at 95. See also BIANCA & BONELL, su-
pra note 8, at 279 (which also adds that under the same standard, when large 
quantities of goods are involved “it is often sufficient for the buyer to examine 
a small part of the goods, without checking the entire amount he is intending 
to buy. The buyer may reasonably expect that the defects not discovered in 
the examined part do not affect the rest of the goods.”) 
308 See excerpt from Tribunal Cantonal de Vaud, [Canton Appellate 
Court] Oct. 28, 1997, No. C1 97 167, (Switz.), available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/971028s1.html.  
309 See HUBER and MULLIS, supra note 51, at 143. 
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that the buyer was made aware of the precise nature of the de-
fect. 
Finally, the buyer could become aware of the lack of con-
formity by analyzing the circumstances of the specific case. Re-
gardless of whether the goods have been inspected or the seller 
communicated the lack of conformity, there are circumstances 
from which a reasonable buyer should deduce that the goods 
will not conform to the standards imposed by the Conven-
tion.310 If, for example, the price corresponds to what is gener-
ally paid for poor quality goods, the buyer cannot expect to re-
ceive high quality goods.311 Furthermore, if in the past the 
seller usually sold defective goods, the buyer should expect to 
receive non-conforming goods unless the contract specifically 
called for perfect goods.312 A case in which the buyer should 
have deduced the non-conformity from the quality of the past 
deliveries was the Hydraulic press case.313 The dispute in-
volved an Italian seller and a Chinese buyer who had conclud-
ed a contract for the sale of an Hydraulic press. Inspection re-
vealed defects that rendered the press unusable for its ordinary 
purposes. In the ensuing arbitration the Arbitral Tribunal re-
called how the previous year the buyer had purchased the same 
type of machine from the seller. As the same defects were also 
present in the previous product delivered, the tribunal conclud-
ed that the buyer “knew that the machine had these defects 
when concluding the sales contract for the machine involved in 
this case. However, the [Buyer] did not put this forward in the 
contract for this machine, which indicated that [it] accepted 
these defects.”314 The claim was therefore rejected in light of 
art. 35(3) as the buyer could not have been unaware of the lack 
of conformity.  
3.2 Failure to give notice of the non-conformity 
Art. 35(3) CISG is not the sole provision within the Con-
                                                            
310 See BIANCA & BONELL, supra note 8, at 279. 
311 See ENDERLEIN & MASKOW, supra note 158, at 149. 
312 See Poikela, supra note 34, at para. 5.6. 
313 See China International Economic & Trade Arbitration Commission 
(CIETAC), CISG Database, January 20, 1994, available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/940120c1.html. 
314 Id. at para. III(2). 
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vention to exclude the buyer’s possibility to take action against 
a non-conforming delivery. Art. 39 provides that the buyer “los-
es” the right to rely on lack of conformity unless the buyer noti-
fies the seller of the non-conformity within a reasonable time 
after he has discovered it or ought to have discovered it.315 Be-
fore delving into a brief analysis of this provision, what must be 
underlined, at the outset, is that even though both art. 35(3) 
and art. 39 exclude the seller’s liability in a case of non-
conforming goods, there is a conceptual difference between the 
two. Under art. 35(3), the buyer’s actual or supposed 
knowledge of the non-conformity excludes the seller’s liability. 
According to art. 39, instead, the seller’s liability is not exclud-
ed but rather the buyer loses “the right to assert any and all of 
the various remedies”316 otherwise provided under the Conven-
tion for the breach. In the one case, therefore, the seller’s liabil-
ity is excluded a priori while, in the other case, the seller is lia-
ble but the buyer is precluded from enforcing the remedies. 
3.2.1  Art. 39(1): communicating the defectiveness within a 
reasonable period of time  
The buyer’s obligation to notify the seller is designed to al-
low the seller to become aware of the non-conformity and, even-
tually, cure the defect or provide a substitute delivery. The big-
gest problem related to art. 39(1) CISG, is understanding what 
is intended by a “reasonable” time period to give notice. It is 
clear from the wording adopted, that the drafters of the CISG 
were willing to impose a flexible time period for notification 
that had to be determined in light of the circumstances of the 
specific case.317 This solution was considered the most suitable 
in light of the many different situations which the provision 
had to regulate. What was gained in terms of flexibility, how-
                                                            
315 See CISG, Art. 39. 
316 See LOOKOFSKY, supra note 31, at 105.  
317 This intention is confirmed by the words of the Working Group which 
clearly recognized that “for what is a "reasonable time" [is], of course, a ques-
tion that depend[s]on the circumstances of each case”. See United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law, Progress report of the Working 
Group on the International Sale of Goods on the work of its third session, 
held in Geneva from 17 to 28 January 1972, A/CN.9/62/Add.1, 87 para. 78, 
available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NL7/200/38/PDF/ 
NL720038.pdf?OpenElement.  
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ever, was lost in terms of uniformity.318 Indeed, by leaving the 
interpreter free to determine what is intended by a “reasona-
ble” period of time, there is a high risk of inconsistent applica-
tion given the different legal backgrounds of the legal opera-
tors. As the CISG does not provide any guideline, one must 
necessarily rely on scholarly opinions and international prac-
tice to better understand how art. 39(1) CISG should be ap-
plied.  
Notwithstanding the many contributions to this topic, the 
one which has received the greatest acceptance is Professor 
Schwenzer’s “Noble Month doctrine.”319 Starting from the basic 
assumption that in determining the period to give notice due 
consideration, is to be given to all relevant circumstances of the 
individual case (i.e. the nature of the goods, the remedies that 
are envisaged, the nature of the breach etc.), this theory sug-
gests that for “durable goods, in the absence of any special cir-
cumstances, one should accept at least one month as a rough 
average period for timely notice”.320 What greatly contributed 
to the diffusion of the “noble month” doctrine was the fact that 
the standard was applied by the German Bundesgerichtshof. 
The first time, shortly after the publication of the theory, the 
German Supreme court referred to it in the famous Mussels 
case.321 In that occasion, the 30 days period was defined as an 
acceptable “rough average” that took into account the different 
legal traditions. A few years later the Noble Month doctrine re-
ceived a stronger endorsement. In 1999, the German Supreme 
Court in the Machine for producing hygienic tissues case de-
fined the one month period as being "regelmässig," meaning 
regular or normal.322 From the German legal system,323 the 
                                                            
318 See Kuoppala, supra note 287, at para. 4.4.1.1 (recognizing that “The 
subjectivity of the term "reasonable" makes it flexible enough to be applied in 
different circumstances, but at the same time, it may turn out to be too im-
precise to ensure uniformity in its application.”) 
319 This theory was first presented in I. Schwenzer, Art. 39, in 
KOMMENTAR ZUM EINHEITLICHEN UN-KAUFRECHT 567 (P. Schlechtriem & C.H. 
Beck, 2d ed. 1995). 
320 I. Schwenzer, National Preconceptions that Endanger Uniformity, 19 
PACE INT’L L. REV. 112 (2007). 
321 See Bundesgerichtshof, [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], Mar. 8, 
1995, No. VIII ZR 159/94, (Ger.), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/ 
cisg/wais/db/cases2/950308g3.html.  
322 See Bundesgerichtshof, [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], Nov. 3, 1999, 
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“noble month” doctrine spread to the other CISG member 
states thanks to those Courts which, with the intent to promote 
uniformity in the interpretation of the Convention, relied on 
foreign case law.324 Although uniformity on this point is far 
from being reached,325 as of today the “noble month” doctrine 
seems a viable compromise which is flexible enough to cover all 
the specificities of an individual case.326 
According to art. 39(1) CISG, the reasonable period of time 
must be measured from the day the lack of conformity was ei-
ther discovered or ought to have been discovered. The Conven-
tion provides for two alternative starting periods both related 
to the discovery of the non-conforming delivery. 
Under the first option, the time period for notification 
starts running from the day in which the buyer actually discov-
ers the non-conformity. This day must not be confused with the 
day on which the goods were delivered. The two events may 
well occur on the same day, but they are considered separate. 
                                                                                                                                     
No. VIII ZR 287/98, (Ger.), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/9911 
0 
3g1.html. 
323 After the German Supreme Court endorsed the “noble month” lower 
courts started to apply it very frequently. See Oberlandesgericht Stuttgart 
[OLGST] [Provincial Court of Appeal], Aug. 21, 1995, No. 5 U 195/94 (Ger.), 
available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/950821g1.html; Amtsgericht 
Kehl [AG] [Petty District Court], Oct. 6, 1995, No. 3 C 925/93 (Ger.), available 
at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/951006g1.html; Amtsgericht Augsburg 
[AG] [Petty District Court], Jan. 26, 1996, No. 11 C 4004/95 (Ger.), available 
at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/960129g1.html.  
324 See Bundesgericht, [BGer] [Federal Supreme Court] Nov. 13, 2003, 
No. 4C. 198/2003/grl, (Switz.), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/ 
031113s1.html. 
325 Not only are there cases within the same German jurisdiction which 
contradict the 30 days standard (see e.g., Landgericht Frankfurt am Main 
[LG] [Regional Court] Apr. 11, 2005, No. 12/26 O 264/04, (Ger.), available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/050411g1.html. (Recognizing three weeks as 
not reasonable); There are also other courts (see Oberster Gerichtshof, [OGH] 
[Supreme Court] Oct. 15, 1998, No. 2 Ob 191/98x, (Austria), available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/981015a3.html. (Calling for a 14 day period) 
and scholars (see also  M. Karollus, Anmerkung zu BGH 8.3.1995, VIII ZR 
159/94 (UN-Kaufrecht: Vertragswidrigkeit der Ware -- Muscheln mit Cadmi-
umbelastung), (Juristische Rundschau, 1996) which firmly criticize this ap-
proach. 
326 Cf. C. B. Andersen, ‘Reasonable Time in Art. 39(1) of the CISG -- Is 
Art. 39(1) Truly a Uniform Provision?’ (1998) in PACE REVIEW OF THE 
CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS, para. 
VI.2, available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/andersen.html. 
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The reasoning behind this distinction is based on the will to 
protect the buyer. Suppose for example that a complex ma-
chine, although apparently conforming, has a defective ventila-
tion system that does not allow the engine to cool down. It is 
clear that such a defect would be noticeable only once the ma-
chine was fully installed and functioning. Suppose, moreover, 
that it takes around 2 months to install the machine. If the 
time to give notice started running from the day of delivery, the 
buyer would be precluded from relying on the lack of conformi-
ty as the reasonable period of time under Art. 39 CISG would 
have already expired. To avoid such unfair scenarios the draft-
ers of the CISG provided that the time would run from the time 
the buyer was aware of the non-conformity. This solution is 
certainly more in line with the principle of good faith in inter-
national trade, as the buyer can make a conscious choice on 
whether to keep or reject the goods only when it has full 
knowledge of their actual condition.   
The buyer’s awareness, however, is not the sole condition 
which affects the commencement of the time period to give no-
tice of the non-conformity. According to the second option pre-
sented in Art. 39 CISG, the reasonable period of time starts to 
run from the day on which the buyer “ought to have discovered” 
the lack of conformity. The intention behind this solution is to 
temper the “buyer friendly” approach adopted in the first op-
tion which, if taken to the extreme consequences, could lead to 
extremely unfair scenarios for the seller. This time, suppose 
that the parties entered into a contract for the sale of frozen 
fish. Suppose that the seller, instead of delivering the contrac-
tually agreed species, delivers a different species of fish. This 
defect is clearly visible just by opening a couple of boxes and 
inspecting a few samples of the product. Suppose, however, 
that the buyer decides to store the goods in its warehouse with-
out inspecting the product. Eventually, six months after deliv-
ery and one month before the expiration date of the product, 
the buyer opens the boxes and realizes that the goods fail to 
conform to the contract. If the time to give notice  started run-
ning only from the day of actual discovery of the non-
conformity, the buyer would be granted six months to notify a 
defect that could have been discovered upon delivery if only he 
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had carried out a reasonable inspection.327 It is clear that 
whether the buyer “ought to have discovered” the non-
conformity depends on the circumstances of the specific case 
and, in particular, on who the buyer is.328 What must be  
emphasized is the irrelevance of whether the buyer failed to 
discover the lack of conformity because it did not properly in-
spect the goods or because it did not inspect the goods at all; 
what matters is that the non-conformity was not discovered at 
the time when it could have been discovered.329 The Conven-
tion, therefore, fixes a presumptive date with a double intent: 
on the one side to push the buyer to inspect the goods and 
eventually activate the remedies in the shortest possible period 
of time, on the other side, to protect the seller from the nega-
tive consequences arising from claims filed long after the goods 
have been delivered. 
In order to preserve the right to rely on the lack of con-
formity, however, it is not sufficient that the buyer notifies the 
seller in time. According to Art. 39(1), the notice must specify 
the nature of the lack of conformity. In light of this provision, 
notifications reporting that the goods are of “bad quality”,330 
“defective in all parts”,331 or that they “do not conform to con-
tract specifications”332 have been found not to comply with the 
                                                            
327 Cf. CISG Advisory Council, Opinion No 2: Examination of the Goods 
and Notice of Non-Conformity: Articles 38 and 39 CISG DATABASE (2004), pa-
ra. 4.1, available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/CISG-AC-op2.html#1. 
328 See K. Sono in See BIANCA & BONELL, supra note 8, at 310, which jus-
tifies the need to have regard of the specific circumstances by recognizing 
that “there may be buyers who are at a particular disadvantage in respect to 
expert buyers when it comes to examining a technologically complicated ma-
chinery. In this situation, the buyer may need to employ a skilled examiner 
from a distant venue and therefore require a longer time period for the pro-
cess. The standard against which this necessity is judged will be that of «a 
reasonable person of the same kind».” 
329 Martin Karollus, Judicial Interpretation and Application of the CISG 
in Germany 1988-1994 CORNELL REV.  CONV. ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INT’L 
SALE OF GOODS, 69, Sept. 19, 2011, available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/ 
cisg/biblio/karollus.html#v. 
330 See N.V. Namur-Kreidverzekering v. N.V. Wesco, Rechtbank van 
koophandel Kortrijk, [Kh.] [Commece Tribunial], Dec. 16, 1996, No. A.R. 
4328/93 (Belg.), available at 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cases/961216b1.html. 
331 See Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt [OLG] Apr. 20, 1994, No. 13 U 51/93 
(Ger.), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cases/940420g1.html. 
332 See Handelsgericht Zürich [HG] [Commercial Court] Nov. 30, 1998, 
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specification requirement set by art. 39 CISG. Considering that 
the reason for the notice is to allow the seller to take appropri-
ate action against the non-conformity, imposing upon the buyer 
the burden of specifying the nature of the defect is consistent 
with the underlying principle of art. 39 CISG. Indeed, only if 
the seller is fully aware of the non-conformity will he be able to 
decide whether to examine the goods, repair them or make a 
substitute delivery.333  
3.2.2  Art. 39(2): the two year “cut-off” period 
Regardless of whether the buyer was aware or ought to 
have been aware of the lack of conformity, Art. 39(2) CISG pro-
vides a “cut-off” period of two years from the handing over be-
yond which the buyer loses its right to notify the alleged non-
conformity of the goods. Contrary to the choice adopted in the 
first paragraph, Art. 39(2) CISG suggests that the drafters de-
cided to sacrifice flexibility to guarantee certainty. Indeed, not 
only the time frame has not to be determined in light of the cir-
cumstances of the specific case, but also the starting date does 
not vary from case to case.  
According to the clear wording of the provision, the “cut-
off” period will start to run from the moment the goods have 
been “actually” handed over to the buyer. As clearly underlined 
by the Working Group, the word “actually” before “handing 
over” was inserted “in order to make it clear that the two-year 
time-limit begins at the time the buyer is in a position to exam-
ine the goods”.334 This means that time will start running from 
the date of physical handing over of the goods so to exclude the 
transit time from entering the “cut-off” period.335  
This provision becomes particularly relevant when dealing 
with “latent” defects, meaning those non-conformities that are 
not reasonably discoverable through normal inspection. Under 
                                                                                                                                     
No. HG 930634/O, (Switz.), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cases/ 
981130s1.html. 
333 Compare F. Ferrari, Tribunale di Vigevano: Specific Aspects of the 
CISG Uniformly Dealt With 20 J.L. & COM. 235, (2001), available at 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/ferrari6.html#vi. 
334 See United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, 1988 
Y.B. – Vol. XIX , 40, para. 63. 
335 See HONNOLD, supra note 32, at .   
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¶. (2), the buyer will be precluded from relying on the remedies 
provided for the non-conforming delivery even if it has not dis-
covered the non-conformity within the two years.336 Although 
apparently harsh on the buyer, two years was considered as a 
fair compromise which, on the one side, gave the buyer enough 
time to discover any defect but, on the other side, protected the 
seller from late claims of doubtful validity.337 
3.2.3  Exceptions to art. 39  
Art. 39 was one of the most debated provisions at the Vi-
enna Diplomatic Conference. Representatives of the least de-
veloped countries were profoundly dissatisfied with the drastic 
consequences related to the failure to give notice of the non-
conformity. Their main concern was that “traders in jurisdic-
tions which did not have a rule requiring notice to the seller 
might be unduly penalized, since they were not likely to be 
aware of the new requirement until it was too late”.338 Moreo-
ver, considering that many traders in developing countries are 
illiterate, these will often learn of the notice requirement only 
after having consulted a lawyer; by that moment the time to 
give notice under art. 39 could have already expired.339 With 
                                                            
336 See LOOKOFSKY, supra note 31, at 107, (stating that “a buyer who first 
discovers and gives notice of a latent defect after the expiration of this period 
(and who has not secured a guarantee which effectively extends the period) 
can claim no remedy, however 'undiscoverable' the non-conformity in ques-
tion might have been.”) 
337 On this point see Secretariat Commentary on article 37 of the 1978 
Draft (draft counterpart of CISG art. 39, para. 2 Commentary 5, available at 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/secomm/secomm-39.html affirming 
that:  
“Even though it is important to protect the buyer's right to rely on la-
tent defects which become evident only after a period of time has 
passed, it is also important to protect the seller against claims which 
arise long after the goods have been delivered. Claims made long after 
the goods have been delivered are often of doubtful validity and when 
the seller receives his first notice of such a contention at a late date, it 
would be difficult for him to obtain evidence as to the condition of the 
goods at the time of delivery, or to invoke the liability of a supplier from 
whom the seller may have obtained the goods or the materials for their 
manufacture.” 
338 United Nations Conference on Contracts for International Sale of 
Goods, supra note 20, at 320, para. 32. 
339 C. Date-Bah, The Convention on the International Sale of Goods from 
the Perspective of the Developing Countries, in LA VENDITA INTERNAZIONALE. 
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the intent to alleviate the severity of this provision, drafters of 
the Convention decided to introduce 3 exceptions: one which 
applies to the first paragraph, one which applies to the second 
paragraph and, finally, one which applies to art. 39 as a whole. 
The first exception, limited solely to the cases falling under 
art. 39(1) CISG, relieves the buyer from some detrimental ef-
fects which follow the failure to communicate the non-
conformity within a reasonable period of time.340 According to 
Art. 44,341 the buyer may reduce the purchase price or claim 
damages, except for loss of profit, if it can prove there was a 
reasonable excuse for his failure to give the required notice. 
The exception provided by Art. 44 was not present in the 1978 
Draft Convention submitted to the Diplomatic Conference. The 
provision derives from a joint proposal of Finland, Ghana, Ken-
ya, Nigeria, Pakistan and Sweden342 which tried to find a com-
promise between the need to protect the buyer and the necessi-
ty of a timely notice.343 To trigger the application of Art. 44, the 
buyer will have to prove the existence of “reasonable” excuse. 
What constitutes a “reasonable” excuse cannot be determined a 
priori but rather must be measured in light of the circumstanc-
                                                                                                                                     
LA CONVENZIONE DI VIENNA DELL’ 11 APRILE 1980 (Giuffrè, 1981), 48. 
340 HONNOLD, supra note 32, at 283. 
341 See CISG, supra note 5, at art. 44, which reads: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1) of article 39 and para-
graph (1) of article 43, the buyer may reduce the price in accordance 
with article 50 or claim damages, except for loss of profit, if he has a 
reasonable excuse for his failure to give the required notice. 
342 See Amendment A/CONF.97/C.I/L.204 in United Nations Conference 
on Contracts for International Sale of Goods – Official Records (1980), at 108, 
para. 7, proposing the following provision:  
“Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1) of article 37, para-
graph (2) of article 39 and paragraph (3) of article 40, the buyer may 
declare the price reduced in accordance with article 46 or claim damag-
es except for loss of profit if he has a reasonable excuse for his failure to 
give the required notice. However, the seller shall be entitled to set off, 
in any claim by the buyer pursuant to this paragraph any foreseeable 
financial loss caused him by the buyer's failure to give the notice." 
343 Mr. Date-Bah (Ghana), introduced the joint proposal explaining that 
“the sponsors had endeavored to draft a compromise under which a buyer 
who had a reasonable excuse for failure to give notice did not lose all his 
rights to rely on a lack of conformity, but which at the same time recognized 
that the requirement for due notice by the buyer was an important aspect of 
the seller's right to cure.” See United Nations Conference on Contracts for In-
ternational Sale of Goods, supra note 20 at 345, para. 1. 
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es of the specific case.344 In evaluating the specific circum-
stances, due regard is to be had to the interests pursued by 
each party in so far as they merit protection, the seriousness of 
the buyer's breach of duty, the type of the buyer's business, the 
nature of the goods and, eventually, the buyer’s lack of experi-
ence.345 It must be underlined, however, that the buyer who 
can provide a “reasonable” excuse for the tardy notification will 
not be treated as the buyer who notified the non-conformity in 
accordance with Art. 39(1). While the latter can invoke all the 
remedies provided by the CISG for non-conforming delivery, 
the former can solely request a reduction of the purchase price 
or claim damages, other than for loss of profit.346 Accordingly, 
the buyer will be precluded from avoiding the sales contract 
even if the breach were to be considered fundamental ex art. 
25. 
The second exception, recalled directly in Art. 39(2), is in-
tended to limit the application of the two year “cut-off” period. 
According to the wording of the provision, if this time limit is 
inconsistent with the contractual period of guarantee, art. 39(2) 
will not apply. Suppose, for example, that the seller guarantees 
the proper functioning of a machine for three years. In the ab-
sence of such an exception, if a defect were to be discovered in 
                                                            
344 See HONNOLD, supra note 32, at 283, affirming that “the use of the ex-
pression "reasonable excuse " indicates the applicability of more individual-
ized considerations than would otherwise be relevant under Article 39(1).” 
345 Cf. P. Huber in COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE 
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) (P. SCHLECHTRIEM ed., Oxford Univer-
sity Press 2d ed. 1998). 
346 It goes without saying that what the buyer claims will not always cor-
respond to what he will get. As correctly noted by Prof. Schlechtriem “even if 
the buyer has a "reasonable excuse" for not sending timely notice, it must 
still be determined whether his claim for damages may be reduced under Ar-
ticle 77 or whether his demand for a price reduction could be countered on 
the basis of Article 80. The seller might argue, for example, that he would 
have had an opportunity to cure the lack of conformity if he had been notified 
in a timely manner. Though notice cannot be regarded as a measure "reason-
able in the circumstances" under Article 77, even in cases where the buyer 
has a "reasonable excuse" in the sense of Article 44, the failure to examine the 
goods (which is not excusable on the basis of Article 44) might be the cause of 
increased damages. And the seller, on the basis of Article 80, could maintain 
that timely examination and notice would have permitted him to cure the de-
fects completely”. See P. Schlechtriem, Uniform Sales Law - The UN-
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (Manz, Vienna: 
1986) 71. 
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the third year, Art. 39 CISG would preclude the buyer from re-
lying on the lack of conformity even if the contractual guaran-
tee is still in force. This exception finds its roots in Art. 6, 
which recognizes the parties’ freedom to derogate from, or vary 
the effect of, any CISG provision. In light of the priority recog-
nized to party autonomy, the contractual clause guaranteeing 
performance for more than two years will override the gap-
filling two-year period in Article 39(2).347 An issue which still 
remains unclear is whether a contractual guarantee shorter 
than two years can be considered “inconsistent” with the “cut-
off” period.  
Although Art. 39 does not provide any indication on the 
point, Scholars are inclined to believe that the two year limit 
may not be reduced unless the parties derogate from it with an 
express contractual provision. A contractual clause guarantee-
ing the performance for less than two years will not, therefore, 
suffice to shorten such time frame.348 In support of such posi-
tion, it has been argued that “where the guarantee period is 
shorter than two years and where it […] guarantees a certain 
standard of performance for the short period […] the guarantee 
of certain standards […] may expire after the short period but 
claims for the original non-conformity will probably not expire 
until after the expiry of the two-year period”.349  
The third and last exception applying to art. 39 CISG as a 
whole, may be found in art. 40 CISG. The buyer who invokes 
the application of this provision to justify the failure to notify, 
must establish that the seller “knew or could not have been 
unaware” of the facts to which the lack of conformity relates. 
Art. 40 CISG, therefore, operates as a “safety valve” that re-
lieves the buyer from having to examine the goods or notify the 
non-conformity.350 The exception provided by art. 40 CISG is 
                                                            
347 See LOOKOFSKY, supra note 31, at 108. 
348 Cf. Secretariat Commentary on article 37 of the 1978 Draft (draft 
counterpart of CISG article 39), para. 7, available at  
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/secomm/secomm-39.html presenting 
examples indicating that a shorter, one-year guarantee would be unlikely to 
affect the two-year CISG limit. 
349 K. Sono in COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: THE 1980 
VIENNA SALES CONVENTION, supra note 8, at 312, available at 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/sono-bb39.html. 
350 See Alejandro M. Garro, The Buyer's "Safety Valve" Under Article 40: 
What is the Seller Supposed to Know and When? 25 J.L. & COM. 253 
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perfectly consistent with the ratio of the notification duty. The 
whole purpose of art. 39 CISG is to guarantee that the buyer 
informs the seller of any non-conformity within a reasonable 
period of time. However, when the lack of conformity is already 
known or could not have been ignored, the seller has no rea-
sonable basis to demand a notification informing him of what is 
already known.351 To trigger this exemption, the buyer bears 
the burden of proving that the seller was aware or could not 
have been unaware of the facts relating to the non-conformity. 
As for this first condition, where the buyer cannot prove the 
seller’s actual knowledge it may demonstrate that the defect 
was so obvious that no reasonable person in the same condition 
of the seller could have ignored it.352 The exception provided by 
art. 40, however, does not apply if the seller is able to demon-
strate that the lack of conformity was disclosed to the buyer. 
For this condition to be fulfilled, the seller's disclosure of the 
non-conformity must be express and straightforward; letting 
the buyer deduce that there is a risk that the goods may not 
conform to the contract would not suffice.353 Under art. 40, 
therefore, the burden of proof is equally allocated between buy-
er and seller: once the buyer has proved that the seller was 
aware or should have been aware of the non-conformity, it is up 
to the seller to show that the non-conformity was disclosed to 
the buyer. In conclusion what can be affirmed is that, in line 
with the principle of good faith in international trade,354 this 
exception is designed to avoid that the seller benefits from its 
own wrongdoing. In the absence of such a provision, a seller 
that was aware or could not have been unaware of a lack of 
conformity could eventually benefit from hiding this infor-
mation to the buyer.355 
                                                                                                                                     
(2005/2006), available at: 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/garro4.html 
351 See Secretariat Commentary on art. 37 of the 1978 Draft (draft coun-
terpart of CISG article 39), supra note 337, at para. 1. 
352 Cf. Heuzé, supra note 144, at 237. 
353 See Garro, supra note 350 at 255. 
354 C D. Ramos Muñoz, supra note 265 at para.  VII(B)(1). 
355 Cf. Kuoppala, supra note 291 at para. 4.8.  
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4. CONCLUSION 
The success of the United Nation Convention on Contracts 
for the International Sale of Goods can clearly be seen. From 
the initial 11 Contracting States, the CISG has now been rati-
fied in 80 countries thus becoming the law regulating a signifi-
cant percentage of the many international sales contracts con-
cluded every single day. Of the many factors that contributed 
to its success, a central role was certainly played by the provi-
sions regulating the conformity of the goods to the contract. 
The simple yet balanced structure achieved in art. 35 CISG not 
only guarantees an efficient allocation of responsibilities be-
tween buyers and sellers, but also allows economic operators 
coming from the most diverse legal and social backgrounds to 
easily understand the provision.  
Art. 35 CISG, however, went far beyond the initial expec-
tations. What started as a provision intended to regulate the 
conformity of the goods to the contract in international sales 
between professionals, ended up having a broader influence.356 
The most evident example of this strong influence can be found 
in the European Union Directive 1999/44 on certain aspects of 
the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees.357 When 
the European Commission had to lay down those rules regulat-
ing the conformity of the consumer goods to the contract, it ex-
pressly relied on the solutions adopted in art. 35 CISG. Indeed, 
rather than following the “Roman” tradition that distinguished 
the delivery of defective goods from the delivery of an aliud pro 
alio, it opted for the CISG’s “unitary” notion of non-conformity 
                                                            
356 The importance of the 1980 Vienna Convention was expressly recog-
nized by the European Parliament itself. In the Resolution on the approxima-
tion of civil and commercial Law of the Member States (see ‘Resolution of the 
European Parliament on the approximation of civil and commercial Law of 
the Member States’, COM (2001), para. J) it was clearly stated that “the 
United Nations Convention on contracts for the international sale of goods 
(CISG) could provide a basis for a future common body of law”. Moreover, the 
wide diffusion of the CISG amongst the different member states has pushed 
some scholars to consider the 1980 Vienna Convention as being acquis com-
munitaire, meaning a part of the common European Union body of law. See 
Pilar Perales Viscasillas, Late Payment Directive 200/35 and the CISG, 19 
PACE INT’L L. REV. 130, available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/ 
perales8.html#23. 
357 Council Directive 1999/44, 1999 O.J. (L 171/12) (EC). (Explaining cer-
tain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees).  
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according to which any difference between what has been con-
tracted and what has been delivered is considered a lack of con-
formity. Considering that the Directive had to be transposed 
within the single EU Member States, this choice forced all Eu-
ropean legislators to align their sales law to the model present-
ed in the CISG. 
The great success of these rules regulating the conformity 
of the goods to the contract is not a mere coincidence. There are 
two factors that undoubtedly contributed to the influence of the 
provision: the international character and the pragmatic ap-
proach. As for the first, it must never be forgotten that art. 35, 
alongside with the rest of the CISG, has been purposely drafted 
by scholars with different legal backgrounds. The result of this 
collaboration is a provision that is both independent from and 
compatible with any national legal system. Moving now to the 
second decisive factor, it can be noted that the conformity pro-
visions in art. 35 CISG are designed to be as simple and linear 
as possible. Contrary to the many legal texts that use complex 
technicalities, the drafters of the CISG created a set of rules 
that any economic operator, regardless of their cultural back-
ground, could easily understand and apply. Abandoning the 
complex distinctions between aliud pro alio and defective de-
livery in favor of a “unitary” notion of non-conformity, is cer-
tainly a clear demonstration of that intent.  
Thirty years after the introduction of the CISG, the goal of 
achieving uniformity in the field of international trade is no 
longer out of reach. The convergence which followed the diffu-
sion of the 1980 Vienna Convention brought legal systems 
which were once far apart, to adopt similar solutions. This is 
especially true when dealing with the issue of conformity of the 
goods to the contract and its exceptions. Indeed, many major 
legal systems, in primis the European ones, have revised their 
sales law relying on the provisions set out in art. 35 CISG. 
Achieving a common set of rules, however, is just one of the two 
steps that must be taken in the long road leading to uniformity 
in international trade. In order to achieve this ambitious goal, 
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, 
together with national regulators, must work to foster the uni-
form interpretation and application of common rules. It is un-
questionable that a truly uniform regulation of the conformity 
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of the goods to the contract will be attained only when legal op-
erators scattered around the globe will attribute the same 
meaning to the same provisions.  
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